Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This is approximately the same phenomenon that causes medical students to self-diagnose themselves with every disease they learn about Could you say more about this? It seems pretty counter-intuitive that medical students could look at some diagnostic criteria—which I assume often contain some fairly straightforward things like, "green spots on armpits" or whatever—and come out convinced they have the disease. When…
I think the idea is that an implied symptom in diagnostic criteria is that the person was distressed enough to seek treatment . That bit of info is important for determining likelihood of having the disease. Say you have a test for someone having a heart attack that is 99.9% accurate. If someone comes in complaining of chest pains, and the test says they are having a heart attack, then it is pretty certain they are h…
1. Additional always-present criterion of distress
2. Knowledge of prior base rates as a means of estimating a proportion of false positives.
The first one makes sense to me in connection with the earlier comment. We aren't great at definitively reading our own states: it's easy for us to imagine symptoms, especially when prompted. But if something is actually wrong, an element of distress is typically present.
The second one seems like a separate issues though, or at least I don't see the connection. It seems like there are two important bits of information for correcting false positives. The first is that you have a known accuracy which suggests a 1 in 1000 chance of any diagnosis being incorrect; the second is that through historical record you can estimate how many people in e.g. the US are having a hard attack at any given moment on average.
I don't see the connection between either of those pieces of information and loose diagnostic criteria though.