151–160 of 165 posts
According to the article Boeing has halted production, but this leaves the door open to producing them again in the future after design updates. I predict they'll try to rename the model and fly it again after making changes and certifying. That being said, I never want to fly on a 737 Max or whatever they plan to rebrand it as.
Diebold -> Premier Election Solutions Blackwater -> Xe -> Academi 737 Max -> ?
>Boeing is in talks with banks to secure a loan of $10 billion or more… … >Banks that have already committed to contribute to the loan include Citigroup, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan… https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/20/737-max-crisis-boeing-seeks-...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
MCAS is not the fundamental problem. The new CEO has said they may require training for this 737 variant after all. Given a failure to simply drop MCAS, do extra pilot training and move on, we can conclude the plane isn't safe without additional computer control - of the quality MCAS was not. I hope I'm wrong about that, but the longer it drags on the more it looks like that may be the case.
I'm not directly involved, but my understanding is that to some degree the entire computer system is now involved. The problem is that the design philosophy of the instruments and computers on the 737 is the idea of having two "sides" to many sensors and instruments, a left and right. If the captain's airspeed readout differs from the FO's readout, the pilots are supposed to decide which one to trust. Crucially, in o…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm willing to bet airliners are going to remove any indication of what aircraft submodel is planned for the flight prior to ticketing, if not aggressively debating that move.
Great opportunity for a "SkySafe" app; filter out known flight/tail numbers based on the equipment (with data from public FAA feed). Can't lie about your equipment in flight plans to the FAA.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can check it all you want. That won't change the physics of its dynamically unstable design.
The max 8 doesn't have an inherently unstable design. This meme now only lives in the minds of the most ignorant out-of-the-loop individuals who wilfully consume FUD and ignore expert evidence. If the airframe is truly unsafe, then it'll never fly again. But everyone knows it will. Because it isn't. The only thing that'll happen is the max 8 will probably require a new type rating which will hurt airline economy a bi…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Great opportunity for a "SkySafe" app; filter out known flight/tail numbers based on the equipment (with data from public FAA feed). Can't lie about your equipment in flight plans to the FAA.
What metrics would you consider when it comes to aircraft safety?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not directly involved, but my understanding is that to some degree the entire computer system is now involved. The problem is that the design philosophy of the instruments and computers on the 737 is the idea of having two "sides" to many sensors and instruments, a left and right. If the captain's airspeed readout differs from the FO's readout, the pilots are supposed to decide which one to trust. Crucially, in o…
Thank you for elaborating on the deeper issues surrounding MCAS. Where can I read more about Boeing's design philosophy around FCC redundancy, or more about Boeing vs Airbus philosophies?
EDIT: And an hour after writing this Boeing just now announcing (surprise, surprise) they don’t expect return-to-service until July and stock is currently trading down 5.5%) I shorted BA for a few months based on many HN posts after the crashes, but covered my position after it seemed to stabilize at ~320. I think it will probably head lower, but as a general rule I try to find companies I believe in rather than comp…
Your claim here is that FAA's Certification practice has been hollowed out, but your evidence is that it's been funded consistently. Can you further support the claim? 230MM is less than 0.2% of DoT's budget; what would the incentive have been to downsize it?
Delegation seems to have steadily increased in scope since the 1930s. A brief and interesting history of Delegation from the FAA is here. [1] It has evolved over decades to become what it is today.
The specific concept of the ODA - Organization Designation Authorization — which is the program which delegates certification work to Boeing, didn’t exist until 2009. Last year Boeing had 1,500 people working internally in their ODA Compliance program, and there were just 45 people at the FAA BASOO (Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office).
Cost was one factor, but perhaps not the primary driver. Wanting to leverage private industry expertise is usually the reason cited. I don’t think it was downsizing necessarily as a cost control measure. It was downsized as a policy decision that delegating increasing amounts of the compliance work to industry was the right way to get the job done because that’s where the experts were.
