Earlier quoted context omitted.
Engineering has a much stronger and more specific focus on avoiding "unexpected" problems like this. At its most general you use things like dimensional analysis to identify and avoid issues that you can't specifically foresee. This is, bare minimum, an embarrassing failure of design. No system, especially on a military ship , should have no redundancy. A single point of failure should not bring down every toilet on…
Any very large project is expected to have a number of embarrassing failures. You just don't hear about most of them. Not surprisingly, on a __military__ ship, sewage is not considered mission critical and required to have multiple redundancy. You can, after all, take a poop in a bucket and throw it over the side. Redundancy engineering is reserved for truly mission-critical things, like being able to find and shoot…
It's easy to imagine that the toilet failures here under discussion represent an isolated concern and a teething problem for the kind of new, nonessential system that you expect to see in a new class of capital warship which, after all, still gets the fundamentals right. The trouble is that, once you start really looking, that's just not borne out by the evidence.
A lot of the ideas in play with these ships, as with the LCS or the F-35, are fundamentally good. But the US military procurement process has become so deeply corrupt that we as a country are no longer capable of implementing these good ideas well. The multiple-decade, trillion-dollar boondoggle has become table stakes, and that doesn't deserve to be excused by anyone.
(Also, a Ford-class carrier has a crew of something like four thousand. They're gonna need a lot of buckets...)
(1) https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/navys-troubled-ford-carr...