"In Android 11, Scudo [1] replaces jemalloc as the default native allocator for Android. Scudo is a hardened memory allocator designed to help detect and mitigate memory corruption bugs in the heap" I am curious about the performance impact of this change. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo
I found this [0] 2019 blog post from what looks to be one of the people credited in the blog post (Kostya). It's not directly comparing Android+jemalloc vs Android+Scudo, but it does compare the two allocators and others. [0] http://expertmiami.blogspot.com/2019/05/what-is-scudo-harden...
System Hardening in Android 11
11–20 of 211 posts
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#12* apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage)
* apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query)
These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocked [1]. When this is enforced for all devices some apps, like the eBay app, won't run on unlocked devices anymore. I've always trusted CyanogenMod/LineageOS more then than a device manufacturer, but after >10 years of using Android I think it's finally time for me to switch to an iPhone.
[1] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/safetynet-api-client...
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#13In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#14In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#15Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#16In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…
What does external mean? SD card? or anything outside the app's own directory?
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#17In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…
Enforcing SafetyNet is probably also a net positive change, and you (and I) are a minority among the general user base. Sadly this was always coming, it was nice while it lasted, I guess.
I'm not quite sure what I will do once my current phone dies. I don't see myself investing in the Apple ecosphere, so either go with the time (do nothing) or have a second phone for "secure" apps (Banking, Netflix) etc.
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#18Earlier quoted context omitted.
I found this [0] 2019 blog post from what looks to be one of the people credited in the blog post (Kostya). It's not directly comparing Android+jemalloc vs Android+Scudo, but it does compare the two allocators and others. [0] http://expertmiami.blogspot.com/2019/05/what-is-scudo-harden...
So according to these figures, scudo is the best allocator out of all the options tested? That's pretty decent.
Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#19Re: System Hardening in Android 11
#20In addition on Android 11 API * apps can't simply access the "external" storage (enforces scoped storage) * apps can't get a list of all installed apps (package visibility, they can specify app names and intent signatures in the Manifest they want to query) These are welcome changes in my view, but unfortunately they also seem intend to fix SafetyNet and require hardware attestation that the bootloader is not unlocke…
Not a troll, I'm really curious.