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U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

reuters.com

41–50 of 260 posts

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#41
post #6

Given the option, would anyone choose to book a trip on one of these new Boeing aircraft rather than anything else? I know I wouldn't, my family wouldn't, and none of the friends or co-workers I've discussed this with would. Something tells me airlines are going to be making it even more difficult to determine which aircraft you'll be flying on when you book a ticket. As far as I know they're not required to tell you…

Even though this model has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record, the absolute level of risk is still pretty low. I knowingly expose myself to larger risks in my day-to-day life. So I won’t lose any sleep over booking a flight on this type of plane.

> has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record

understatement...

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#43
post #8

Noob question here: Since, if I get this correctly, all these changes will require new pilot training, why is the MCAS still needed? My understanding was that this system was installed in order for the new plane to behave exactly like the old one therefore not requiring costly additional pilot training.

> why is the MCAS still needed?

Because Boeing and the FAA are talking out of both sides of their mouth. The planes aren't safe to fly without MCAS, MCAS is unreliable, so the solution is to disable MCAS whenever the plane determines it's best, even if it's going to be highly detrimental to safely operating. We still don't have ANY data on flying the planes safely without MCAS. We only have data on planes where MCAS fails, and those planes crashed.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#44
post #8

Noob question here: Since, if I get this correctly, all these changes will require new pilot training, why is the MCAS still needed? My understanding was that this system was installed in order for the new plane to behave exactly like the old one therefore not requiring costly additional pilot training.

Additional training != new type rating. Additional training may just be a couple hours of instruction. A new type rating would involve both ground school instruction and dozens of hours in a sim. It'd probably take a couple weeks to get a single pilot a new type rating.

However, the bottleneck is that there aren't very many sims worldwide, and most are owned by airlines that don't exactly have an incentive to get pilots other than their own trained.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It must feels like an entirely different aircraft No, if MCAS is disabled then the vast majority of the time it will fly just like normal. MCAS is only there to adjust flying characteristics when the wing is at a high angle of attack.

> only there to adjust flying characteristics when the wing is at a high angle of attack. No, that's a Boeing talking point. It's there to prevent the aircraft from stalling, not to 'adjust flying characteristics.' The nose pitches up during high thrust, MCAS kicks in to to counter what the pilot is doing (stick and thrust) so the plane doesn't stall.

All planes with low mounted engines (read: most current jet airliners) pitch up with increased thrust. It's not controversial, and pilots deal with it routinely. MCAS does not activate under normal flight conditions.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#46

Given the upcoming Microsoft Flight Simulator 2020 release, I wish it could provide us non-commercial flyers with a simulation of the flight controls under the specific events that cause failure in the Max 737. I realize the subject isn't something a corporation would touch or code for, nor do they have a 737 in the lineup for 2020, but it would provide me with better understanding of the problem.

Given that the 737 isn't fly by wire the forces needed to operate the controls is something critical that a home sim isn't going to be able to model.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#47
post #3

https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/19_035n-R3-8-3-20... > "To address the unsafe condition, the FAA proposes to require four design changes: (1) installing updated flight control software (with new control laws) for the FCC operational program software (OPS), (2) installing updated MDS display processing computer (DPC) software to generate an AOA disagree alert, (3) revising certain AFM flightcrew operating p…

> seems to amount to about 20 lines of code

it's sobering to think that 20 lines of code could potentially have saved 346 lives :/

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even though this model has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record, the absolute level of risk is still pretty low. I knowingly expose myself to larger risks in my day-to-day life. So I won’t lose any sleep over booking a flight on this type of plane.

This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.

Obviously you'd choose the safer plane if it's equally convenient. But if the absolute risk is low and there's no other plane at the same time, or the alternatives cost 2x as much, it's reasonable to be willing to fly on a more dangerous plane.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#49
post #8

Noob question here: Since, if I get this correctly, all these changes will require new pilot training, why is the MCAS still needed? My understanding was that this system was installed in order for the new plane to behave exactly like the old one therefore not requiring costly additional pilot training.

There are different types of training requirements.

New type rating requires most training. Then there transition training between same aircraft family. These changes are probably just small updates that require least training.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even though this model has big design flaws and a relatively bad safety record, the absolute level of risk is still pretty low. I knowingly expose myself to larger risks in my day-to-day life. So I won’t lose any sleep over booking a flight on this type of plane.

This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.

It is a good argument because you can control other risks, like commuting or whatever.
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