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U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

reuters.com

211–220 of 260 posts

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#211
post #137

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or repurpose the existing second trim cutout switch... (AFAIK there are two, that used to serve different purposes, and are now both left in to keep the same type rating).

Yes! If this was available, at least the second crash seemed likely preventable given the timeline of events. I didn't read the timeline for the first one.

Relevant article:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein...

That would allow a pilot to put the plane in a configuration for which it is not certified to transport passengers, however, and the triggering thereof should always be deemed an emergency if we're going to take our regulations with any level of seriousness.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a funny anecdote, likely apocryphal, but still worth retelling because of the implied wisdom: When talking about the soon to be released Chinese passenger jet one of the principals of the company was overheard saying that he would never allow his family to board one of these aircraft, that's how bad they were. Some party bigwig overheard this and addressed the man: "I know 100% certain that this is going to…

Hmmmm. "This had better be the best thing ever, because since I heard that you expressed technical reservations you may be powerless to do anything about, and I have power over you, out of spite I'm going to put your entire family on a plane against your wishes, possibly regardless of your realistic capability to influence the outcome." There is no implied wisdom there besides "best not be the family of a principal i…

what it does however is it realigns the incentives of the C*O from meeting target deadlines to meeting target safety, especially in a culture where people are too afraid to speak up their concerns.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#214
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Triple is not needed, just double with a redundant "disagree" alarm. Once the pilot knows there's one bad AOA, they can lock out the bad one as an input to the autopilot/MCAS, or hand fly without automation. Of course this is all a bunch of new software and training though.

> they can lock out the bad one as an input to the MCAS The 737 MAX didn't support that as delivered. Even with the warning (which some US airlines paid for), you couldn't "lock out the bad one" even assuming you knew which one that was (you don't). All you could do is disable the electronic horizontal stabilizer completely, so that MCAS couldn't command it into a dangerous and unrecoverable state. MCAS has been fixe…

> Half measures are exactly how we got to this point

also they increased the maximum stabilizer angles mcas could command, the review/certification was done with a 0.6 cap (effective but not overwhelming) and on production it was increased on a whopping 2.5 degrees.

it was also meant to be using vertical acceleration to understand whether the plane was actually stalling, but that trigger was removed

it was also supposed to operate slowly enough to let people catch up with its operation and be able to disconnect it in case of a runaway trim, but the increased angle required to move the stabilizer faster

I don't know the exact English term for this kind of iterative failure of people communicating changes to each other assuming they are both fixing a problem, instead making it worse, but it's not just like they were doing half measures, they were each tuning their systems in silos, without considering cross system functionality from each system behavioral changes

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Deaths per billion: |Journeys | Hours | KM Bus| 4.3 | 11.1 | 0.4 Air| 117 | 30.8 | 0.05 That's really interesting. Per KM, air is way safer than bus, but per journey it's roughly the same degree in the other direction. I'm having a hard time saying which one is safer from that data. However, both are very, very safe. I would like to see "Air" replaced by "737 Max" though.

Huh? That's interesting! Don't tell me that when people tout the safety of air transport they're using deaths per billions of km rather than per (billions of) journeys. Journeys is the important metric, surely!

The median bus journeys is probably about 20 minutes long since intercity journeys are probably dwarfed in number by city busses, so I'm not sure per journey is the best metric here. Per hour or per KM seems better, or possible take a weighted average of all three.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#216
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> However the method, it's far more likely to injure you than flying on a 737 MAX. That depends. If you take a bus to go to the airport and it takes you an hour to get there, then your flight also lasts an hour (for simplicity's sake), you are almost 3 times more likely(on average) to die during the flight than you are during the bus ride [0]. In terms of number of journeys by plane and bus, for the same number of jo…

Measuring the risk of travel in terms of hours seems largely pointless, unless I'm missing something. It equates an hour bus ride with an hour plane ride, which are not interchangeable, so it makes sense that the associated risks are also not interchangeable. You could account for the additional time it takes to go on a bus to adjust for the longer duration of risk, but at that point it seems like you're just approxi…

If you're taking trip, you can reduce your likelihood of death by either choosing your transportation to and from the airports or choosing your airplane for the flight itself. Given how bad the crash rate of 737 MAX was, it would be prudent to focus on choice of airplane, rather than choice of grand transportation.

The correct comparison isn't "airplane vs. bus" it's "A320 instead of 737 MAX vs. bus instead of car".

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#217

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.

Yours is not a good argument. You can't assess this type of risk, let alone control it. Even if you are an aeronautical engineer, you won't convince me that you can assess these risks, because teams of aeronautical engineers designed this plane and did it overall very safely like they did the planes that came before it, and I'd have no reason to believe your claims. None of them assessed this level of risk as risky,…

No, these crashes, as well as the decisions that led up to them are evidence that the design process of the aircraft was flawed. This increases the probability that there might be other design flaws in the aircraft that will surface once it re-enters service. That's not bad juu-juu, it's just proper Bayesian statistics.

