Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hmm. So that looks like two separate issues to me, but maybe I'm missing something. I see: 1. Additional always-present criterion of distress 2. Knowledge of prior base rates as a means of estimating a proportion of false positives. The first one makes sense to me in connection with the earlier comment. We aren't great at definitively reading our own states: it's easy for us to imagine symptoms, especially when promp…
The base rate part is just explaining why the diagnostic doesn't work when applied on a healthy population (like med students) The instruction would be something like "if the patient complains of x, check for symptom y... if the have symptom y, they are likely suffering from z" But the med student then checks themselves for symptom y, and thinks they have z, but that is only the case if they are suffering from x. The…
For instance, let's say a patient complains of a headache. The doctor uses whatever other knowledge they have of the patient to come up with some candidate diagnoses, and proceeds checking for symptoms from each of the candidates.
Presumably 'headache' is just another symptom on the diagnostic criteria for each of the other candidates. So why is it treated specially?
(Btw, thanks for your response—not sure why you were downvoted, but that was not from me!)