Earlier quoted context omitted.
> What’s in it for the Cloudflare & NextDNS? It gives them a competitive advantage in DNS industry against other B2B providers, such as NS1.
curious, can see the case for the capability giving advantage, but how do you think running the public service would? or do you mean competitive advantage in marketing their products?
Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
341–350 of 777 posts
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#342I wish they wouldn't do this. I trust my ISP more than I trust Firefox and whatever company they chose for DNS over HTTP. This "We know better than you" attitude is why I stopped using Firefox so many years ago. I switched back recently, to stop using Chromium, but I have a growing list of annoyances, and it might be time to give NeXt Browser a chance again, or see what else is out there.
"Firefox defaults to Cloudflare, though you can change this." So it's whichever company you choose for DNS, rather than the company chosen by your ISP. Many of us were already choosing not to use the ISP's DNS, for reliability, but with this feature the ISP can't eavesdrop on that.
And like I said, I trust my ISP more than I trust Firefox and CloudFlare, so their spying on my DNS (if they even are) is less of a concern to me than CloudFlare or Firefox spying on the requests.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#343Earlier quoted context omitted.
So your point is that your attack model was that makers of malwareApp would try to connect to malwareapp.net instead of a random IP? If you are worried about traffic in the browser you can not enable it, it you are worried about anything else then VPNs were already a thing since some time ago.
I suppose my model is that every connected device and app, every web site someone visits, is malware. My household is full of things collecting data and passing it on to entities I don't wish to share that data with. How do I stop that when my ability to control what happens on my own network has been been reduced to Can access the Internet over 443, or not ?
If you are talking about Firefox itself, then disable it.
I sympathize with wanting more control, but I do not understand how DoH changes things in a household settings.
(I am assuming your is not a corporate point of view, in that case I agree that DoH might cause significant headaches)
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#344Does anyone know when something like this might come to Brave?
I know Brave is supposed to be a privacy-centric browser, but their plan for advertising seems at odds with that. Advertising is a slippery slope and I wonder how long before these promises are eroded or outright reversed. > 100% of your ad spend is placed for active users that opt-in to a rewarding private ad experience. > Craft effective offers and provide captivating full-page experiences directly with consumers i…
I know "Have I Been Pwned" is supposed to be a security tool for white hats, but the fact that they collected hundreds of millions of users passwords seems at odds with that.
Additionally, there's a service called 1password that leverages this data. It claims to be a tool to help users know if their password has been compromised. But a service that has the ability to check a user's current password against a database seems at odds with that.
On a completely unrelated note-- do you know how Brave actually implements advertising in their browser?
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#345I'm so sad to see Mozilla move forward with this massive attack on user privacy. Firefox DoH is snake oil, plain and simple. It sends all the users DNS queries to Cloudflare, adding a new party which can surveil the user's traffic (and can be legally compelled to do so and not disclose this fact)-- providing a convenient choke point to save spies and hackers the trouble and exposure of extracting the data from tens o…
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the concern I have about browser-controlled DoH is that it seems like it could make it harder for a tech-savvy user to assert control over their own network. IIRC, most network-level ad-blocking operates at the DNS level. I've also personally blocked telemetry by setting my router's DNS proxy to resolve certain telemetry servers to 0.0.0.0. It's my understanding that DoH would bypass that. Couple that with Google's planned neutering of Chrome's ad-blocking API, and it seems like it will become increasingly hard for end-users to avoid ads.
And the fact that DoH uses HTTP seems like it would make it impractical to block as a protocol.
I think I would have preferred an encrypted DNS protocol that ran on its own port, at least.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#346Why are people so down on DNS over HTTPS? DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.
With normal DNS anyone in the request chain can see a stream of DNS requests but there is no context. By the time the request is one or two hops from you it will be interwoven with tens of thousands of other requests making it impossible to know which one came from who.
With DOH the DNS provider will have a unique identifier to correlate requests back to a specific system/user. Google offers one of the most used DNS services, with DOH they will be able to track all DNS requests you make even if you turn on a VPN.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#347Earlier quoted context omitted.
"You can just opt out" is the same tired line that in former times Mozilla has fought against. It's extremely hard to keep track of and manage "opt outs", especially in a household with multiple computers and multiple people. Formerly, I "opted out" of having a browser that phoned home my browsing traffic by using Firefox.
> Formerly, I "opted out" of having a browser that phoned home my browsing traffic by using Firefox. Formerly your browser still "phoned home" to your default DNS provider, using an insecure protocol. I appreciate your concerns but, unless you run your own DNS server, you have to trust someone at some point.
This is kinda painful to read, to the point where I'm not sure if it's intentionally misleading;
DHCP will give you a DNS config, that DNS server can be local, remote, it can support DNSSEC or DNS over TLS (yes, that's a thing[0]). I even have configurations where a local DNS resolver on my machine (DNSMasq/unbound) would query _different_ recursive resolvers based on the domain I'm requesting.
DoH takes away huge amounts of configuration, and the ability to locally host DNS and ensures that a central body gets your DNS requests. The only "opt-out" in the current system is not using DNS at all, which is still an option. (NETBIOS/mDNS/Hosts)
[0]: https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/dns-over...
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#348My gateway has a bunch of static DNS entries for internal hosts, which are all in a fake top-level domain. How will resolving these work if the request goes to CloudFlare? CloudFlare obviously doesn't know about my internal domain. Currently my gateway resolves what it knows about and uses my ISP's DNS to resolve what it doesn't.
Pi-Hole is presents a similar problem.
Finally, if DoH is the future, how do I run my own DoH server which can resolve internal hosts? Does such software even exist yet? How do I point Firefox at this DoH server? The relevant Wikipedia article[0] points to a list of public DoH servers I can use, but offers no insight as to what software I'd use to run one for my own use.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#349Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#350I'm so sad to see Mozilla move forward with this massive attack on user privacy. Firefox DoH is snake oil, plain and simple. It sends all the users DNS queries to Cloudflare, adding a new party which can surveil the user's traffic (and can be legally compelled to do so and not disclose this fact)-- providing a convenient choke point to save spies and hackers the trouble and exposure of extracting the data from tens o…
This seems unnecessarily alarmist. DNS over HTTP doesn't protect against state-level legally-mandated surveillance because it's not designed to protect against state-level legally-mandated surveillance. There are no solutions to the problem you posit that don't involve SOME kind of trusted name authority somewhere that is, effectively by argumentative fiat (i.e. not really) "out of the reach" of whatever government i…