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Briar Project

briarproject.org

21–30 of 189 posts

Re: Briar Project

#21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In before someone suggests storing encrypted messages in a public blockchain. This is a really good overview of the challenges with these messaging systems. Store and forward has been our MO since email and Usenet were invented because always on always connected devices that aren’t restricted by some network obstacle are not really feasible or even desirable most of the time. I do wonder what alternatives we have to…

Do you have an opinion on Skype like centralised coordinator that then sets up P2P connections?

This really isn’t my field, I am more of a full stack developer who mostly works on web apps with a heavy interest in networking. So definitely not an authority on the subject.

I think that’s basically the sort of system that most places employ. It’s nice because it’s easy to set up but you really need to trust Skype. Say they actually try to use end to end encryption. How does that work? Well, you could say “I am Alice and I want to establish a connection to Bob. Here is my public key he can use to send me messages and I’d like his public key so I can send him his.” That of course would need to happen in addition to establishing a network connection. So no if Skype is a good actor they will pass my public key to Bob, get his and send it to me as well as coordinate us establishing a direct connection.

But what if Skype is a bad actor? Well they could take my public key and send Bob one of their own. Then they could also send me their own. Now they can listen in on my conversation. They can also in a similar fashion make it seem like I’m connected directly to Bob’s networked device but really just relay the connection through their servers. Neither Bob nor I would have any way of knowing that without having exchanged public keys prior and having verified them. So this system is basically insecure against Skype wanting to listen to my conversations or being compelled to do so by a state actor.

Re: Briar Project

#22
post #6

I've been looking for secure messengers during the last few weeks. I use WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. Telegram isn't very secure, WhatsApp is owned by Facebook and even Signal - while very secure - requires a cell phone number... Briar seems great in this regard but isn't available on iPhone and has no support for images, calls, voice messages, etc. Apparently they're going to support images and a desktop client,…

care to elaborate on how telegram is unsecure? Their fat bug bounty program yielded no security issues for years and I'm unaware of any issues with MTProto

Re: Briar Project

#24
post #6

I've been looking for secure messengers during the last few weeks. I use WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. Telegram isn't very secure, WhatsApp is owned by Facebook and even Signal - while very secure - requires a cell phone number... Briar seems great in this regard but isn't available on iPhone and has no support for images, calls, voice messages, etc. Apparently they're going to support images and a desktop client,…

Signal is working on getting rid of the cell # requirement, but it'll take a while.

Re: Briar Project

#25
post #6

I've been looking for secure messengers during the last few weeks. I use WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. Telegram isn't very secure, WhatsApp is owned by Facebook and even Signal - while very secure - requires a cell phone number... Briar seems great in this regard but isn't available on iPhone and has no support for images, calls, voice messages, etc. Apparently they're going to support images and a desktop client,…

also, very soon signal won't require a phone numbet as the PIN feature (what is present now for storage encryption) will be extended to serve as account ID

Re: Briar Project

#26

Now that I think about it, why aren't most messaging apps peer to peer? Shouldn't that be the standard? I mean it's literally the point of messages: sending from one person to another.

P2P requires both clients to be running at the same time in order to communicate. If you friend's phone is off and you send a message, they won't get it when they turn their phone on.

Seems to me like there should be a DHT way to solve this. When you boot up, you take your place in the table and query your neighbors for messages. If someone's unreachable when a message is sent, you hand the message to their neighbors to hold it until they appear.

Re: Briar Project

#27
post #6

I've been looking for secure messengers during the last few weeks. I use WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. Telegram isn't very secure, WhatsApp is owned by Facebook and even Signal - while very secure - requires a cell phone number... Briar seems great in this regard but isn't available on iPhone and has no support for images, calls, voice messages, etc. Apparently they're going to support images and a desktop client,…

Signal is working on getting rid of the cell # requirement, but it'll take a while.

It can't happen soon enough. I installed Signal a few years ago, and the first thing it did was notify a bunch of people I had in my contacts, that I was now using Signal...

...Including the unstable frenemy-guy who was only in my contacts so I'd recognize the number if he called and I'd know not to answer...

....who immediately PM'd me on Signal to push his latest delusion and make sure I didn't disagree.

Great, just great. For a privacy-focused product, that's a pretty colossal fuckup.

Re: Briar Project

#28
post #6

I've been looking for secure messengers during the last few weeks. I use WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. Telegram isn't very secure, WhatsApp is owned by Facebook and even Signal - while very secure - requires a cell phone number... Briar seems great in this regard but isn't available on iPhone and has no support for images, calls, voice messages, etc. Apparently they're going to support images and a desktop client,…

care to elaborate on how telegram is unsecure? Their fat bug bounty program yielded no security issues for years and I'm unaware of any issues with MTProto

Their server backend code is closed source and they're running custom crypto. Also groups and desktop clients don't support end-to-end encryption.

Re: Briar Project

#29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because: a) Often the intended recipient isn't online when the message is sent, and it may happen that there is never a time when both sender and recipient are online simultaneously (e.g. sender's device only turns on to send the occasional message, receiver's device is usually off but turns on occasionally to check if there are messages) b) Often one or both devices can only connect to, but can't be connected to (be…

Is IPv6 likely to be a practical solution to the router/NAT issue? Are routers assigning globally-routable IPs to their clients, is that already a thing?

IPv6 solves one of the reasons to use NAT. One more intractable reason is that many players (cellphone network operators, corporate networks) consider it a positive thing that individual devices are not globally accessible.

Re: Briar Project

#30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

P2P requires both clients to be running at the same time in order to communicate. If you friend's phone is off and you send a message, they won't get it when they turn their phone on.

Seems to me like there should be a DHT way to solve this. When you boot up, you take your place in the table and query your neighbors for messages. If someone's unreachable when a message is sent, you hand the message to their neighbors to hold it until they appear.

Which requires you to trust your neighbours. To which you might say: aha! Just use end to end encryption! And sure, you can. But at that point, what benefits are you getting over using E2E with a centralised system? Very few. And you’re getting a bunch of drawbacks in terms of reliability too.
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