331–340 of 831 posts
I am working on my own on a system that creates long lasting human relationships. It is a solution to loneliness. I used to run match.com's research division. I left to pursue this project.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you plan to insure that your digital identity system can be used for illegal/criminal purposes, such as aiding Jews and other undesirables in evading lawfully authorized detention and relocation (or by said undesirables for said evasion)? (I don't mean to single you out specifically; this is something that any digital identity system needs to deal with. And most of them enthusiastically don't.)
Why have you chosen to express this point in such a trollish way? We've already received complaints about it. It sounds like you're trying to say something about the danger of such systems being abused by the state in holocaust-like situations, but the wording is so odd that it's unclear what your real intent is.
I am legitimately confused by this question, since it does not appear trollish to me.
I chose to express it that way to emphasize that (some) abuses of a digital identity system would present as lawful actions by authorized law enforcement personnel, and (apparently too tacitly) that "holocaust-like situations" are not a qualitatively different operating regime that system can assume it is not in during 'normal' operation.
I was a bit worried that it would be percieved as overly confrontational (hence the second paragraph attempting to disclaim that), but I assume that's not what you mean by "trollish".
I’m working on a new way to talk online, with the goal of killing cancel culture, increasing understanding, and basically calming down current radicalization. Picture Reddit, but with the ability to anonymously share ideas with other people in your social circles. My theory is that most reasonable people stay off social media, so places like Twitter end up filled with unreasonable narcissists. At the same time, discu…
I think Google already tried it with circles
I hope this counts as weird enough ... PROBLEM: If time travelers from the future were to visit you, it would be difficult for them to quickly prove their authenticity. SOLUTION: Temporal passwords. At the start of each year, you devise a new password. You commit the password to memory, but you never write it down or divulge it to anyone until Dec. 31, when you submit it to the Temporal Password Registry, which publi…
I mean if this happened to me, my first thought would "who is this person and how did I got hacked?" which seems way more likely than being visited by someone from the future. Would prefer to wait for a confirmation such as telling me about what would happen on the next day.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You’re not wrong when you say it’s hard. I have been struggling with the problems you’ve brought up for awhile. Re:anonymous fb, I’m not going for exactly that but let’s imagine I was and consider the problem for a second of the homophobic/racist/etc Uncle. The simplest solution for not getting that content is to remove them from your list of contacts. But I also have a theory that this is where there could be a glob…
how will you remove the racist uncle if his content is anonymous?
I hope this counts as weird enough ... PROBLEM: If time travelers from the future were to visit you, it would be difficult for them to quickly prove their authenticity. SOLUTION: Temporal passwords. At the start of each year, you devise a new password. You commit the password to memory, but you never write it down or divulge it to anyone until Dec. 31, when you submit it to the Temporal Password Registry, which publi…
This has a big flaw. If the future visitors copy all passwords to a usb stick and take it with them then anyone in the present time that gets a copy can pretend to be from the future. Worse still, everyone would believe the phoney future visitors without question.
The idea is to assign a random 8 or 16 byte number (DdosID) to each connection. The DdosID is unrelated to any other identifier; like the HTTP3 connection id. The client puts the DdosID at the beginning of every UDP packets data section (raw; no encryption or compression.) Packets that have a valid DdosID are processed. Packets with an invalid DdosID are dropped. New connections use zero as the DdosID. Any client can use zero to re-establish a connection or if something goes wrong.
If attackers make random DdosIDs it will result in packets that are dropped before decryption. If a valid DdosID (or hundreds of valid DdosIDs) are used, the volume of packets with that DdosID will make the attack obvious, and the DdosID can be invalidated and the packets dropped.
Attackers will need to spam new connection attempts (DdosID zero) to deny service. New connection attempts could be dropped, or a small percentage allowed when the application can handle them. The rate of allowed new connection attempts could be adjusted very easily and quickly, but a high rate of bad packets would still deny new connections. Existing connections to continue to work.
The challenges are mostly creating functional thresholds: what packet volume is too high? how long is a DdosID valid? Should a load balancer record the IP and Port and to force a new DdosID if it changes?
I would also like to see a way that applications and load balancers can use a DdosID system without it being dependent on the specific application; DdosID should not depend on the protocol it's protecting.
Teaching machines to diagnose cancer, because without that, there's no way we are going to solve cancer generally. There just aren't enough pathologists. Harder that going to Mars, probably easier than world peace. Definitely involves an enormous amount of data. Like, a non-trivial fraction of world-wide storage.