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15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

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Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#121
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nothing, per se. But they don't set up softlimits or message size limits by default, both of which you should definitely do... it's just that the values you put in are specific to your situation.

If you have DJB's ego yelling at you that the default configuration is safe, why would you bother setting limits to fix it?

DJB has been telling people to run it with the memory limits since 2005.

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#122
post #111

This is why you don't run software that fossilized back in the nineties. Qmail was solid code but hasn't received the support and on-going development it needed. Use postfix instead for a secure MTA.

Integer overflow bug causing manual memory allocation bug leading to RCE. All too common. We need to stop relying on software written in unsafe languages.

It is about safe and unsafe implementations rather than safe and unsafe languages.

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I could trust softlimit all right, but my point was that I wouldn't trust users to wield it correctly.

softlimit is not difficult to use, certainly no more difficult than patch. programs like tinydns-conf for example autmatically generate a run script containing softlimit with a recommended -m setting. maybe qmail needs something similar.

Correction: With tinydns, it's a -d setting, not an -m setting

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#124
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://twitter.com/FiloSottile/status/1262854396934791168

Filo is upset that he did not bother to check the code (that originally came from SUPERCOP, a benchmarking tool) he blindly included in go's xcrypto. Here is DJB's tweet: https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/1108637226089496577 (regardless, you should not directly encrypt a large amount of data, even nacl suggest against it https://nacl.cr.yp.to/valid.html ) In addition both Filo and Garrett have a bone to pick wit…

Your criticism of the messenger of further evidence of djb's longstanding refusal to deal straightforwardly with security reports is not on topic, IMO.

Not everything is a simple dichotomy.

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#125
This is great. I remember when this came out. Georgi Guninski was a very accomplished bug hunter. Well known for finding vulnerabilities in web browers (ie. internet explorer) But the security community frowned upon that a bit as "not real hacking" so he was like "hold my beer", went after the hardest "real" target you could find and this was the result.

The guy is a legend

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#126
post #51

That's quite interesting because the bug was there and was quite clear, and was not fixed by one of the most brilliant security persons out there (DJB). Maybe here the attitude really was the wrong one, considering how security oriented qmail was since the start, because the simplest possible fix does not seem to demand any other dimension, like complexity or performances.

While I think that he should have rewarded the original 2005 bug report I do not think that he did anything wrong after that. He was pretty clear about the memory limit for years now.

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#127
post #124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Filo is upset that he did not bother to check the code (that originally came from SUPERCOP, a benchmarking tool) he blindly included in go's xcrypto. Here is DJB's tweet: https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/1108637226089496577 (regardless, you should not directly encrypt a large amount of data, even nacl suggest against it https://nacl.cr.yp.to/valid.html ) In addition both Filo and Garrett have a bone to pick wit…

Your criticism of the messenger of further evidence of djb's longstanding refusal to deal straightforwardly with security reports is not on topic, IMO. Not everything is a simple dichotomy.

(regarding qmail) It was a security bug back in 2005. It stopped being a security bug when DJB mentioned on the official page about the memory limits.

Regarding the salsa20 implementation: I just mentioned in my previous message why this was not a bug and the only reason that people were upset over it was due to Filo's incompetence.

As for evidence of DJB dealing straightforwardly with security reports: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23250748

I think that https://old.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/72w42c/statement_re... would be a better example of DJB not properly handling security reports.

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#128
post #24

DJB makes great code, but it always leaves a sour taste to use his code, because he has such a big ego and refuses to admit when he makes a mistake. He can't admit that it's possible to be the best but still make mistakes. I really hate supporting that.

> and refuses to admit

I wish people stopped repeating it over and over. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23250748

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#129
post #24

DJB makes great code, but it always leaves a sour taste to use his code, because he has such a big ego and refuses to admit when he makes a mistake. He can't admit that it's possible to be the best but still make mistakes. I really hate supporting that.

> and refuses to admit I wish people stopped repeating it over and over. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23250748

So he paid a bonus one time? And that negates all the other times he refused to admit he was wrong (including the time this very article is about, twice)?

Re: 15 years later: remote code execution in qmail

#130
post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Integer overflow bug causing manual memory allocation bug leading to RCE. All too common. We need to stop relying on software written in unsafe languages.

It is about safe and unsafe implementations rather than safe and unsafe languages.

This specific type of vulnerability and the tens of thousands of similar ones like it would absolutely have been prevented by a safe programming language.
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