Earlier quoted context omitted.
Whether or not the API is opt-in is orthogonal to its security hardening - this is a false dichotomy.
I'm not suggesting any false dichotomy, I'm trying to reason about the likely security consequences given what we saw with WebGL in Firefox: serious security flaws in its implementation, with the features enabled in the browser by default. See my links above, one of which summarises with anyone running Firefox 4 with WebGL support is vulnerable to having malicious web pages capture screenshots of any window on their…
A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
41–50 of 80 posts
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#42Will this API be opt-in, or can we expect another security disaster like with WebGL? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16457791 , https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/webgl-a-new-dimension-for-... , https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/webgl-more-webgl-security-... Edit I should have given a quote from one of the articles covering the issue, so here's one: > anyone running Firefox 4 with WebGL support is vulnerable to h…
Browsers should be run in a VM, via a fake GPU which is mapped to a window ( possibly root window ) of a main desktop. Giving code fetched from the internet in real time full access to hardware, especially complex hardware, is lunacy. I'm shocked that neither Google nor Mozilla still have internalized this lesson.
I agree that it would be nice to see stronger hypervisor based sandboxes.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#43Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#44I know some people coded up raytracers with glsl texture shaders, but rayracers are massive parrallel with no shared state needed algorithms (the entire scene is tiny in those examples). Would this new API enable shared state (to some extent)? For example, someone may want to solve numerically the diff equation of the liquid flow. This usually involves dealing with big lattices where parts of the lattices can be upda…
We are exposing writable storage buffers and textures in all shader stages (there is a caveat discussion [1] on the topic though), which means you can write data out directly. Sharing data between shader threads can be efficiently in the compute shaders (via the shared group memory), which are included in the core of WebGPU. P.S. vange-rs [2] is written on wgpu-rs and uses ray-tracing in fragment shaders for the terr…
Beware the behaviour of writes will not be consistent between vendors or shader stages, and may be surprising.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
We are exposing writable storage buffers and textures in all shader stages (there is a caveat discussion [1] on the topic though), which means you can write data out directly. Sharing data between shader threads can be efficiently in the compute shaders (via the shared group memory), which are included in the core of WebGPU. P.S. vange-rs [2] is written on wgpu-rs and uses ray-tracing in fragment shaders for the terr…
> writable storage buffers and and textures in all shader stages Beware the behaviour of writes will not be consistent between vendors or shader stages, and may be surprising.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
But that's not what parent was saying, I think. He was saying that WebGL not being opt-in was a security disaster; while saying nothing about the security hardening of the WebGL module itself. Even when a module is well tested, I'd like non-essential modules to be opt-in too.
I’d like Javascript to be opt-in. Turning it on by default was a mistake.
The web is not a static document viewing anymore. Now I agree, that sites should have a static fallback, as I also do not want to run a full webapp, when all I want is a static article for example. But this is because of a different problem - the financing of most of the web, through advertisment and not the fault of javascript.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#47This is not working for me on Safari even with turning on the experimental feature, when will this land on regular Safari ? Excited to see WebGPU possibilities.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not suggesting any false dichotomy, I'm trying to reason about the likely security consequences given what we saw with WebGL in Firefox: serious security flaws in its implementation, with the features enabled in the browser by default. See my links above, one of which summarises with anyone running Firefox 4 with WebGL support is vulnerable to having malicious web pages capture screenshots of any window on their…
Running firefox 4 (or any other comparably old browser), this would be the least of your security problems, it's not even RCE. The stream of discovered vulnerabilities is constant.
When WebGL was first implemented in Firefox - long ago - it shipped with serious security flaws. This struck many people as sadly predictable, as graphics APIs like OpenGL are not intended to be accessible from untrusted code. WebGPU seems awfully similar to WebGL in this respect: it's trying to wrap a low-level graphics API in a secure sandboxed API. This isn't the equivalent of a routine addition like a new feature in CSS.
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why don't you say the same about CPU or RAM? In the end it's just resources that are abstracted away to the user, used with the purpose of performing tasks in the most efficient way possible.
Because some resources have mature security controls around them, and some don't. Why do you care if someone can see your bank account number? In the end they're just numbers.
So we thought, then ROWHAMMER arrived..
Re: A Taste of WebGPU in Firefox
#50I know some people coded up raytracers with glsl texture shaders, but rayracers are massive parrallel with no shared state needed algorithms (the entire scene is tiny in those examples). Would this new API enable shared state (to some extent)? For example, someone may want to solve numerically the diff equation of the liquid flow. This usually involves dealing with big lattices where parts of the lattices can be upda…