Earlier quoted context omitted.
> A system based on math, software, and publicly available data would be accessible to independent audit and verification. So instead of trusting a few thousands (several thousands, in reality) and a system where you can literally walk in the place where they are counting votes and observe them, you'd rather trust a few tens of people to write the software and audit it? How does that follow? And this doesn't even tak…
> ...you'd rather trust a few tens of people to write the software and audit it? Of course not. All of the software should be open source, with multiple independent implementations, test suites, etc. And the data should be open to analysis by any number of people while preserving people's right to privacy (this is one of the hard parts). Most people have no any idea how electronic voting machines work today, so why d…
USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
271–280 of 390 posts
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#272Am I the only one still against network-based, and to a lesser extent electronic-based, voting? It's near impossible to rig or suppress a physical election without a lot of effort, but one person can DDoS an entire network and no one can vote and the whole election needs to be scrapped. Not even the strongest cryptographic or software systems are free from exploits (especially over time) and there's no way to be sure…
You are not the only one. However I don't think security is even a relevant concern, because there is one much more fundamental flaw in all electronic voting systems: The goal of voting is to produce agreeable consent — so it doesn't really matter how you organise voting, as long as everybody afterwards can agree who won, who lost and by how much. So phrased differently, one of the most important properties of any vo…
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
> ...you'd rather trust a few tens of people to write the software and audit it? Of course not. All of the software should be open source, with multiple independent implementations, test suites, etc. And the data should be open to analysis by any number of people while preserving people's right to privacy (this is one of the hard parts). Most people have no any idea how electronic voting machines work today, so why d…
This is bull. You can be one of the people who does the counting or you can watch it take place. There should be no electronic voting machines involved, that's the whole point of having a manual system. That allows basically anyone who wants to, including a hypothetical five year old, to verify that the system is working as intended. Your system relies on me going out and getting a PhD in cryptography to verify that…
Do you really think paper ballots have not been used to rig elections? Because that's absurd given the current situation in Belarus and the long history of ballot tampering going back thousands of years.
Paper ballot counting is security theater. A system based on math and software could be provably secure.
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#274Earlier quoted context omitted.
The ballots are designed to accomodate the governments we have in place. We can't easily change the structure of national, state, and local governments. In California, one-ballot-per-contest would mean a voter would get a stack of up to 75 ballots on a presidential year.
Whereas currently they get a multi page document. Seriously, as logistical problems go, print separate ballots is really not a hard one and would cut down on the number if people who accidentally vote for the wrong candidate for the wrong thing. Counting may take longer. It may stretch over a few days. Well, fine. Count the presidential ballots first, announce the results and move on down the list until you get to th…
If you don't trust the tabulating machines, we have mechanisms to check them at scale. Basically, randomly sample the paper ballots and check them against the machine results. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk-limiting_audit
If you don't trust the people running elections, you should know that polling places in the US are run by community volunteers. Literally anyone who's a registered voter can participate and see how the sausage is made. In fact, there's a shortage of these folks, so boards of election are thrilled to get more people participating.
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#275Was this patent filed before or after the head of USPS was installed by the Dear Leader?
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#276So, we are making all the votes a matter of public record? It's either do that, or the voter is forced to blind trust whatever system is used to record their voter intent. To consider this problem properly, think about the problem a blind voter has with a ballot. They cannot see the record of their vote, when it's made by a mark. With a punch card, they cannot see the candidate associated with their record either. Th…
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#277Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nope, it relies on me being able to go to my local church Hall and watch the ballots being counted or take part in the count myself. All the parties in the election send their own representatives along to watch over the ballot and they also keep a running total. It is a process that I can verify is being carried out correct with my own eyes. Saying "citizens would be much better off not having to trust and be able to…
You can only observe a single ballot counting location, while there are hundreds or thousands to observe. Someone could be bribing people in dozens or hundreds of locations and there are lots of tricks to pull. You're not really verifying much at all by watching the counting process. It's really just a false sense of security. You actually have no idea if all the ballots are being counted, if they're all real ballots…
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#278Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Our entire field is bad at what we do. Our entire field is bad at what we do, because it's full of coders instead of engineers. Think about it. Building airplanes reliably has been figured out by aircraft engineers, building elevators safely has been figured out by building engineers, and building software reliably has been figured out by software _engineers_ (the NASA kind, who landed a spacecraft on the moon). Ho…
You mean like the 125m Mars orbiter lost due to engineers forgetting imperial/metric conversion? https://www.simscale.com/blog/2017/12/nasa-mars-climate-orbi...
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#279Earlier quoted context omitted.
is coercion really a threat on a large scale in the US (I'm sure in other countries it is). But if the onl way to know my vote is to have my random identifier, if I dispose of my random identifier, they can't know my vote. i.e. I feel we can both have total anonymity if a person desires, while also having verifiability. as an example: a random uuid is assigned to me and my votes are printed out on a slip of paper wit…
> is coercion really a threat on a large scale in the US No, largely because of the secret vote and the fact that there is no way anyone can verify how "you" voted after the fact. So you can lie to the thug threatening you with a wrench that you voted for "candidate A" and the thug has no way to know otherwise. > But if the onl way to know my vote is to have my random identifier, if I dispose of my random identifier,…
edit: or perhaps better, a random sampling were permitted to print out a proof of vote slip, but didn't have to. But if not chosen, you didn't get a proof of vote slip.
Now, in thinking it through, it might not help much. if someone can manipulate the voting machines, they can know who printed out their slips and manipulate the other votes. With that said, if done correctly, with a paper trail, I think it be difficult.
i.e. users are giving 1 or 2 outputs. piece 1 is a paper print out with a uuid and their votes that gets deposited in big box and counted as deposited. piece 2 that not everyone even has an option to get, can be kept. there has to be no way to distinguish the different piece 1s of those who get a piece 2 or not. If so, if everyone who got a piece 2 sees that their vote was recorded per the record they have, they can be confident that their vote was recorded correctly.
if their vote is not recorded correctly, they should have an anonymous mechanism to deposit their slips to make known that their vote was not recorded correctly. (hand waving at that, as unsure how to do that).
Re: USPS Files Patent for a Blockchain-Based Voting System
#280Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are not the only one. However I don't think security is even a relevant concern, because there is one much more fundamental flaw in all electronic voting systems: The goal of voting is to produce agreeable consent — so it doesn't really matter how you organise voting, as long as everybody afterwards can agree who won, who lost and by how much. So phrased differently, one of the most important properties of any vo…
Wouldn't a blockchain voting system help here, if everyone can examine the time, place, and votes in the history, and see that all the block hashes match what's expected? That gives much stronger guarantees than paper, and while the average Joe can't verify it himself, there would be three million programmers in the US alone who easily could. Whereas with paper I can't count the votes myself, I have to trust the auth…