The quote about DNS seems wrong to me ""Consider a situation where I can view DNS traffic (e.g. company network), and I send a link to the company health portal, with #:~:text=cancer," he wrote. "On certain page layouts, I might be able [to] tell if the employee has cancer by looking for lower-on-the-page resources being requested."" I thought DNS requests just get the domain, not the hash and not even the page reque…
The github issue has more actual examples. The important bit is the "looking for lower-on-the-page resources being requested." bit. You can't necessarily tell anything from that lone DNS request. But after loading the page, the user's browser will go on to send requests for elements on the page, and anything JS wants to grab based on position, which can be a channel for information. Example: 99% of your employees' DN…
It's still not realistic at all unless you can already snoop on them in some way.
The starting assumption here is "I assume I already violated someone's privacy in a massive way." Like, ok, sure you can violate it a little more in some situations maybe. But does this introduce any new risks in situations where user privacy hasn't already been so massively hijacked?
And since Chrome, along with others, are moving towards encrypted DNS, the feasibility of getting these DNS lookups is even less plausible than it is today. You need to actually be able to snoop on all the target's network traffic.