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Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

blog.mozilla.org

141–150 of 777 posts

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#141
post #8

Why are people so down on DNS over HTTPS? DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.

And now they have a one-stop shop for all their DNS surveillance needs.

> And now they have a one-stop shop for all their DNS surveillance needs.

There are a few dozens of DoH services out there [1] and nothing prevents anybody else from running their own.

[1] https://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> DoH just enables any piece of software or hardware on my network to bypass any security controls I have in place. I think this is an error in how you've thought about the problem. If your "security controls" depend upon other people volunteering to use some protocol then those weren't "security controls" they were more like "guidelines". [ My local airport has a sign and a telephone so that if you've arrived with g…

> If your "security controls" depend upon other people volunteering to use some protocol then those weren't "security controls" they were more like "guidelines". It's not about volunteering. Previously I could block udp/53 and tcp/53 and be confident of the fact that no DNS look ups would happen. (DNS queries over other ports could be caught doing packet sniffing.) Now I have to worry about DNS queries going out via…

That is a good point, but it is also mostly independent from DoH, a VPN with an hardcoded IP would have worked in the same way (if you look into elusive VPNs you can also find some that work by injecting traffic into padding of another connection).

The only difference is if you are worrying about the traffic leaving your own browser and in that case you can just not enable DoH

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#143

Why are people so down on DNS over HTTPS? DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.

> DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.

And DoH will enable every device you own to continue spying on you for the benefit of corporations.

DNS is the last bastion of preventing devices I can't sufficiently control from spying on me. I use DNS filtering to block their tracking domains. I use my firewall to prevent devices from accessing DNS resolvers I don't control.

DoH takes those options away from me. Ridiculously, in the name of privacy. Ha!

Unfortunately, the battle was lost the moment someone created a DoH implementation. It hardly matters what the browsers do. All the other things I don't want to have DoH will eventually implement it. And they won't respect use-application-dns.net or whatever other frameworks Mozilla comes up with for controlling DoH at the network level.

(Also, does anyone really believe that governments, ISPs, and public DNS resolvers aren't going to disable DoH with use-application-dns.net? I'm sure whomever came up with DoH in the first place had great intentions but the end result is a disaster that will cause more harm than benefit)

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#144
Bottom of the infographic appears to contain a new Firefox logo. Looking at their website, it appears this is actually the logo for the larger (and somewhat confusingly named) Firefox suite of products, to distinguish them from the Firefox browser. Which is nice I guess, but what most people see is the browser icon, and this logo would be far preferable to the current one in that capacity.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#146

Why are people so down on DNS over HTTPS? DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.

I'm not down on encrypting DNS, I'm down on moving DNS from a network/system level to an application level.

Java poisoned this well a decade ago by not respecting DNS TTL settings.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#147
post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So what if I run a Pihole at home as a DNS server and want to stop being able to resolve various domains? I would like to know how to stop all devices (actually worse, individual applications!) on my network deciding to DoH of their own accord (and therefore bypassing my local DNS server). This kind of centralised ability to block DoH is very useful to me.

There are a couple use-cases here. * On devices that you own and control you don't need a network level control like this except for convenience. This is when you should be applying the override record. * On devices that you do not own or control (family/friends/guests) disabling DoH makes you the malicious network operator. Connecting to your Wi-Fi doesn't make you trusted in any sense of the word. * On devices that…

Thanks. Not to be argumentative, but I find it odd/interesting that guests connecting to my WiFi and using my DNS set up makes me a "malicious network operator" in your eyes. That's a very odd view of the world in my opinion, as it is my WiFi and DNS set up.

That's like saying that me stopping guests taking photos of my daily activities (showering, using the toilet) whilst in my house is a malicious behaviour too. I suppose I should let them post the photos off to whomever they choose?

If someone is in my house and using my WiFi, I don't want their device looking up domains that I choose to block. How do I know that their device is not recording its surroundings and sending them off to the said domain? How do I know that my guest is not up to nefarious/illegal activity using domains that I have blocked? I would be the one prosecuted due to the IP address = a person approach by the law in most circumstances (should they ever deduce the requested domains from the DoH set up). Being that the DoH provider is under law, I am pretty sure that the DoH will have to hand over any records they have, which will lead it back to me and my network.

And then once again we are stuck in a situation where I cannot control what domains are being looked up by devices and applications on my network. My devices are no longer mine. I have handed off control to some company the other side of the planet with employees I will never meet.

How do I stop the 5+ tracking domains that the Instagram app uses on my wife's iPhone, for example? Am I a malicious network operator for stopping that garbage being sent off?

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#148

As a resident of a country whose government and ISPs heavily and habitually censor the Internet for political reasons, I for one truly appreciate Firefox's DoH. They should also enable 'network.security.esni.enabled' by default because the censors here have upgraded from DNS to SNI-based blocking. I get it that better solutions are possible, but got to teach people to first walk before teaching them to run. AFAIK, Ch…

Chrome uses opportunistic DoT - it uses your system configured resolver, and if it supports DoT, it will use DoT, if not, it will fall back to 53/udp.

I like Chrome's approach much better; it doesn't force you to statically configure DNS server - it is a PITA, especially when roamining and you want to resolve hostnames available only in local networks.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#149
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>> We invented DNSCrypt. There’s also DNS over TLS. Lots of ways to encrypt DNS without centralization. Ummm so what’s the downside then? Are those services arcane and hard to use and utterly forbidding blackest black magic, like almost all crypto stuff? If you’re thinking browser users will just do this then that then this and x and y and z to “get dns crypto going”, then I’ll take Mozilla’s “it just works” approach…

Not sure what any of your reply means. Adding OS support isn’t required. People just run a local resolver that supports these things. No different than any other application. Nothing arcane. Certainly no more than HTTP and SSL. I think you have some reading to do.

You can literally do the same with DoH.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#150
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

DNS over TLS and DNSCrypt both depend on servers... exactly as centralized as DoH. They are just different wire protocols that in the end do the exact same thing with a centralized DNS server.

In fact, the only meaningful difference between DoH and DoT is that DoT runs on a separate port, so network operators (and ISPs) can filter it. DoT is DoH with a kill switch.

DoH can be blocked by IP addresses, DNS canary and probably SNI, while DoT by IP addresses and port number. So "DoT is DoH with a kill switch." is again nonsense.
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