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Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

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Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#211
post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

While you wait for his response: https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-silicon-valley/th...

At first, the site attracted about sixteen hundred daily visitors, and Graham moderated and maintained it himself. Today, around five million people read Hacker News each month, and it’s grown more difficult to moderate. The technical discussions remain varied and can be insightful. But social, cultural, and political conversations, which, despite the guidelines, have proliferated, tend to devolve. A recent comment t…

I find that the opposite is true. Most comments are emotional, and I have to search for controversial comments to find anything objective/worth reading. Like Reddit, this site is biased to the political left (USA). I wish we could just avoid all politics in tech.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#212

The serverside key handling stuff is bad, but generally known (Zoom has features whose natural implementation require them to keep keys serverside). People are dunking on Zoom for rolling their own crypto and coming up with AES-128-ECB. This is also bad, but people should be aware that it's a lot more complicated than "you can see penguins through it". You can see penguins through an ECB-encrypted bitmap because disc…

But it does. It means that they're too inept to know the difference. What else are they claiming that is wrong?

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know audio well enough to answer this, but you can play with it directly; it took about 7 minutes for me to throw a trivial Go program together to AAC-encode a WAV of half a minute of speech; the only repeated 16-byte blocks I got were a couple runs of zeroes. The trick with ECB is that you're relying on 128-bit blocks of plaintext repeating with perfect alignment, and, to do anything useful with it, those re…

For audio, you don't want to send a wav file over the line, as it's incredibly wasteful. Once it's reasonably encoded, you necessarily end up with a lower entropy steam... So should still have some version of "solid blocks of color", especially for silence. (Exact details depend on the codec, though.)

Lossy compression reduces entropy, I'd expect fewer repeats and more of what looks like random data in any compression worth its salt. Thomas also mentioned AAC, not PCM. I agree on the silence, but it would come up as smaller packets, not repeated packets, IMO. And then we're back to timing analysis of speech.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#214

The serverside key handling stuff is bad, but generally known (Zoom has features whose natural implementation require them to keep keys serverside). People are dunking on Zoom for rolling their own crypto and coming up with AES-128-ECB. This is also bad, but people should be aware that it's a lot more complicated than "you can see penguins through it". You can see penguins through an ECB-encrypted bitmap because disc…

Thank you for clearly articulating why using AES-ECB here is not as bad as the penguin image everyone seems to know. It's still a bad choice - you really need to prove to yourself that your data stream isn't susceptible and it's honestly easier just to use an appropriate stream cipher mode.

I absolutely agree that the real deserved flak is for saying "end-to-end encryption" when that's clearly not what's happening. Honestly, I don't know how they could make their product work as well as it does with actual end-to-end (consumer to consumer) encryption. Self-hosted solutions can do this but their servers are doing a lot more than ferrying raw data streams around. That's why their meetings work so well with 200+ participants.

They also deserve criticism for saying AES-256 when they're using 128-bit keys, but like you said it's not a security issue. I suppose they could be referring to TLS that they use to set up connections and meetings rather than the stream itself but that's a stretch.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#215
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Compression already makes a compressed file roughly indistinguishable from random noise (module access to the decompressor). So the patterns have been removed. That doesn’t make this good , but it means that one specific example isn’t immediately applicable.

There's more in the stream than just compressed data. There'll be metadata info that you can make reasonable guesses about. ECB mode lets you take that information and apply it to other blocks in the ciphertext.

I’m not arguing that. I’m saying that for compressed data, underlying patterns in data aren’t trivially exposed by ECB. Ergo, the “tux” attack on bitmap image files doesn’t really apply here. I meant nothing more and nothing less than that.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#216
post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your point does not stand on its own. No, but it will when the next generation of Nazi, Stalinist, and Maoist regimes arise and gain access to the data in question because we weren't fanatical enough about E2E privacy today. And just as Niemoeller's verse warns, by then it will be too late.

> And just as Niemoeller's verse warns, by then it will be too late. But, this is just wrong. In Germany we did speak out when they came for the communists, the socialists, the unions and the jews. Niemöllers argument was relevant in 1937 when he was arrested and I appreciate that you picked up on it but frankly it's different here in Germany. We do still speak out against discrimination against all of them. Maybe E2…

Maybe not. Hope you're right.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#217
post #139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's more in the stream than just compressed data. There'll be metadata info that you can make reasonable guesses about. ECB mode lets you take that information and apply it to other blocks in the ciphertext.

This thread is an excellent illustration of why you don't want your encryption implemented by merely good coders. You need people who know what they are doing.

I’m literally one of those people who “knows what they’re doing”. This is the problem with discussing ECB on an online forum. There’s no space to have a nuanced discussion without people cargo culting “ECB bad” over every comment.

Yes, ECB is almost always the wrong choice. Yes, there are other ways it’s going to fail in this use case. Yes, compression before encryption itself often enables other attacks. No, I should not have to prefix a comment about ECB with this type of disclaimer when I’m making (what should be) an uncontroversial statement that the tux attack doesn’t directly apply to compressed image data.

Ironically, when designing a protocol for my company, one of the reasons we didn’t use ECB when it would have been entirely justified (each chunk of data was precisely one block in size and keys were only ever used once) was because of potential backlash from people who only know “ECB bad” and nothing more.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For audio, you don't want to send a wav file over the line, as it's incredibly wasteful. Once it's reasonably encoded, you necessarily end up with a lower entropy steam... So should still have some version of "solid blocks of color", especially for silence. (Exact details depend on the codec, though.)

Lossy compression reduces entropy, I'd expect fewer repeats and more of what looks like random data in any compression worth its salt. Thomas also mentioned AAC, not PCM. I agree on the silence, but it would come up as smaller packets, not repeated packets, IMO. And then we're back to timing analysis of speech.

> Lossy compression reduces entropy, I'd expect fewer repeats and more of what looks like random data in any compression worth its salt.

Um, so, just to make sure I understand you, you're implying that lossy compression is not worth its salt? Because you will surely have more repeats in a lower entropy space.

Re: Zoom rolled their own encryption scheme, transmit keys through servers in China

#220

The serverside key handling stuff is bad, but generally known (Zoom has features whose natural implementation require them to keep keys serverside). People are dunking on Zoom for rolling their own crypto and coming up with AES-128-ECB. This is also bad, but people should be aware that it's a lot more complicated than "you can see penguins through it". You can see penguins through an ECB-encrypted bitmap because disc…

Somebody should add an ECB encrypted JPEG to wikipedia.
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