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TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

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Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#31

Post by Reelin »

yegle wrote: post #30
Reelin wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is misguided. As you note, the system is anonymous and can't have any registration or authentication. Moreover, an Apple or Google specific API for validation would prevent interoperability of other (future) implementations including any free and open source (ie actually verifiable) ones. Therefore, all authentication must be done on the receiving end by deciding which data sources to trust. This should be fairl…

What you describe is not in conflict with the Apple/Google proposed solutions. Or rather, it (the part of reporting and aggregating on the server side) is not part of the proposed solution. When tested positive, to which server the diagnosis keys are reported to can vary depending on the platform and app. It could be reported via a goverment approved app, or reported to Google/Apple provided server. As long as Google…

> What you describe is not in conflict with the Apple/Google proposed solutions.

I didn't mean to suggest that it was. Rather, I was objecting to your earlier claim that there must be an internal and proprietary Apple API used to validate diagnosis keys and that only Apple could mitigate the abuse risk.

> As long as Google/Apple aggregate the diagnosis keys across multiple servers

There's nothing that inherently requires Google or Apple involvement here (although realistically I assume they will end up providing the majority of the servers as a service). All implementations and services including the framework, any apps, and the data server can be done completely independently (if desired) and still interoperate with any Apple or Google provided implementations. That's what's so great about a decentralized system.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#32

Post by yegle »

Reelin wrote: post #31
yegle wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you describe is not in conflict with the Apple/Google proposed solutions. Or rather, it (the part of reporting and aggregating on the server side) is not part of the proposed solution. When tested positive, to which server the diagnosis keys are reported to can vary depending on the platform and app. It could be reported via a goverment approved app, or reported to Google/Apple provided server. As long as Google…

> What you describe is not in conflict with the Apple/Google proposed solutions. I didn't mean to suggest that it was. Rather, I was objecting to your earlier claim that there must be an internal and proprietary Apple API used to validate diagnosis keys and that only Apple could mitigate the abuse risk. > As long as Google/Apple aggregate the diagnosis keys across multiple servers There's nothing that inherently requ…

According to the previous announcement, we should know more about the implementation details sometime in mid-May.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#33

Post by ytdouchebags »

You guys are pieces of shit for participating in any aspect of this contact tracing thing. They are doing RSSI logging with timestamp data that can be used for precise localization of each observed BLE stack - opt in or not - and with zero requirements for a cryptographic PRNG for rolling identifiers which will result in the ability to unroll everything back to the original source. This is a garbage project that will do nothing but create a massive surveillance network that needs no connectivity to the MTSO. Not surprising from the YT homo programmer crowd. Bet you have a Dallas Mavericks mask on while you push Swift.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#34

Post by prawn »

emptybits wrote: post #10
conroy wrote: post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My understanding is that to mark yourself as Covid+, you’ll need a code from a health care provider. I agree that allowing self diagnosis would ruin the entire system.

A quick scan of the linked project suggests no such healthcare provider code is required. The source[1] suggests the flow is literally: "I Have COVID-19" -> "Are You Sure?" -> "Click OK", and that's that. Anyways, I take this project to be a proof of concept. One would hope that governments will have healthcare professionals replacing the self-diagnosis step. * hope * [1] https://github.com/CrunchyBagel/TracePrivatel…

Yes, just a concept. Developer tweeted about issues with government’s plan and then spent part of a day building a concept to show how it should be done, then fleshed it out to share code publicly.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#35

Post by atleta »

devit wrote: post #13

I don't quite understand why Apple and Google are releasing an API instead of a single system application. This is going to create a gigantic mess as governments with limited software development competence slowly release incompatible and partially broken applications, while Apple and Google could just deploy a single solution via a system update. Also, it's much easier to make it mandatory if it's a system app (and…

It doesn't have to be governments. 3rd parties can build these systems either by themselves or paid for by governments and several governments can use/buy the same system. Also, these (some of these) can hopefully be open source apps, too. Pretty important as there will be privacy concerns (rightfully) which can hurt in two ways. First: the concerns could be real and the data collection could be problematic. Second: whether or not the first is the case, this may prevent a lot of people installing it.

If it's a mandatory update that sidesteps the second issue, but then it could hurt Google's and Apple's image. Also, could cause serious problems with the EU (think GDPR). Even if they really can't get any meaningful and sensitive data out of it, they would be running the risk of an investigation.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#36

Post by pmiller2 »

yegle wrote: post #26
pmiller2 wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right, and there’s no possible abuses this could be used for, of course — no way this data can ever be deanonymized, right? What I object to is putting this all into an automated system for everyone, infected or not. If there’s a way to generate a diagnosis key, there’s a way to spoof it, and that can be used to infer contacts for the non infected. You may have a point when it comes to the infected, but even then, gi…

Wait what part of the data do you want to deanonymize? It's computational impossible to reverse from Rolling Proximity Key to Daily Tracing Key to Tracing Key.

