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Hard Startups

blog.samaltman.com

61–70 of 331 posts

Re: Hard Startups

#61

I feel like the money quote was buried in the postscript. > Another solution to this problem is to think about startups that can become quite successful with less than ten people. As compensation packages from the giant tech companies continue to increase, I suspect this will become a trend. As cash comp at big public companies grow and the future value of startup options plummet, we need to start thinking about diff…

Is 2.5mm really viable for 10 people within SF Bay Area? That would mean compensation would be around $250k per person (not including payroll taxes, office rent, and whatever else cuts into that). That's distant from the compensation packages being given out by Big N.

Re: Hard Startups

#62
>The most counterintuitive secret about startups is that it’s often easier to succeed with a hard startup than an easy one.

I completely disagree. It has nothing to do with being "easy" or "hard". It has everything to do with the RIGHT people heading the team of RIGHT people. Put RIGHT people together and you can solve both easiest and hardest problems out there.

Companies fail a lot of times because wrong people with wrong or little experience make executive decisions that ultimately destroy these companies.

Poor managers cant build and keep good teams together. Poor managers ultimately erase companies chances to succeed.

Re: Hard Startups

#63
post #7

The problem with startups building hard tech is it takes a long time to fail. Failures that take decades doesn't work in the startup model. Image working on a fusion reactor. It might take 25 years to fail. The failure may not be that your idea doesn't work, but because some other kind of reactor comes along that is a better business (ie, cheaper). At this point, you are now a world class expert at a technology that…

Former fusion startup founder here. This is a very good point. My startup took 6 years to fail and much of our competition at the time is still at it 20 years later.

There are a number of things which are also impedance mismatches between the typical SV startup mode and hard startups. One of these is the failure path. When an adtech startup fails, the founders just go get well-paying jobs at a FAANG, or at least that what the perception appears to be. When your fusion startup goes bust, you... get evicted and live in your car for a while. There's no on-ramp for failed founders back into the industry. Heck, if its a hard startup, there may be no industry yet to go back to. So, you have to go find something else to do to pay the bills. The personal cost of failure can be much higher than typical startups. "Our incredible journey" for hard startups is more like, "Well, none of us died".

Another thing which doesn't mix well between the typical SV expectations and hard startups is that all the things which VCs think are advantages to being located in SV are generally disadvantages to people working on hard problems. Doing web software with ads? Lots of people to recruit in the Valley. Doing nuclear fusion... is there anyone doing nuclear fusion in the Valley? How do they afford to live when competing with all that cheap ad money? Perhaps I should locate on Madison Avenue, it has the same "advantages".

Then there is the typical way that VCs filter, starting with step one, "Know someone who can introduce you". That's a lot easier when you are in the same location, working in similar industries. It's a poor filter when most of the people working on a problem live far away, doing stuff very different from everyone you know. There are far fewer serial entrepreneurs when the failure time is measured in decades, so networking is more difficult.

I'm happy to see VCs try to return to working on hard problems. The Valley used to be good at that, before they became a center of the advertising industry. But Valley VCs need to read their history. In the late 1950s/early 1960s, New York was the center of finance and advertising. The idea that somewhere out in the wilds of California would become a center of a new industry with its own finance ecosystem was crazy. But everyone in the early Valley knew what those East Coast people were like. The Valley is now the new East Coast people, the new Madison Avenue. Doing a hard startup in the Valley now is like trying to start Intel in 1960 New York. Hard startups are hard enough, without trying to do that.

Re: Hard Startups

#64

Before I started Submotion, I did a fairly thorough analysis of what kind of startup I wanted to create. I decided that I wanted to create something that - was B2B. Consumers are fickle, things can explode but they can also go out of style just as fast. It's more sexy and makes for better smalltalk but my assessment is that they are much more difficult to grow predictably. - targets SME's. I am somewhat extroverted f…

Hell, that sounds like my reasoning. Can you mind read?

But seriously, I agree that this is the way to go. Add low fixed costs and you can have a very healthy, very profitable company. And if the business model scales reasonably well even a potential VC ready startup with the need for VCs. Can't think of a better strategy to become, and stay, my own boss.

