Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yep, it’s so much better than just key files: keeps key material in a secure system (Secure Enclave), you know when a key is used (standard macOS security prompt), and requires a physical interaction (Touch ID) to use a key.
So, a non-portable YubiKey?
Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
101–109 of 109 posts
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#102Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, there are arguments against generating RSA keys with closed-source software (don't tell me that's all pure hardware in a smartcard). For one, generating keys that are vulnerable to something exotic is very much a viable threat, and yubikeys in particular had an issue where some accidentally created very weak keys. Sure, you need to make sure the key doesn't leak on it's way, but that's not really the issue.
> and yubikeys in particular had an issue where some accidentally created very weak keys. So did Debian between 2006 and 2008 https://certlogik.com/debian-weak-key-check/
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#103Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
Been using this since the beginning and it’s great. However, there has been no updates ever since they were acquired by Akamai. A bit worried it’ll suddenly stop working one day...
Thankfully (i believe) everything that goes into it is open source https://github.com/kryptco
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is a native way in .ssh/config. I just added a reply to a different post.
That only restricts the blast radius to one key. One is unawares of when, how, and for what purposes that key is used - as forwarding the key means it's available for use by any user process (as the mechanism behind the forwarding is user-owned) or root (as root can see everything). Touch-to-authorize helps mitigate that. If one seees the prompt come up when they've just performed a git pull, it's expected and likely…
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#106Cool but the enclave only supports the secp256r1 curve, whose coefficients are NSA chosen.
While I don‘t think that this is relevant for my personal thread scenarios, I think that this is unfortunate at least and Apple should change it with new hardware.
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#107I've been using a YubiKey device for SSH using yubikey-agent [0] and it's been great since it’s not possible to extract keys from hardware keys and the device is carried with me. The agent is also integrated with pinentry so it requires a pin code for the session. [0] https://github.com/FiloSottile/yubikey-agent
You don't even need the agent with the latest SSH versions, SSH can now use U2F natively, which is wonderful.
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, there are arguments against generating RSA keys with closed-source software (don't tell me that's all pure hardware in a smartcard). For one, generating keys that are vulnerable to something exotic is very much a viable threat, and yubikeys in particular had an issue where some accidentally created very weak keys. Sure, you need to make sure the key doesn't leak on it's way, but that's not really the issue.
> and yubikeys in particular had an issue where some accidentally created very weak keys. So did Debian between 2006 and 2008 https://certlogik.com/debian-weak-key-check/
Re: Secretive – macOS native app to store SSH keys in the Secure Enclave
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
> and yubikeys in particular had an issue where some accidentally created very weak keys. So did Debian between 2006 and 2008 https://certlogik.com/debian-weak-key-check/
Yes, but software is easier to fix and the problem is easier and more probable to find.