OK, so if I grasp this, the problem is that an EMV skimmer gets the card number and an iCVV. The bad guys make a stripe card with that number and the iCVV.
That should not work because banks are supposed to look for the iCVV only on dipped transactions, and look for the CVV on swiped transactions (and the CSC for online/telephone transactions).
Some banks apparently left out the logic of matching the type of code to the transaction method, and so using iCVV in place of CVV works for them.
Even if all banks got this right, though, it seems to me you could still get fraud. The CVV is only three digits. Once you've got the card number just make a stripe card and guess the CVV. If it fails, try another CVV. As long as you don't do too many guesses too close together and cause the bank to lock out the card, you should eventually find the right CVV.
Even if the bank is very trigger happy on fraud lockouts, if your skimmers got several thousand card numbers you are going to have many CVV guesses turn out to be right the first time.
Instead of the stripe on cards that have both EMV and stripe being just a copy of the same card that is in the EMV side of things, shouldn't they be separate? The issuing bank should issue two logical cards for the underlying account, with one being EMV only and one being stripe/online only.