Earlier quoted context omitted.
No harm in it either though. Unless for some reason someone imports one into their authorized_keys (which presumably would require deliberate steps not random numbskullary) in which case there is a (low) risk as they have just given a dev access to an account said dev does not know exists.
What you described is quite literally a feature in Ubuntu Server. Type in a github username during the installer to import from github.com/%s.keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.
OpenSSH 8.2
41–50 of 61 posts
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#42Last year I switched over to using signed SSH host keys, and for my fleet of ~150 VMs, some of which respin on a nightly basis, this has been a game changer. No longer do I need to keep a master "known_hosts" file updated and distributed across the fleet.
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
No harm in it either though. Unless for some reason someone imports one into their authorized_keys (which presumably would require deliberate steps not random numbskullary) in which case there is a (low) risk as they have just given a dev access to an account said dev does not know exists.
What you described is quite literally a feature in Ubuntu Server. Type in a github username during the installer to import from github.com/%s.keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.
@reboot root ssh-import-id gh:my-username
That way when I want to tinker with one, it will pull down my newest GitHub once it reboots and I’ll be able to login. The GitHub key is always up to date.Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure. Consider the Web PKI ("SSL Certificates"). Suppose you have a web site pmf.example it is of course pretty easy to get yourself a certificate to make https://pmf.example/ work, today for free but even many years ago it was pretty affordable from several commercial vendors. The way those certificates work is they use a digital signature based on a hash algorithm, the CA uses its private key to sign the hash, and…
Very enlightening. Thank you for explaining this. Are there any resources you might recommend to someone looking to learn this stuff more in depth?
In particular he works on/with the PoC||GTFO team and is responsible for the MD5 collision cover art in a past issue:
https://github.com/angea/pocorgtfo
For SHA-1 (and others) you might find more at his github project:
https://github.com/corkami/collisions
hth,
adric
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#45Notably from the changelog: It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release.
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#46Notably from the changelog: It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release.
Oh deer, perhaps someone at Microsoft DevOps should be told. https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/idea/365980/supp...
See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22324492 and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22324535
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#47Notable in this release is support for generating and using keys backed by FIDO/U2F tokens (and, with supported tokens, keys fully resident in FIDO/U2F tokens that you can transport between computers).
I'm happy to see this, however I'd be far more excited if I thought there was a chance of it landing in the upcoming Ubuntu 20.04 release - else I'll likely be waiting impatiently until 22.04 for server-side support.
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#48Notable in this release is support for generating and using keys backed by FIDO/U2F tokens (and, with supported tokens, keys fully resident in FIDO/U2F tokens that you can transport between computers).
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#49Notably from the changelog: It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release.
Just for fun, most users on Github have RSA keys exclusively. Did you know that your SSH keys are public on Github? https://github.com/taylorotwell.keys https://github.com/alexcrichton.keys https://github.com/andrew.keys https://github.com/egoist.keys https://github.com/fabpot.keys Some of the most popular users even have DSS keys.
Re: OpenSSH 8.2
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
No harm in it either though. Unless for some reason someone imports one into their authorized_keys (which presumably would require deliberate steps not random numbskullary) in which case there is a (low) risk as they have just given a dev access to an account said dev does not know exists.
What you described is quite literally a feature in Ubuntu Server. Type in a github username during the installer to import from github.com/%s.keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.
Exactly. That would be the deliberate steps I mentioned as a gate for this causing a problem. If you give it someone else's key you have a problem, though a minor one unless you've been conned into doing so by an adversary who will later scan for accounts that allow their key pair for auth.
Importing your own public key this way is not problematical at all.
Of course you might end up with people publishing their private key along with the private one, by error or because it seems convenient & they don't think things through...