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An update on our security incident

blog.twitter.com

11–20 of 245 posts

Re: An update on our security incident

#12
Freaking Twitter needs a serious auth infra upgrade. Unless phishers hijacked employee devices, they accessed the tools remotely, meaning there's no form of client authentication?? Something like U2F which by now is pretty old seems like it would prevent this kind of attack

Re: An update on our security incident

#13
post #5

Source (with more details): https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update... > The social engineering that occurred on July 15, 2020, targeted a small number of employees through a phone spear phishing attack. A successful attack required the attackers to obtain access to both our internal network as well as specific employee credentials that granted them access to our internal support tools. Not all o…

Why are internal employee tools publically accessible? Minimum they should require VPN access, but really go further with Zero Trust.

The blog post is vauge but definitely implies that a vpn was in place.

Re: An update on our security incident

#14

Are account support tools available off premises? I know nothing about security for big companies like Twitter but it seems like tools that enable you to post from any verified user (outside of Trump, someone here once mentioned he had additional account controls) should only be accessible from secure offices regardless of individual credentials.

That would probably not work well during the pandemic...

Re: An update on our security incident

#15
post #8

It is inexcusable that Twitter is employing people who are susceptible to social engineering attacks like this. This is simple training and seriousness.

It just takes one mistake to be spearfished.

I will freely admit that I fell for a phishing campaign. I’d just bought something on eBay (this was a while ago). I got an email about something in my account later that day that made it through my spam filters. I clicked on it, signed in, and then realized I’d done the deed. Nothing happened or was lost, but yes - it just takes one quick mistake.

Re: An update on our security incident

#17
post #5

Source (with more details): https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update... > The social engineering that occurred on July 15, 2020, targeted a small number of employees through a phone spear phishing attack. A successful attack required the attackers to obtain access to both our internal network as well as specific employee credentials that granted them access to our internal support tools. Not all o…

Why are internal employee tools publically accessible? Minimum they should require VPN access, but really go further with Zero Trust.

AFIK, in a Zero Trust Architecture a VPN is considered a perimeter and therefore it becomes a vector of attack to access systems of authoritative decision.

Many security researchers have already established that the benefits of a VPN especially in the modern distributed world are marginal at best.

Basically, yes a VPN makes you a tiny bit safer but it also adds a lot of networking complexity and adds more friction to the job of your employees. It also becomes an attack vector for malicious parties, since once they get VPN access they can theoretically access at least the first layer of protected resources.

So in layman's terms an attacker just needs to phish for VPN credentials, maybe steal an OTP token and they will have access to a non-trivial amount of network protected resources.

On the other hand if every service you use has its own authentication then the attacker needs to target each service and to know what services to attack they need knowledge that is possibly contained in another system that also requires authentication and is definitely not guaranteed for the attacker that all the systems will have the same password and/or have 2FA disabled.

Honestly, in my opinion VPNs are just an excuse to monitor traffic. This is a bit of cynical take, but I'm convinced that companies that use VPNs are more interested in seeing what goes in and out their network than in protecting their resources.

Re: An update on our security incident

#18
post #8

It is inexcusable that Twitter is employing people who are susceptible to social engineering attacks like this. This is simple training and seriousness.

Training that is notorious for being ineffective in practise and usually more about box ticking.

Assuming that none of your employees fall for phising, much less targeted phising, is woefully unrealistic. Especially at twitter's scale.

Assuming humans won't do stupid things 100% of the time is never an effective security control.

Re: An update on our security incident

#19
post #5

Source (with more details): https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update... > The social engineering that occurred on July 15, 2020, targeted a small number of employees through a phone spear phishing attack. A successful attack required the attackers to obtain access to both our internal network as well as specific employee credentials that granted them access to our internal support tools. Not all o…

Why are internal employee tools publically accessible? Minimum they should require VPN access, but really go further with Zero Trust.

What if the attackers phish the VPN credentials too? Does Zero Trust imply phishing-resistant credentials? What Twitter needed was phishing-resistant credentials (security keys, aka U2F).

Re: An update on our security incident

#20

They should require hardware security devices (dongles). Really Twitter should be ashamed of their poor internal security.

Dongles are rare here in the US. But I know that bloomberg uses them. I was shocked when I learned that retail banks in Singapore give everyone dongles to log in. In the US that's tyranny Lol
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