Earlier quoted context omitted.
All the occasions you mention are covered in the blog. The sarin attack is used to demonstrate that even in the best conditions for the attacker they would not be effective in a military sense against modern first tier armies. As a terror weapon yes but the question is why don’t modern militaries plan to use them. It doesn’t rest on perfect efficiency. At this point the US, for example, doesn’t have the quantity need…
The nuclear weapon question isn't really covered, which is an interesting case because they're also strategically useless to a Modern army -- and the U.S. government knows it [1]. Yet disarmament basically froze 10 years ago. In the language and framework of this article, I understand why countries with Static armies might feel the need to develop them, but I don't understand why Modern armies which are happy to disp…
This has created a few paradoxical situations. One of them is that their strategic value lies primarily not in their use (which will not achieve any result) but rather the threat of use, which may be sufficient to dissuade leaders from committing to a war (arguably, this happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis--both Kennedy and Khrushchev blanched at the prospect of starting a nuclear war). Another interesting side effect is that this means that the development of counter technologies produces staunch opposition: nuclear war has to be seen as unwinnable for its deterrent value to be effective.
Part of the motivation for nuclear weapons as a strategic (rather than deterrent) option comes from the lineage of people who see strategic bombing as an fast, cheap, easy way to win a war. For a century now, adherents have predicted that once you started bombing a few cities indiscriminately, you'd easily win a war. And people continue to argue this despite the rather thin evidence for this proposition, and mountains of evidence in opposition.