In concept it’s almost reasonable. In practice they underestimated the degree to which Boeing could fuck up on the designs, overestimated the level of independent authority would vest in the ODAs to correct deficiencies, and I think eventually you lose “critical mass” back at home base (the FAA) and the ability to actually oversee the people doing the work.
I mean, the FAA Director went on record saying they would need to hire 10,000 people to fully staff this function. This to me indicates they have lost the critical mass required to perform the role even primarily as an outsourced effort.
Excerpting from PDF Page 13 of the JATR report;
> The BASOO is required to perform a certification function, including making findings of compliance of retained (non-delegated) requirements, while also performing the oversight function of the Boeing ODA. The BASOO must have the resources to carry out these two primary functions without compromise. The JATR team concluded that FAA resource shortfalls in the BASOO (and other allocated resources) may have contributed to an inadequate number of FAA specialists being involved in the B737 MAX certification program. In some cases, BASOO engineers had limited experience and knowledge of key technical aspects of the B737 MAX program.
> The BASOO delegated a high percentage of approvals and findings of compliance to the Boeing ODA for the B737 MAX program. With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety. However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated with MCAS. In addition, signs were reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit members (E-UMs) performing certification activities on the B737 MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in this system of delegation.
Further, from PDF Page 46;
> The FAA initially delegated acceptance of approximately 40% of the B737 MAX project’s certification plans to the Boeing ODA. Additional certification plans that were originally retained for acceptance by the FAA were later delegated to the Boeing ODA as the certification project progressed. While the JATR team did not conduct an exhaustive review of other ODAs, the team observed that delegating the acceptance of certification plans does not appear to be a widespread practice for the FAA.
“Does not appear to be widespread” seems to me to be a political way of saying “outside of acceptable practice and this should never have been done.”
The next paragraph continues;
> Finding F5.1-A: The FAA extensively delegated compliance findings on the B737-8 MAX project to the Boeing ODA. Safety critical areas, including system safety documents related to MCAS, were initially retained by the FAA and then delegated to the Boeing ODA. (See also Findings F4.1-A, F4.1-B, and F4.1-C.)
Delegation was used to an improper extent in the project, and what little staff they had dedicated to the BASOO appear to have insufficient experience, technical expertise, or knowledge of the 737-8 systems themselves.
Now the FAA is on record as saying those same people will have all the time they need to get it right without any compromises. In my experience, a team that failed under undue pressure the first time will take a deliberately exorbitant amount of time, given a second bite at the apple and the instructions to “do whatever it takes to get it done right.”
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think you’re underestimating how much fear people have of flying. If there’s a plane that is considered “dangerous” then people are going to avoid it. It’s not like airlines losing your luggage which people just put up with.
I have many friends who fly a lot more than me, and I've never heard any of them mention the type of airplane as an issue. Most of them don't know the exact model or even brand of "that plane that was grounded".. I guess people in general rely on the government agencies to do this decision for us..
Having money/status to travel doesn't == intelligence, unfortunately.
EDIT: And an hour after writing this Boeing just now announcing (surprise, surprise) they don’t expect return-to-service until July and stock is currently trading down 5.5%) I shorted BA for a few months based on many HN posts after the crashes, but covered my position after it seemed to stabilize at ~320. I think it will probably head lower, but as a general rule I try to find companies I believe in rather than comp…
> Today they have as I understand it just ~750 total pilots and engineers on staff to review technical data from the plane manufacturers. The FAA said last year to do it themselves they would need 10,000 more. [5] Not 10000 more pilots and engineers. 10000 more employees. Now they have "1,300 employees, 745 of whom are pilots, engineers and technical staff who oversee design approvals and production."
This is the number he gave to answer what it would take to do the whole thing internally with no delegation whatsoever. Hard to say how of this number is just political grandstanding.
10,000 perhaps is too many, but 45 is too few.