Note that the problems aren't specific to the 737 MAX either; I know commercial / cargo pilots who were worried by the 787 design process and would have been terrified to fly the plane in its first several years. They believe it was simply good luck that the 787 didn't experience any bigger issue than battery problems. Likewise, many pilots are worried that the 777X could have potential safety problems and want to avoid flying it.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> properly functioning (but awkward and confusing) MCAS systems It had almost unlimited pitch authority, used only one (potentially faulty) AOA indicator to decide to activate, and could activate repeatedly unless purposefully deactivated. Even the way in which it was certified was extremely suspect. I'm curious as to how you think that is "properly functioning". Its initial implementation was straight up dangerous,…

The EA pilots were given an Emergency Airworthiness Directive which gave a two step process for recovering from MCAS malfunction: 1. use the electric trim switches to drive the trim to normal 2. cut off the trim system with the console cutoff switches. That's it. As simple as that. And it is NOT what the EA pilots did (they cut off the trim first). Here are the exact directions: "Initially, higher control forces may…

https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/61203/what-is-t...

That article I think summarizes the state of the pilot error arguments back when people were still discussing this online. Two methods of disabling an out of control MCAS were mentioned but only one would actually work with a faulty AoA sensor: lowering the flaps. I wonder why Boeing did not mention just lowering the flaps to disable MCAS in an emergency situation. Could that also have saved the flights?

This is actually the first I've heard anyone mention the simple method of using the electric trim to fight MCAS until reaching a neutral trim and only then hitting CUTOFF, but would this still work if you were already at max trim and heading nose down toward the water? This method seems to depend on the electric trim being fast enough to fight MCAS to a neutral or near neutral trim even from a maxed trim stab position. Is it fast enough to do that?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-procedu...

>“It appears the flight crew reactivated electric trim,” former Boeing engineer Peter Lemme said. “But they only made a very small nose up adjustment - I would have expected them to immediately and without stopping move the stabilizer back into trim. The last MCAS command comes 5 seconds after their last manual trim command.”

This does appear very strange to me. Why let go of the electric trim before getting to neutral or even a bit nose up? Did they think the trim could only be used in small increments or something? Were they so focused on the mystery of what was causing the trim adjustments that they didn't think to just jam down the electric trim switch until trim neutralized?

https://projects.seattletimes.com/2019/boeing-737-max-12-pro...

Here is another good article that summarizes what happened. Seems to me that there are essentially 3 ways the flights could have been saved although I'm less sure about your method of just electric trimming to neutral and then hitting CUTOFF because the electric trim adjustment would have to be fast enough to overcome the MCAS counter-adjustments. Surely electric trim would not have been designed for such a race.

And also that seems like such an obvious thing to do even if you haven't read the airworthiness directive you cite. Something is messing with the trim. There is a button that adjusts trim ffs. Why not try to just hold it down? Even a child might think of that simple solution. But these pilots didn't? Some of them were even experienced.

The other two methods are lowering the flaps which seems to have worked well for them even if it was by accident or slowing down the plane and then hitting the CUTOFF switches and hoping you can spin the trim wheels fast enough. Probably the Ethiopian pilots were unaware of the airworthiness directive and reverted back to the standard runaway trim procedure without realizing their high speed would make the wheels more or less impossible to turn. I am not a pilot so I am not clear on how easy it is to slow down a plane that is already in the nose down position. Gravity is a harsh mistress.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#219
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Triple is not needed, just double with a redundant "disagree" alarm. Once the pilot knows there's one bad AOA, they can lock out the bad one as an input to the autopilot/MCAS, or hand fly without automation. Of course this is all a bunch of new software and training though.

How do you know which one is bad?

Strictly speaking, you cannot know which one is bad, but the correct reaction to bad AOA data is not to engage MCAS. The accidents were caused by MCAS activating on the input of a single defective AOA sensor.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#220

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah 2 out of 387 hull losses over 2 years is a pretty awful record. I will stick to not 737 MAX thanks.

My understanding is that the crashes were due to properly functioning (but awkward and confusing) MCAS systems. I have to imagine that any pilot flying a 737 MAX is going to have a very solid understanding of how that system works and how to tell if it's malfunctioning and avoid the same situation. Also, it was 2 crashes in 500,000 flights. It seems a little misleading to just compare it to hull losses.

Hull losses is a reasonable way to reason about relative risk of dying from spending your time on the plane. E.g. if you lived on one of the aircraft, you would have had a ~0.5% chance of dying during that time period. That's pretty terrible.
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