As someone who has had to teach grumpy old high school teachers how to not fall for phishing and mitm attacks, I really can't see the problem here.
The way I used to teach was very simple and very effective: there are 3 parts to a URL - the first part tells you if the connection is secure, the second part tells you who you're connected to and the third part tells you where on that site you are. The first part needs to be httpS, the second part needs to be the site you're expecting and the third you can ignore. They're even shaded differently to make it easier to read. "If you're going to Google and the black part ends with anything but google.com, call IT" made sense to even the oldest and most reluctant people I've had to deal with. The problem was actually getting them to check every time and not forget.
It seems to me that this change will not help people without training, change nothing for people with training, and make sharing links even more confusing for everyone.
Are you saying someone is less likely to get phished on "supershop.co.hk" than on "http://supershop.co.hk/account_login.php", even where the http:// part is replaced with a red padlock and /... is grayed out?
I see only one real solution to phishing: don't let users type passwords manually. WebAuthN and password managers both automatically read the domain and won't try to authenticate on a domain that isn't a perfect match. I've had more success with that than any other anti-phishing measure I've tried deploying (history-based domain trust, explicit trust on first use popup, detecting unicode gaps and domains in credential fields...).