They should use Threema [1] which is based in Switzerland. Even though Switzerland is not in the EU it's not as bad as the US (from an EU standpoint) and since Switzerland is heavily dependent on the EU the likelihood of them spying on the EU is pretty small. Apart from that Threema publishes a transparency report [2] where they list all requests from governmental authorities. [1]: https://threema.ch/en [2]: https://…
EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
221–230 of 289 posts
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#222Earlier quoted context omitted.
Lasers, electron microscopes and x-ray scanners used for testing and verification in the semiconductor manufacturing industry plus loads of custom and open source tools.
Can it really be economically viable to have these scanned rather than just toss them out? I would imagine that anyone high enough in the EU to be a target is only using drives provided to them
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#223They should use Threema [1] which is based in Switzerland. Even though Switzerland is not in the EU it's not as bad as the US (from an EU standpoint) and since Switzerland is heavily dependent on the EU the likelihood of them spying on the EU is pretty small. Apart from that Threema publishes a transparency report [2] where they list all requests from governmental authorities. [1]: https://threema.ch/en [2]: https://…
The BÜPF law in Switzerland requires any company that has more than 100 request per year to retain data. Threema reached this in 2019.
"Der Dienst ÜPF erklärt eine Anbieterin abgeleiteter Kommunikationsdienste als eine mit weitergehenden Auskunftspflichten (Art. 22 Abs. 4 BÜPF), wenn sie eine der nachstehenden Grössen erreicht hat:
a. 100 Auskunftsgesuche in den letzten 12 Monaten (Stichtag: 30. Juni);
b. Jahresumsatz in der Schweiz von 100 Millionen Franken in zwei aufeinander folgenden Geschäftsjahren, wobei ein grosser Teil ihrer Geschäftstätigkeit im Anbieten abgeleiteter Kommunikationsdienste besteht, und 5000 Teilnehmende, die die Dienste der Anbieterin in Anspruch nehmen." [1]
[1] https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20172173/...Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#224Earlier quoted context omitted.
All US ambassadorships are political appointment, therefore option 2 is the only answer. These positions are almost always ceremonial. They are there to execute the will of the president. The real work is done by the diplomats who are appointed through the US Foreign Service office. They do the actual work of the embassies.
> All US ambassadorships are political appointment, therefore option 2 is the only answer. These positions are almost always ceremonial. They are there to execute the will of the president. Not really, a foreign service officer can be appointed by a president to be an ambassador. A recent example from the news is Marie Yovanovitch. In regular times, my impression was that foreign service officers were appointed to th…
Now, for sensitive countries you want a specialist. Like your probably not sending golfing buddies to broker Israel/Palestine peace agreements. But they'll probably do alright being the Ambassador to Belgium or Canada. Those embassies are practically on rails.
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#225I once worked in the Commission, briefly. Technical security seemed to be non-existent as far as I could tell (in an admittedly very junior role). Once all of the interns got invited to the U.S. embassy to meet the Ambassador (some guy who literally said he got the job because he was friends with Obama). On the way out the nice embassy staff gave us goodie-bags, complete with handy pen drives... Basically everyone wa…
And I work at a European cybersecurity company and we are routinely tasked to inspect USB drives and devices EU politicians receive at conferences, so I guess we've come full circle. I'm sure the NSA has implants in the EU systems but they're not dumb enough to just hand them out on USB drives that can be traced back to them.
Why not? The US was found to be spying on Merkel and nothing seemed to come from that.
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#226Earlier quoted context omitted.
at least the Dutch sites work. try a post communist country gov site and you'll start appreciating it right away.
Have you ever used Estonia's?
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#227They should use Threema [1] which is based in Switzerland. Even though Switzerland is not in the EU it's not as bad as the US (from an EU standpoint) and since Switzerland is heavily dependent on the EU the likelihood of them spying on the EU is pretty small. Apart from that Threema publishes a transparency report [2] where they list all requests from governmental authorities. [1]: https://threema.ch/en [2]: https://…
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#228I once worked in the Commission, briefly. Technical security seemed to be non-existent as far as I could tell (in an admittedly very junior role). Once all of the interns got invited to the U.S. embassy to meet the Ambassador (some guy who literally said he got the job because he was friends with Obama). On the way out the nice embassy staff gave us goodie-bags, complete with handy pen drives... Basically everyone wa…
And I work at a European cybersecurity company and we are routinely tasked to inspect USB drives and devices EU politicians receive at conferences, so I guess we've come full circle. I'm sure the NSA has implants in the EU systems but they're not dumb enough to just hand them out on USB drives that can be traced back to them.
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#229Earlier quoted context omitted.
Such projects are expensive since it's not only development but also rollout including training of users. The development is also more expensive than in other areas since there is need for documentation. And then there is a flaw in the process: Producing the software has to be done via some bidding process. For writing the requirements documents they already rely on companies, which can add clauses making it hard for…
That, and they are expensive, because people expect them to be expensive. When, say, the national Police asks companies to come up with sofware to manage contact details for all employees, you could come up with "Install and Configure SomeOpenSourceCRM on a VPS" for €3000. Whereas typically some Enterprise Consultancy quotes a factor hundred of that to "integrate" it in a crappy way. I've worked in such projects, for…
> we don't allow dynamic languages
I would translate as "we have now experience in running and maintaining those platforms, which causes issues"
> require a deploy-window to be announced 21 days in advance"
This sounds a bit like ITIL or similar processes in oalce, which are there to ensure the systems are in defined state.
> with four(!) managers managing me.
Usually those should have different roles. Like technical oversight, communicating with the actual users and getting their requirements, then the IT management for operations and than oversight (variance exists, but lots of things, different stakeholders and as they spent public money they have to do extra documentation of processes for accountability reasons)
Re: EU Commission to staff: Switch to Signal messaging app
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
And I work at a European cybersecurity company and we are routinely tasked to inspect USB drives and devices EU politicians receive at conferences, so I guess we've come full circle. I'm sure the NSA has implants in the EU systems but they're not dumb enough to just hand them out on USB drives that can be traced back to them.
> I'm sure the NSA has implants in the EU systems but they're not dumb enough to just hand them out on USB drives that can be traced back to them. Why not? The US was found to be spying on Merkel and nothing seemed to come from that.