151–160 of 296 posts
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"US says it can prove Huawei has lawful intercept access to mobile-phone networks" would be a better headline.
Because Huawei is a global law-enforcement agency and hence can claim lawful interception on all equipment it sells? Doesn't make any sense.
You had to initiate some specific knock sequence to trigger it.
Did they find something like this in their source code?
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Snowden showed they were sharing nudes of ex-girlfriend in TAO. How well do you think the FISA warrant process is going in reality?
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Moreover, there's much more than anecdotal evidence. The recently-released report on the Trump investigation proves this. Even if you hate Trump, there's no getting around the fact that the FBI completely abused the FISA court system, getting warrants by lying and misleading the court. This is a systemic problem.
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This is one of those "if X has access, so does everyone else" and rule makers still don't seem to grasp it.
"Because I can log into my sshd, so can everyone else"...? We are not talking about weak crypto here (though AFAIK 5G crypto is designed to be decidedly not E2E), but rather access to the data processed by these systems. There is no particular reason why granting e.g. the NSA access to a stream of CDRs would immediately give others access.
So yes, any intervention like that seems to me to be less about "the Chinese can snoop" and more about "we can't".
> Telecom-equipment makers who sell products to carriers "are required by law to build into their hardware ways for authorities to access the networks for lawful purposes," but they "are also required to build equipment in such a way that the manufacturer can't get access without the consent of the network operator," the Journal wrote. I love this quote. The US is essentially complaining that Huawei has access to the…
The theory behind the lawful intercept concept is that with the appropriate legal authorization a law enforcement agency can get a capture of a subscribers traffic in a somewhat standard format - that way the LEA doesn't have to have a different way to process the data from each network equipment vendor.
Here is a description of how the feature is commonly implemented: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful_interception https://www.arubanetworks.com/techdocs/Instant_40_Mobile/Adv... https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/10000/10008/fe...
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In western countries you can, in general, publicly mock your leaders on the front steps of your legislature. Try dancing in a Winnie-the-Pooh costume in front of the Great Hall of the People and see what happens...
Because in China is the power is indeed in the hands of the government. Not sure this is the case in the west anymore I'm afraid
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That it's illegal doesn't mean that we should pretend that it's not happening. Moreover, there's much more than anecdotal evidence. The recently-released report on the Trump investigation proves this. Even if you hate Trump, there's no getting around the fact that the FBI completely abused the FISA court system, getting warrants by lying and misleading the court. This is a systemic problem.
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That it's illegal doesn't mean that we should pretend that it's not happening. Moreover, there's much more than anecdotal evidence. The recently-released report on the Trump investigation proves this. Even if you hate Trump, there's no getting around the fact that the FBI completely abused the FISA court system, getting warrants by lying and misleading the court. This is a systemic problem.
I never said we should pretend it's not happening. I'm saying that even bringing that up as a point of comparison with China is silly.
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Snowden showed they were sharing nudes of ex-girlfriend in TAO. How well do you think the FISA warrant process is going in reality?
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" saying "we totally have proof!" without providing proof is effectively meaningless." They've provided ostensible 'proof' to the authorities in Germany and the UK who are the entities they are trying to convince of the issue, which is reasonable. We'll have to wait to see how the Europeans respond.
The British response has been to still go ahead with using Huawei for potentially over 30% of their non-core infrastructure. In any case, my point is not that they aren't plausible reasons why they might not make any proof public. My point is that they aren't above using those plausible reasons to propagate disinformation. So their statements are meaningless to us (the public) because it's impossible to discern truth…
This might be wrong in a couple of ways.
First - without knowing any details, there certainly are many good reasons why the information might not made public, most obviously because it would possibly compromise their methods of acquiring such information. There's a 100% chance that any information they divulged will be acrimoniously parsed by the Chinese to determine the means by which the US obtained the information. The information will likely betray how the Americans are thinking about the problem as well. (Reference yesterday's WaPo article on US/Germany surveillance program and how it was compromised).
Second - there's very limited upside in making the information public, are many downsides. The US, UK, and German agencies don't care about you, or I or any other privacy advocate, or really the knowledge that might arise from a number of public voices piping in. This isn't like open-source SSL software, where it makes sense from a security perspective to be open about it.
Also, I'm doubtful if the 'evidence' the US presented is purely technical in nature. My guess is that this is not a situation of "hey, look at this source code, on like 501, there you go, back door!", it's probably much more complicated. If you read the article, you'll indicate that the US has evidence that China is using its gear to surveil state actors, etc..
Revealing the 'evidence' almost surely involves sensitive information regarding state officials from other countries, insight into US spy programs etc..
If the US is legitimately trying to convince UK/Germany that Huawei gear is a legit threat, then providing them with the necessary information in confidence is obviously the rational thing to do.