Re: Hard Startups

#65
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Interesting thoughts. Since you apparently have significant experience raising VC funding, I'm curious about your opinion on the following (others, of course, are welcome to chime in). If you were working on a deep tech (science-based) startup and considered using venture capital, would you prefer pitching your idea(s) to VCs, who happen to have relevant domain expertise (most likely, as their educational background)…

If someone with domain experience thinks you can't do what you're trying to do or are doing it the wrong way: 1. They're correct and you should not get a check. 2. They're incorrect, and you wouldn't want them to be the person writing the check. 3. They have good reasons for their concern which you had not yet considered. All of these sound like good outcomes to me.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts. What you're saying definitely makes sense. However, the question is whether one should prefer or avoid such, considering my assumptions on relevant pros and cons (in other words, it's a question about fundraising process optimization).

Re: Hard Startups

#66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with this, except we decided on closing CEO deals, we sucked at SEO by comparison.

Oh I am not doing any SEO either. I am still writing emails and making calls, just not the kind that start a 6-month long sales process ending with cigars :-)

Would you mind if we have a short chat about your sales approach? This is something I am still struggling with a little bit!

Re: Hard Startups

#67
post #61

I feel like the money quote was buried in the postscript. > Another solution to this problem is to think about startups that can become quite successful with less than ten people. As compensation packages from the giant tech companies continue to increase, I suspect this will become a trend. As cash comp at big public companies grow and the future value of startup options plummet, we need to start thinking about diff…

Is 2.5mm really viable for 10 people within SF Bay Area? That would mean compensation would be around $250k per person (not including payroll taxes, office rent, and whatever else cuts into that). That's distant from the compensation packages being given out by Big N.

I would take a pay cut if it meant working with a high talent concentration team that was small enough to be agile end to end in the full sales -> ops -> product/dev -> support cycle.

But that's a unicorn. You don't find a unicorn, you stumble upon it one day and miss the opportunity because you can't rationalize the fact that you actually saw a mythical creature.

Re: Hard Startups

#68
Counterpoint: If you're looking for a life-changing outcome you probably shouldn't work on a hard startup until after you've already saved some money working somewhere else -- like at least spend two years somewhere stable so you can get approved for a mortgage. Investors in hard startups are often more like patrons who don't really understand the tech in which they are investing. They probably got their first taste at money from selling a software app and then invested that money in other "easy" software startups until they had enough money to patronize your quantum computing project. Think of the clout they are generating from magnanimously throwing money at PhDs they've convinced to waste their lives in a field that will never produce practical outcomes. When there's an economic downturn, the investor will still be rich, just not enough to continue patronizing your project. The PhDs may scrape by somehow or eventually be overcome by the existential dread that they should have worked on something with fewer hurdles and higher probability of success so they pivot to work on a location sharing app or venture capital investing.

Re: Hard Startups

#69
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s not exactly what he is aiming for; the quote is most likely related to Instagram which reached a $1bn valuation with ~10 people. A lifestyle business is worthless to VC (and unsustainable if it decides to take VC money).

Slowly I having my doubts about that. At least for early stage and angle investment. Investors need a 10x exit. Now imagine an early stage investment of 250k in a small business that grows to 10 million revenue. Healthy, because it is a lifestyle business not geared towards hyper growth. Assuming the company is profitable and cash positive, buying back the investor for 2.5 million through a bank loan is a reasonable…

Why would a company bother buying back the investment? Surely there’s not much reason to do that unless the terms of the investment were different than what is common today.

Re: Hard Startups

#70
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s not exactly what he is aiming for; the quote is most likely related to Instagram which reached a $1bn valuation with ~10 people. A lifestyle business is worthless to VC (and unsustainable if it decides to take VC money).

Slowly I having my doubts about that. At least for early stage and angle investment. Investors need a 10x exit. Now imagine an early stage investment of 250k in a small business that grows to 10 million revenue. Healthy, because it is a lifestyle business not geared towards hyper growth. Assuming the company is profitable and cash positive, buying back the investor for 2.5 million through a bank loan is a reasonable…

I think one problem is opportunity cost for the VC. Arguably, they have to spend as much time on diligence for that .25MM investment as for a 10MM one. Put another way, to deploy a $125MM fund, you’d have to do 500 of these microinvestments.
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