Earlier quoted context omitted.
Which "entitlement"? The one expressed in the idea that you owe nothing to others, or the one where others should expect something of you? Why is one "entitlement" and not the other? In either case, there is no logical fallacy present. And the question is independent to the question of freedom which is secondary to the question of moral constraint. Ie., establishing what is moral in our interactions with others (murd…
That comes down to a question of negative vs positive rights. To quote Bastiat: >> M. de Lamartine wrote me one day: "Your doctrine is only the half of my program; you have stopped at liberty; I go on to fraternity." I answered him: "The second half of your program will destroy the first half." And, in fact, it is quite impossible for me to separate the word "fraternity" from the word "voluntary." It is quite impossi…
Does "negative freedom" include "freedom from reprisals for murder" ?
Ie., in a society which maximises "negative freedom", is there no system of redress for murder?
I do not think a libertarian believe so. Rather they have a prior morality in which certain actions "deserve" a redress -- ie., you are owed punishment, or you owe a victim (of, say, theft) what you have stolen from them.
So everyone in this conversation both wishes to maximise negative and positive freedom. The only variable is the moral constraints we place on that maximum.
In the case of leftwing thought, one benefits from society in a way which creates obligations that are not fully "internalized" in market transactions. The positive externality of society is not accounted for: you owe something by being in society which, unpaid, would be theft.