Earlier quoted context omitted.
I work for a crypto currency company and it was the first time in my career that I was issued a YubiKey (I once had an RSA 2fa token for vpn access). It took some getting used to but now I just keep in on my keychain and I always have it with me. I need it for SSO, git, VPN, and basically all internal services. They aren't sufficient by themselves however, they don't protect from is malicious internal employees.
Preparing for malicious internal employees seems to me like preparing for "the big one," in the northwest. Do a cursory amount of preparation. Outside of basic measures, you're probably doing more harm to the business than good. The likelihood of internal malicious attackers is very low in the grand scheme of things, and the attack surface is huge. Most companies are going to be compromised by outside attackers—its t…
From a defense-in-depth perspective, agreed: most attacks involve privelege escalation on the inside as soon as they switch from attack vector to breach, even if just host-level, so teams should absolutely "assume breach". Attackers will phish folks, get on their devices, get root, and then have fun there and potentially elsewhere. Ransomware is a more common goal than what Twitter got hit with as it is easily profitable, and it means a takeover. Controls on what most users can do and the ability to scope & report is part of growing up (in the US). It's good Twitter was able to map the attack - I bet many popular social networks couldn't, esp outside of the US or non-top-10.
Shameless plug: A lot of folks use our tool for mapping network logs, and I always encourage to also map out host / app / cloud logs as well, such as logins and the oftentimes black hole that is winlogs.