Until recently, I was working at CZ.NIC and people who are working on Knot DNS resolver were in the next office. The easiest way to get them crazy was to mention DNS over HTTPS. They hated it passionately.
Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
211–220 of 777 posts
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#212Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
> ISPs are not going to block AWS IP ranges or Azure IP ranges, etc. Tell that to China, Iran, Turkey (?), etc.
Ok, authoritarian regimes not included
And yet this was/is one of the justifications for implementing this.
They're not doing it in the EU because (a) there are decent privacy laws, and (b) IP addresses are (IIRC) considered personal information and so Cloudflare DoH would be responsible for keep a whole bunch of data safe. They may not want that responsibility.
This seems to (currently) be US-only because of the sucky US privacy laws.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#214As a resident of a country whose government and ISPs heavily and habitually censor the Internet for political reasons, I for one truly appreciate Firefox's DoH. They should also enable 'network.security.esni.enabled' by default because the censors here have upgraded from DNS to SNI-based blocking. I get it that better solutions are possible, but got to teach people to first walk before teaching them to run. AFAIK, Ch…
Chrome uses opportunistic DoT - it uses your system configured resolver, and if it supports DoT, it will use DoT, if not, it will fall back to 53/udp. I like Chrome's approach much better; it doesn't force you to statically configure DNS server - it is a PITA, especially when roamining and you want to resolve hostnames available only in local networks.
Not really.
If you're not blackholing traffic at the dns-layer via DoH, set Firefox's trr.mode to 2. Per documentation, at the cost of additional latency incurred, system-level / network-level resolvers should pick up the slack, provided they've been set as appropriate via DHCP or otherwise.
Ref: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Trusted_Recursive_Resolver#network....
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#215Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#216As a resident of a country whose government and ISPs heavily and habitually censor the Internet for political reasons, I for one truly appreciate Firefox's DoH. They should also enable 'network.security.esni.enabled' by default because the censors here have upgraded from DNS to SNI-based blocking. I get it that better solutions are possible, but got to teach people to first walk before teaching them to run. AFAIK, Ch…
I've noticed some problems with eSNI so far unfortunately. Some domains like discordapp.com have some access points with eSNI enabled and some without, so when clients access the ones without eSNI, they believe that they are under attack. I cannot wait for it to be finished and implemented though, it would be a huge benefit for the privacy of millions.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If your "security controls" depend upon other people volunteering to use some protocol then those weren't "security controls" they were more like "guidelines". It's not about volunteering. Previously I could block udp/53 and tcp/53 and be confident of the fact that no DNS look ups would happen. (DNS queries over other ports could be caught doing packet sniffing.) Now I have to worry about DNS queries going out via…
That is a good point, but it is also mostly independent from DoH, a VPN with an hardcoded IP would have worked in the same way (if you look into elusive VPNs you can also find some that work by injecting traffic into padding of another connection). The only difference is if you are worrying about the traffic leaving your own browser and in that case you can just not enable DoH
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#218Earlier quoted context omitted.
The ISP can just check which IP you contact, so I don't see this increasing privacy.
And until ESNI gets high adoption they can also just look at the SNI header. I do not see how DoH gives any significant amount of extra privacy.
We've seen regular US ISPs hijack unencrypted DNS to insert content or replace sites entirely. We've also seen bad actors do far worse on public WiFi.
So acting like DoH is a waste of time unless every part of the privacy puzzle is online is wrong-headed. It is a huge step in the right direction for privacy, increase their costs, and will be much needed when eSNI is online. In the meantime "all" we get is a huge security improvement.
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#219Questions I couldn’t find answers to in the post or linked info about the Trusted Resolver Program: What’s in it for the Cloudflare & NextDNS? Are they getting paid to handle this traffic or paying to have the opportunity to access this data? Can users outside the US opt-in? The comment about having “no plans” to enable this outside the USA seems a bit disingenuous. Hard to believe they built this program / feature a…
> The comment about having “no plans” to enable this outside the USA seems a bit disingenuous The comment actually very clearly says "we do not have plans to roll out the feature in Europe or other regions at this time ". Also I have mixed feelings about this. On one hand yeah, encryption is great and someone sitting between me and my ISP will no longer be able to monitor my DNS queries. On the other hand I don't fee…
Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs
#220Earlier quoted context omitted.
> before DoH, setting a custom DNS via DHCP was enough That ship had already sailed. You also have to run your own DNS, allow DNS egress only from your own DNS, and DNAT the rest back to yours in order to un-break all the things with hard-coded resolvers.
Same with NTP surprisingly. Literally everything I have talks to a NTP server once in a while, but only Linux machines actually ask the network's NTP servers.