That literally cannot be true if there’s a way to generate this “diagnosis key” and notify everyone I’ve been in contact with.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#37

Post by contravariant »

yegle wrote: post #23
devit wrote: post #13

I don't quite understand why Apple and Google are releasing an API instead of a single system application. This is going to create a gigantic mess as governments with limited software development competence slowly release incompatible and partially broken applications, while Apple and Google could just deploy a single solution via a system update. Also, it's much easier to make it mandatory if it's a system app (and…

The system is intended to be annonymous and can't have any user registration or authentication. How can you validate when someone report they are infectious, the Diagnostic Key is indeed from a legit iOS device? If you can't validate it, this can be easily abused (attacker generate a huge list of Diagnosis Keys and upload, claiming to be infected, and causing a wave of public panic) My understanding is that there mus…

With a sufficiently large key that attack you're proposing is effectively impossible (people would notice the yottabytes or however many you need to pull it off).

Although you still do need to protect against people making false claims.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#38

Post by devit »

yegle wrote: post #23
devit wrote: post #13

I don't quite understand why Apple and Google are releasing an API instead of a single system application. This is going to create a gigantic mess as governments with limited software development competence slowly release incompatible and partially broken applications, while Apple and Google could just deploy a single solution via a system update. Also, it's much easier to make it mandatory if it's a system app (and…

The system is intended to be annonymous and can't have any user registration or authentication. How can you validate when someone report they are infectious, the Diagnostic Key is indeed from a legit iOS device? If you can't validate it, this can be easily abused (attacker generate a huge list of Diagnosis Keys and upload, claiming to be infected, and causing a wave of public panic) My understanding is that there mus…

They should only accept infection reports that are signed with a trust chain terminating with an Apple/Google internal CA, and sign keys provided by governments with their root CA.

Alternatively, the system could be configured to connect to the "infected keys server" run by the local government(s), as determined by the countries of the cell network the user connected to in the last 30 days.

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#39

Post by 0xBeefFed »

yegle wrote: post #20
pmiller2 wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That sounds like a massive privacy violation to me.

The only time your keys are uploaded, is when you are infected. The assumption is that if you are infectious certain privacy needs to forgo to protect others. In fact this is over simplification. The only key that will be uploaded is partial of the daily tracing key (called Diagnosis Key in the specification). Most importantly, there's no location or timestamp involved or needed. Once this Diagnosis Key is uploaded,…

Your use of the word partial could lead to confusion. The Diagnosis Keys are a subset of the Daily Tracing Keys for the days youre contagious. You then upload these Daily Tracing Keys and associated day numbers. Also you are incorrect about the involvement of a timestamp. The protocol uses DayNumbers to track the specific day a Daily Tracing Number was used.

In terms of privacy, small-scale adversaries can deanonymize infected users that have uploaded their [keys by keeping logs] of and limiting who they have come in close contact with.

On a large-scale, adversaries in control of large Bluetooth receiver networks (such as cities performing traffic analysis) can now track the movements of individual infected users over the course of a day. One could argue that this is already being done to track anyone with bluetooth enabled.

In addition, the process of uploading to the backend server could alert adversaries monitoring your network that you (the device using your IP address, uploading to the server IP address) have tested positive for the virus.

I recommend that you look at other contact tracing protocols that circumvent some of these issues by decrease or eliminating the linkability of identifiers, allowing users to censor records uploaded, and encourge the use of network-anonymization.

*Edit Spelling - Source: https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/cu...

Re: TracePrivately – open-source sample app using Apple's contact tracing framework

#40

Post by 0xBeefFed »

devit wrote: post #38
yegle wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The system is intended to be annonymous and can't have any user registration or authentication. How can you validate when someone report they are infectious, the Diagnostic Key is indeed from a legit iOS device? If you can't validate it, this can be easily abused (attacker generate a huge list of Diagnosis Keys and upload, claiming to be infected, and causing a wave of public panic) My understanding is that there mus…

They should only accept infection reports that are signed with a trust chain terminating with an Apple/Google internal CA, and sign keys provided by governments with their root CA. Alternatively, the system could be configured to connect to the "infected keys server" run by the local government(s), as determined by the countries of the cell network the user connected to in the last 30 days.

Other protocols have suggested that uploads be governed by authorization codes provided by health-care providers. Another suggests having providers digitially sign records uploaded to the server too.
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