Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The real story here is Twitter's lack of spear-phishing training for their support staff, not support employees have access to support tools. Spear-phishing by its very definition is a highly targeted attack. I wouldn't count on any level of training to prevent someone from getting phished. Given some of the spear phishing campaigns I've seen, I wouldn't trust even myself not to fall for them. It's a problem that n…
FWIW, this is actually quantifiable. We contract with a firm that tests employees' response to spear phishing about once a quarter with varying degrees of "difficulty". Part of an overall scheme that also identifies people who blindly click on things for, uh, further email education.
The cynic in me reckons "Hell no! Those sorts of people are way too often _proud_ of their zero-thought blind clicking and lack of understanding of how things work"...