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Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

blog.mozilla.org

371–380 of 777 posts

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#371
post #289

I'm so sad to see Mozilla move forward with this massive attack on user privacy. Firefox DoH is snake oil, plain and simple. It sends all the users DNS queries to Cloudflare, adding a new party which can surveil the user's traffic (and can be legally compelled to do so and not disclose this fact)-- providing a convenient choke point to save spies and hackers the trouble and exposure of extracting the data from tens o…

> We continue to explore enabling DoH in other regions, and are working to add more providers as trusted resolvers to our program. DoH is just one of the many privacy protections you can expect to see from us in 2020. Cloudflare is just one of the initial providers and they indicate that they are adding more. Also, I'm assuming you can add your own custom provider based on the screenshot in the article. You can just…

> You can just disable the feature as well

For now. Where's my option to disable complete blocks on domains with funky/invalid SSL certificates? Gone, for the past few years.

Sure, most people don't need that. Most people don't care about DoH being enabled by default, either. I do.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#372
I predict that DoH will break many enterprise infrastructures that rely on custom DNS servers. Unwary sysadmins that update Firefox will be in a lot of trouble when they switch this on by default.

We ourselves have a custom DNS setup with an only internally resolvable TLD as a security measure, so this change will break our infra for all Firefox users (thankfully we’re in the EU so we’re spared, for now).

Good thing that Cloudflare wants to centralize DNS and access control anyway, so those enterprises can just switch to their proprietary DNS service and VPN replacement, I guess ;)

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#373
post #365

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> you have to trust someone at some point. Give me a non-profit infra provider than I can donate to, similar to Let's Encrypt. Let's call it "Let's Resolve", give it a non-profit charter and org style, with transparency, governance, and strong privacy protections. Mozilla could even be one of the sponsors of such an org, thereby ensuring the values it supports are adhered to. Open Street Map runs on a budget of ~$100…

I'm dubious. If someone asked me to run such a thing and offered to pay for it, I'd turn them down: It's too easy to be compromised (via hackers, including the state funded kind) or ordered (e.g. via an administrative subpoena, NSL, or plain court order) and fail to deliver on the expected privacy. This false sense of security might even get people killed, when they think their activities are private when they really…

If someone asked me to run such a thing and offered to pay for it, I would do so in a heartbeat (build, staff, and move on). You don't get progress without pragmatism and compromise. The benefits far outweigh the potential downside. You want people who care leading the charge.

We should endeavor to build something good enough today, so someone in the future can build something better on our shoulders.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#374
post #333

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does DoH allow marketers to do anything they couldn't have done before by just hardcoding their own DNS server? It might make it harder to block queries by deep packet inspection, but do you actually do that on your network right now?

Marketers using hardcoded private servers are the easiest thing to defend against: just block those servers. That fact is one of the big reasons why marketers and other spies don't do that -- they use DNS lookups to find the mother ship. However, now marketers can use DoH, combined with public servers that would cause disruption to block, to be able to engage in lookups without a means of detecting or blocking them s…

Safer protocols don't care who or what they protect. Even if browsers didn't use DoH, other devices could. And any protocol Mozilla can use to protect their users will also work for other devices.

I don't think it makes sense to bemoan the newfound existence of safer infrastructure for everyone just because devices you don't like can also use that infrastructure.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#375

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Good point. Sniffing traffic is orders of magnitude more expensive than simply logging DNS queries.

tcpdump -i any -s 1500 '(tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2)+5:1] = 0x01) and (tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2):1] = 0x16)' -nnXSs0 -ttt Is it though? This one liner works just fine for me on my gateway and is capturing quite a huge number of raw SNI names. 0x0110: c008 0016 0013 0010 000d c00d c003 000a ................ 0x0120: 00ff 0100 0113 0000 001d 001b 0000 186c ...............l 0x0130: 6f67 7369 6e6b 2e64 6576 6963 657…

It's not complicated, but that's also going to take more time , cpu power, and memory bandwidth to do so than just recording dns packets. When you need to do that to millions or billions of connections per second the costs start to really add up.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#377
post #360

How does this work with hosts that are not resolvable outside your own network? If I tell firefox to go to internalsite.mycompany.com - which resolves internally, but not outside our network - how is firefox going to resolve it, if it's not using our DNS servers?

Correct.

In order to preserve compatibility, Firefox's implementation has a "fallback" where if it sees that it can't resolve a domain, then it will fail back to using the system-configured DNS provider.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#378
post #326
post #319

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It sends all the users DNS queries to Cloudflare I wonder how much Cloudflare paid for this 'privilege' of being the default DNS provider.

Mozilla claims that Cloudflare is not paying them, and claims that they have a contract with cloudflare which prohibits them from selling the data. I don't think that this improves the situation substantially. The history of internet privacy failures is full of empty and unrealized promises, and no amount of contracts or promises can trump a court order or a NSL. "Has no ability to collect" is the gold standard, and…

>Mozilla claims that Cloudflare is not paying them, and claims that they have a contract with cloudflare which prohibits them from selling the data.

As you said, this does not improve the situation. Mozilla can't even verify it.

Also it could be a reverse data selling situation like with Google: They don't sell the data, companies pay money to Google to display ads to the users. Since they have so much data, they can target specific groups more easily. Data doesn't even need to leave Google for that to work.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#379

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Marketers using hardcoded private servers are the easiest thing to defend against: just block those servers. That fact is one of the big reasons why marketers and other spies don't do that -- they use DNS lookups to find the mother ship. However, now marketers can use DoH, combined with public servers that would cause disruption to block, to be able to engage in lookups without a means of detecting or blocking them s…

Safer protocols don't care who or what they protect. Even if browsers didn't use DoH, other devices could. And any protocol Mozilla can use to protect their users will also work for other devices. I don't think it makes sense to bemoan the newfound existence of safer infrastructure for everyone just because devices you don't like can also use that infrastructure.

> Even if browsers didn't use DoH, other devices could.

Precisely so.

> I don't think it makes sense to bemoan the newfound existence of safer infrastructure for everyone just because devices you don't like can also use that infrastructure.

I'm not. First, I don't think this is actually a "safer infrastructure" compared with other DNS encryption schemes, because it opens a new hole.

Second, this isn't about "devices I don't like" using an infrastructure. This is about software and websites being able to bypass a layer of my defenses.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#380
post #337

Earlier quoted context omitted.

99 % of users won’t touch default values, so it’s not a valid excuse. I really have come to the conclusion that privacy is just a marketing feature for Mozilla. They e.g. also do nothing against data exfiltration by popular extensions although they have known that issue for years. If they’re really serious about privacy they should have waited to implement DoH as an open standard and allow more DNS providers to suppo…

> I really have come to the conclusion that privacy is just a marketing feature for Mozilla. They e.gg. also do nothing against data exfiltration by popular extensions although they have known that issue for years. I thought about this recently, and the move to HTTPS-Everywhere is the biggest issue here. In the old days, you could have something like the @guard firewall on Windows, which could examine all outgoing HT…

HTTPS intercepting proxies ("middle boxes") are commonly deployed in the corporate world. Firefox-- and internet protocols themselves-- makes many concessions to avoid gratuitously breaking these things.

For free software, squid ssl-bump works, though is something of a pain to configure!

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