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State of Linux Desktop Security

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Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#41

Post by pjmlp »

woodruffw wrote: post #21

I think the author is generally right (especially about sandboxing!), but picked a few funny examples: * Windows page signing is a feature of Authenticode, and applies specifically to "high integrity" kernel drivers. It's basically a niche of normal code signing and should be treated as such. * Windows just (as in, within the last 6 months) got hardware-backed control flow protection, via Intel CET. They had to add a…

On Android side of the mobile OS fence, Google is now enforcing ARM memory mitigations starting with Android 11 and it builds up on the OS lockdown features that they have been adding since Android 7.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#42

Post by kanox »

sprash wrote: post #39

People rarely run untrusted software on FOSS systems. If you can't trust your package manager and your distrobution you have all kinds of problems the least of which is sandboxing applications. The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account. The notion that every application must be 100% sandboxed is mostly security theater and will make your life wit…

> The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account.

Do you also run a separate display server? I'm not convinced a truly malicious executable can be stopped by boundaries between users.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#43

Post by pjmlp »

izacus wrote: post #38
pjmlp wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which is why 98% of the desktop and mobile users don't care about Linux. That is the price to pay when only technical minded users are the target group.

And that's ok, there's nothing wrong with tools being specialised for certain small markets. It makes them significantly better for those people than being forced to use a ill fitting tool for someone else. Consolidation and lack of competition makes for a worse experience.

I really don't see what better experience does having all of this https://distrowatch.com/ for those 2% provides.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#44

Post by tsimionescu »

alcoholic_byte wrote: post #6

Well. The principle of Linux was and still is to give tools and have users use them. It gets out of the users way to use them. One can always use firejail or other sandboxing solutions to do that. Chrome itself is a security nightmare, always with the mic on and listening. Microsoft and Apple also have CVEs unattended. Binary checks before starting a program? Why I have a package-manager that does the checks. Untrust…

While I think you are right to some extent, articles like the parent's are mostly aimed at people claiming 'Linux Desktop is actually better for grandma'. The reality is that grandma is going to be better protected while running Windows or MacOS or Chrome OS. If she's running Linux, she is wide open.

Also, some of the most common practices on Linux that are claimed to be superior from a security standpoint are just bad. For example, the package manager is very nice, but when you want to install anything that is not in the official repos, your options get just as bad as windows, or worse, despite what many people think. A common recommendation in advanced projects is to add their apt/yum repo to your system, which is not only equivalent to downloading stuff off the internet, it is also you registering them as trusted to deliver updates to your system forever. On Windows, you at least have some anti-virus tool scanning for known malware, so you still have a small chance that you won't be allowed to run some well known malware from years ago.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#45

Post by RMPR »

gizmo686 wrote: post #15
29athrowaway wrote: post #7

What about SELinux or AppArmor?

I made a post about that here [0]. I don't think anyone is seriously applying those to a desktop system. They are both based on the Linux Security Module subsystem; which is just too low level to be effective at desktop security. Essentially, they suffer from the same problem as traditional UNIX permissions: no one cares that the attacker cannot access system files. The user's bank account is in their home directory.…

At least they won't be able to install drivers[0]

0: https://xkcd.com/1200/

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#46

Post by sprash »

RMPR wrote: post #36

>Any app running under Xorg can see the contents of any other app runing under Xorg. It's one of the problems addressed by Wayland

Xorg already provides a full suite of security protocols that allow fine grained control over every aspect of any application down to the single pixmap via access control hooks.

The fact that nobody really uses them should tell you that the sandboxing craze and whitelisting is mostly if not completely security theater and hostile to the general workflow typical for Desktop applications.

Wayland addresses none of those problems. Wayland is merely just a protocol that can be used to blit some bitmaps together. The protocol says nothing about security except that those problems should be dealt with other protocols which are not part of Wayland.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#48

Post by sprash »

kanox wrote: post #42
sprash wrote: post #39

People rarely run untrusted software on FOSS systems. If you can't trust your package manager and your distrobution you have all kinds of problems the least of which is sandboxing applications. The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account. The notion that every application must be 100% sandboxed is mostly security theater and will make your life wit…

> The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account. Do you also run a separate display server? I'm not convinced a truly malicious executable can be stopped by boundaries between users.

Yes, I run those programs in a separate Xorg session. If I need it on the same session I simply spin up a Xephyr window.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#49

Post by lifty »

tsimionescu wrote: post #44
alcoholic_byte wrote: post #6

Well. The principle of Linux was and still is to give tools and have users use them. It gets out of the users way to use them. One can always use firejail or other sandboxing solutions to do that. Chrome itself is a security nightmare, always with the mic on and listening. Microsoft and Apple also have CVEs unattended. Binary checks before starting a program? Why I have a package-manager that does the checks. Untrust…

While I think you are right to some extent, articles like the parent's are mostly aimed at people claiming 'Linux Desktop is actually better for grandma'. The reality is that grandma is going to be better protected while running Windows or MacOS or Chrome OS. If she's running Linux, she is wide open. Also, some of the most common practices on Linux that are claimed to be superior from a security standpoint are just b…

The external provided software repos are one thing I find superior on Linux, compared to macOS and Windows. It gives you an OS managed way to do updates to 3rd party providers, as opposed to each app shipping their own update code, many times running as a background daemon. On macOS, the situation for apps outside of the app store is a ghetto. Not sure about Windows as I don’t use it often, but I suspect it’s similar to macOS.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#50

Post by lifty »

sprash wrote: post #48
kanox wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account. Do you also run a separate display server? I'm not convinced a truly malicious executable can be stopped by boundaries between users.

Yes, I run those programs in a separate Xorg session. If I need it on the same session I simply spin up a Xephyr window.

Sounds like a hassle. You might as well run it on a separate computer, at least you will be able to use them at the same time. I would prefer better app isolation so I can run everything with the same user, but still hold the apps accountable for what they are doing. OS’s have been designed when the computing paradigm was “computer as large as a building shared by 20 people that write their own software”. That paradigm has changed and the application landscape makes it that we have to use apps from people we don’t know and we can’t reach. We have to make their apps accountable.
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