91–100 of 194 posts
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It's just a lot of pointless outrage about nothing by a couple of people who need to feel they're accomplishing something. Sadly companies seem to follow them as to avoid being targeted by social media 'shitstorms'.
I was hoping that as a non-native speaker I might have missed some point of nuance somewhere.
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It makes absolutely no sense. Such highly valuable secrets are usually saved using Shamir's secret sharing with parts of the split secret held by people unlikely to collude. Key ceremonies are done in a way that at no point a human being is in position to single-handedly extract the secret from its HSM. This is a huge failure.
Interesting.. What Open source tools do you use for this? I would love to read further how I can not have a printed copy of a master key in a safety deposit box.
https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/
They have a page for each signing ceremony:
https://www.iana.org/dnssec/ceremonies/41
With a script of everything done:
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What surprises me is that you can extract the private key at all - I would expect it to be firmly inside a HSM, that only accepts signing requests and the key never leaves the module & the HSM wipes the key if it detects tampering (there is usually a battery inside to power the tampering detection even if the device is not plugged in). So just exporting the private key so easily without some pretty involved hight-tec…
I worked on a new internal PKI, nothing as high stakes as banking, but we did have a security consultant who had been around the block. We did, of course, purchase such HSMs and design a signing ceremony. But in his opinion it was also normal and expected to keep a decryptable copy of the private key, in case of e.g. changing HSM vendors. It would be even less accessible, but it would exist.
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Don't forget the TSA travel master keys, which can now be 3-D printed by anyone using this repo: https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
Simply put: putting anything you can't replace into checked luggage is foolish. The TSA is a lot more likely to steal your stuff than some random person with a printed key. Plus, if you use a real lock, they have the right to clip it off, which is trivial. Don't put stuff of value into checked luggage. Keep it on your person or ship it via a carrier who has insurance.
Life hack: you can pack a stripped AR lower, and it's legally a firearm. You must use a non-TSA lock, and the TSA (nominally) is not allowed to open it.
Though your core point is valid: your nylon luggage isn't going to keep anyone determined out.
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Don't forget the TSA travel master keys, which can now be 3-D printed by anyone using this repo: https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
Simply put: putting anything you can't replace into checked luggage is foolish. The TSA is a lot more likely to steal your stuff than some random person with a printed key. Plus, if you use a real lock, they have the right to clip it off, which is trivial. Don't put stuff of value into checked luggage. Keep it on your person or ship it via a carrier who has insurance.
But unless you travel with valuables quite often it is definitely cheaper to ship it insured.
>The breach resulted from the printing of the bank's encrypted master key in plain, unencrypted digital language at the Postbank's old data centre in the Pretoria city centre I can't read anymore. Is there anymore technical explanation? Was it actually 'printed' ... on paper? Was it even an actual encryption key or just a password or something?
What it means is that the master secret in the HSM is probably a 128bit AES key. The ways to generate this depend on the ceremony and the particular HSM, but the risk I have encountered in security consulting is the question of whether that master secret itself was just derived from simple components, like pbkdf2("secret phrase known to 3 people", 1000)
The consequence of compromising that key is that an attacker could use it to forge cards, or more usefully, instantiate a virtual card in software to fuzz cryptograms for different account numbers to get available balance information and then personalize cards for those.
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It makes absolutely no sense. Such highly valuable secrets are usually saved using Shamir's secret sharing with parts of the split secret held by people unlikely to collude. Key ceremonies are done in a way that at no point a human being is in position to single-handedly extract the secret from its HSM. This is a huge failure.
What surprises me is that you can extract the private key at all - I would expect it to be firmly inside a HSM, that only accepts signing requests and the key never leaves the module & the HSM wipes the key if it detects tampering (there is usually a battery inside to power the tampering detection even if the device is not plugged in). So just exporting the private key so easily without some pretty involved hight-tec…
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South Africa has insane levels of graft and corruption that have been going on for decades. They also have a lot of politically motivated assassinations. Total basket case of a country.
1. Most of the graft and corruption has been going on at least 7 decades. i.e. Long before the ANC government. 2. "politically motivated assasinations"? Citation wanted, please.
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It makes absolutely no sense. Such highly valuable secrets are usually saved using Shamir's secret sharing with parts of the split secret held by people unlikely to collude. Key ceremonies are done in a way that at no point a human being is in position to single-handedly extract the secret from its HSM. This is a huge failure.
Interesting.. What Open source tools do you use for this? I would love to read further how I can not have a printed copy of a master key in a safety deposit box.
Having access to something as insanely valuable as a bank 'master key' puts the employees at risk of blackmail, extortion, etc.
That's why you have HSMs, key ceremonies, Shamir's secret sharing etc. It's not just for trust, it's also for protection of those involved.
Unauthorized wire transfers can be undone, or covered by insurance. Loss of life cannot.