81–90 of 204 posts
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Ask me if I will volunteer to give apple or google any more information than they already collect and my answer will always be no. I don't care what the reasoning. Germany did it right.
So they’d have to just force it then?
I'm surprised this isn't mentioned in the article or any comments, and I'm wondering whether I'm missing something about the significance of this. But I thought the biggest problem was that Google and Apple didn't build a contract tracing app - they built a framework for local governments to build apps on top of. This leaves the work of marketing the app and driving adoption to each government (as well as building an…
Ask me if I will volunteer to give apple or google any more information than they already collect and my answer will always be no. I don't care what the reasoning. Germany did it right.
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> there’s no particular need to build it off of their contact tracing platform Building surveillance off the contact-tracing platform would allow the three-letter agencies to track movement of a single device regardless of whether or not you try to sever its connection to the cellular network. You might be able to hide a single device from the network, but would you be able to hide all the other devices around you th…
> would allow the three-letter agencies to track movement of a single device regardless of whether or not you try to sever its connection to the cellular network They can do this without the contact tracing platform. Regarding PR, that too can be done very well without a contact tracing “success story”. Also, forcing people to unlock their devices is not an element of the the contact tracing platform. I’m not sure wh…
I'm surprised this isn't mentioned in the article or any comments, and I'm wondering whether I'm missing something about the significance of this. But I thought the biggest problem was that Google and Apple didn't build a contract tracing app - they built a framework for local governments to build apps on top of. This leaves the work of marketing the app and driving adoption to each government (as well as building an…
It's not that their privacy-centric approach was wrong (although this article details its major shortcomings), but the suppression of trial & error definitely was wrong.
Compounding this was Google-Apple's insistence that only government bodies can release exposure notification apps and you have a total absence of real innovation. It's no surprise that nothing has succeeded.
The whole debacle is a case study in the effect of gatekeepers on innovation. As manual contract tracing teams here in the US become overwhelmed, how many lives could have been saved by a successful exposure notification app?
Ignoring the headline, it seems like the article equates quick, widespread adoption of these apps as “success”, and anything else as “failure”. Although it does note: > Conventional contact tracing methods also haven’t been faring well. Despite this, it doesn’t even bother to identify the many reasons tracing apps might not be widely adopted yet, in particular privacy concerns (although it does mention that “draconia…
The vision of smartphone tracing apps in April was that they were going to be a cheap and low-manpower silver bullet for contact tracing. If all they represent is a slow, limited, and mildly effective supplement to normal contact tracing, I don't think they're worth the privacy concerns in the first place.
I'm surprised this isn't mentioned in the article or any comments, and I'm wondering whether I'm missing something about the significance of this. But I thought the biggest problem was that Google and Apple didn't build a contract tracing app - they built a framework for local governments to build apps on top of. This leaves the work of marketing the app and driving adoption to each government (as well as building an…
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Another difference is that you aren't using this data (which are collected anyway) to contain the epidemic. I can't figure out why.
My hopeful guess is that their APIs and policies make the data impossible to access in anything but an aggregated format.
They did release some results on peoples' movement patterns during the pandemic "lockdown" (https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/).
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Well, the Apple/Google mechanism is not useful for surveillance.
It is if you build Bluetooth scanners everywhere in a city and correlate the scan data with other surveillance data, as simple as pointing a camera at whoever passes by a scanner.
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The false choice here is actually that you can sacrifice lives and still expect to have freedom. The alternative to not giving up privacy for contact tracing or similar measures is to be locked into your home medieval style while the plague runs wild in the streets, which is a significantly stronger limitation of freedoms. The choice isn't between liberty or safety, just as it isn't between economic health and lockdo…
Locking yourself up for fear of a <1% chance of dying is very much a choice.