One has to wonder about behind the scenes heuristics as it pertains to taking a chance distributing a backdoored version sideloaded into the App Stores. One also wonders about whether the encryption or app are possibly compromised generally (even if the source is vetted and distributions are verified) Perhaps most of interest though would be how many phones are owned otherwise, to give access to the protester Signal…
Signal does a pretty good job at minimizing the metadata it has access to. For example, the app can tell you who of your contacts has Signal installed but the Signal service itself never gets to see your contacts ( https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/ ).
Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
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Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#12Earlier quoted context omitted.
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read? EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.
https://tests.reproducible-builds.org/debian/reproducible.ht...
We're making great strides into software being completely deterministic. The Bitcoin project for many years has had completely deterministic binaries and a ceremony process for GPG signing the output with many individual parties.
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#13I hope one day apps like Signal will be the default for everyone , not just protesters in a time of crisis.
will only happen if phone manufactures ship them by default rather than the unsecure by default ones they ship atm. Sounds crazy when I say it outloud...
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#14Earlier quoted context omitted.
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read? EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.
Assuming all three match, you know that the binary matches the source.
Someone who is more technically inclined can probably go into more detail on this.
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#15Earlier quoted context omitted.
will only happen if phone manufactures ship them by default rather than the unsecure by default ones they ship atm. Sounds crazy when I say it outloud...
iMessage is end to end encrypted by default. Perhaps not as strongly, but it's a good default to begin with.
iCloud backups (enabled by default) are not end-to-end encrypted.
So while it's technically E2E, in practice you get very little protection from it because it's broken by design.
I still use iMessage because of the user experience, but let's not be fooled by their misleading E2E claims; it's all just marketing BS.
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read? EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.
How do you know you're not living in a computer simulation in which the operators can access your data without any backdoors whatsoever?
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#17Earlier quoted context omitted.
iMessage is end to end encrypted by default. Perhaps not as strongly, but it's a good default to begin with.
Key management is still centralized and controlled by Apple, so they can still MITM communications by messing with the key exchange. iCloud backups (enabled by default) are not end-to-end encrypted. So while it's technically E2E, in practice you get very little protection from it because it's broken by design. I still use iMessage because of the user experience, but let's not be fooled by their misleading E2E claims;…
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#18Earlier quoted context omitted.
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read? EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#19Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read? EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.
How do you know the compiler actually compiles the source code to the binary you expect without injecting backdoors? How do you know that the hardware actually follows the instructions in the binary as they are specified? How do you know you're not living in a computer simulation in which the operators can access your data without any backdoors whatsoever?
[1]: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...
Re: Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption
#20Honest question for those in the know: If I wanted to run my own personal “analysis” to verify the security of Signal, where would I start? Is it even possible? Just curious if there was a way to “know” rather than “trust”.
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS
Are there any “certs”/keys you would need to talk to your contacts?