81–90 of 260 posts
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Given the amount of additional scrutiny these models are getting I wouldn’t be surprised if in the long run of their lifetime they have a better safety record.
I've been wondering about that, too. By the time they're allowed to fly, these might be the most heavily vetted and tested airliners in history.
This proposed AD would require installing new flight control computer (FCC) software, revising the existing Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to incorporate new and revised flight crew procedures, installing new MAX display system (MDS) software, changing the horizontal stabilizer trim wire routing installations, completing an angle of attack sensor system test, and performing an operational readiness flight. https://kokp…
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Even though this model has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record, the absolute level of risk is still pretty low. I knowingly expose myself to larger risks in my day-to-day life. So I won’t lose any sleep over booking a flight on this type of plane.
> has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record understatement...
They need to implement triple redundant AOA indicators. It's obscene that these failure modes are even possible much less approved. Knowing there is a disagreement just lets you know you are close to being fucked.
Triple is not needed, just double with a redundant "disagree" alarm. Once the pilot knows there's one bad AOA, they can lock out the bad one as an input to the autopilot/MCAS, or hand fly without automation. Of course this is all a bunch of new software and training though.
Given the option, would anyone choose to book a trip on one of these new Boeing aircraft rather than anything else? I know I wouldn't, my family wouldn't, and none of the friends or co-workers I've discussed this with would. Something tells me airlines are going to be making it even more difficult to determine which aircraft you'll be flying on when you book a ticket. As far as I know they're not required to tell you…
The DC10 had a phenomenal safety record after the initial crashes. There is a tremendous amount of incentive to ensure the MAX doesn't crash within the first 5 years after being recertified. I would definitely take a MAX when it becomes available again.
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> Do we know or is a reason to believe that FAA checked anything else then the MCAS and the systems related in the crashes? Yes. The FAA's proposal also involves physically re-routing some cables, which is (as far as I can tell) completely non-MCAS-related.
That seems to be related to a rule that FAA added after some other incident but the MAX was not forced to follow this new rule, it is not an issue that was discovered when scrutinizing the MAX.
> During the original design and certification of Boeing’s 737 MAX, company engineers didn’t notice that the electrical wiring doesn’t meet federal aviation regulations for safe wire separation. And the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to detect Boeing’s miss.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-f...
Boeing did try making the argument that since their 737-NG planes were produced prior to that rule, and they're safe, that the MAX shouldn't either. But it was part of the regulations when the MAX was designed.
They need to implement triple redundant AOA indicators. It's obscene that these failure modes are even possible much less approved. Knowing there is a disagreement just lets you know you are close to being fucked.
Triple is not needed, just double with a redundant "disagree" alarm. Once the pilot knows there's one bad AOA, they can lock out the bad one as an input to the autopilot/MCAS, or hand fly without automation. Of course this is all a bunch of new software and training though.
The 737 MAX didn't support that as delivered.
Even with the warning (which some US airlines paid for), you couldn't "lock out the bad one" even assuming you knew which one that was (you don't). All you could do is disable the electronic horizontal stabilizer completely, so that MCAS couldn't command it into a dangerous and unrecoverable state.
MCAS has been fixed, in the sense that it won't command continuously bad trim inputs until the aircraft is unrecoverable when bad AOA data is provided, but ultimately the aircraft either needs to be designed around trustworthy AOA data (i.e. triple) or you untrustworthy (i.e. double, even with the warning). Half measures are exactly how we got to this point, with two crashes.
Both answers are actually acceptable. A lot of completely safe aircraft have untrustworthy AOA inputs, the key there though is that automated systems are designed around that assumption. MCAS had too much flight authority to be linked to untrustworthy inputs.
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This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.
I would absolutely love to see a log of food you've eaten over the past few weeks.
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This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.
How are you getting to the airport? However the method, it's far more likely to injure you than flying on a 737 MAX.
Do you also think it's wrong if someone wants to eat a healthy dinner after having an unhealthy breakfast and lunch?
Given the upcoming Microsoft Flight Simulator 2020 release, I wish it could provide us non-commercial flyers with a simulation of the flight controls under the specific events that cause failure in the Max 737. I realize the subject isn't something a corporation would touch or code for, nor do they have a 737 in the lineup for 2020, but it would provide me with better understanding of the problem.
Given that the 737 isn't fly by wire the forces needed to operate the controls is something critical that a home sim isn't going to be able to model.
It's good that MCAS will now disable itself without having to disable the trim motors completely. I wish they'd just taken the hit on a new type rating and given up on MCAS completely after the failures. Perhaps new 737 pilots could get training on NG and MAX at the same time?
One thing I'm not seeing much discussion of today (though it was addressed in previous posts about the MAX) is the development process issues that led to the problems in the first place. Some blame it on post-McDonnell-Douglas-merger penny-pinching, non-engineer-indulging managers. Whatever it was, the investigation should have resulted in not just plane modifications, but company ones.