> First of all, estimates show that the case fatality ratio (CFR) is around 2%, which is 20x higher than the flu.
These estimates are mostly from China. Obviously likely to be higher for a respiratory condition in a place with some of the worst air quality in the world. There is also some question about whether the less serious cases are even being identified -- if your sample is only of the people with severe symptoms, you get the wrong number for the percentage of people with severe symptoms.
> Second, the transmissibility of the SARS-nCov-2019 (the virus causing COVID-19) is much higher than the seasonal flu. This means the period within which a demand will be made on healthcare services will be much shorter and much more intense.
Fortunately flu season is coming to an end, so there will be less contention for resources there and the same reasons people get the flu less often in April than January will help to mitigate this.
> Third, there are reports showing lasting damage to kidney and lung tissue (sponge-like structures). Even when surviving COVID-19, previously healthy people might become chronically ill.
That can also be true of the flu, isn't it?
> Fourth, in order to prevent at least part of what I am describing, very stringent measures are required. These already have a historic impact on our worldwide economy and will hit developed countries the most (since they require a worldwide infrastructure).
This is probably just not going to happen. They'll try to contain it using strong measures when the number of cases is small enough that there is some hope of that actually happening, but strong measures aren't that problematic when they're only applied to a small number of people.
If they fail in the early stages and millions of people become infected, the strong measures can't be justified at a large scale because once it's that widespread they won't be effective anyway. The point of the strong measures is to prevent that from happening. They aren't worth continuing after you've already lost.