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U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

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Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#51

Post by [deleted] »

quotemstr wrote: post #43
mmhsieh wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The logic behind test bans (in conjunction with numerical caps on warheads) is to create uncertainty in the reliability of one's own arsenal to discourage either side from contemplating a first-strike.

I'm not sure about that. What if you're convinced that your brilliant scientists have created working warheads while you think the enemy's dolts haven't been able to keep their arsenal working? What if your enemy thinks the same thing in reverse? I think there's always a temptation to overestimate one's own capability and underestimate the sophistication of others.

[deleted]

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#52

Post by DuskStar »

jcranmer wrote: post #48
caycep wrote: post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Granted, Yamamoto himself had no illusions re: a protracted struggle between Japanese industry, vs. American industry of the '30's/'40's era. Assuming no loss of political will, I suspect even in a worse case scenario where the US lost all its 3 carriers, it would still have eventually produced enough to win the war. Just maybe it would have taken several years longer...

In 1943, the US was commissioning an Essex-class carrier more or less every month, so the extra time would have been closer to "several months longer" instead.

Yeah - the US commissioned 17 fleet carriers, 9 light carriers and a whopping 76 escort carriers over the course of the war. Japan? 7, 1 and 4.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#53

Post by cameldrv »

rshnotsecure wrote: post #12

It’s very likely that the torpedoes did not work for the whole war really. It sometimes is scary to think about all the complaints sub commanders put in, only to be dismissed by the Department of the Navy as excuses for bad leadership or tactics. I get that you have to take this line sometimes but still... That being said it should be noted US Naval strategy has never particularly relied on subs or been that great at…

As others have said, the Belgrano, but also the Cheonan, and the Khukri have all been sunk by torpedos since WWII.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#54

Post by jcranmer »

ceejayoz wrote: post #35
jcranmer wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Success in 1942 meant Japanese domination of the entire Pacific, including areas of the Soviet Union. Japan and the Soviet Union did not go to war with each other until August 1945.

Sure, because "Success in 1942" didn't happen. It might've happened if Midway had gone differently.

I'm still dubious. Adding a new theater to the war when your other theaters are already stalling without a decisive victory is generally not a winning measure. The naval victory is only at best a temporary reprieve: the US is going to replace all its lost carriers within a year, and is similarly going to replace all the capital units [1] it lost at Pearl Harbor by that time. The Japanese didn't think themselves capable of mounting an invasion of the USSR before about mid-1943, by which point it was beginning to feel pressure on other fronts, and the IJA would start raiding the Manchurian army groups for manpower to keep from losing on the fronts they were already engaged in.

[1] Again, recall that to Japanese strategic thinking at this time, it's the battleship strength that matters. Carriers are just a sideshow.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#55

Post by NeedMoreTea »

DuskStar wrote: post #39
NeedMoreTea wrote: post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No it wasn't keeping them contained, but it was an attempt to draw out the US carriers. Had the US lost Midway and Japan not got bogged down in the endless, unwinnable campaign in the Solomons that absorbed endless Japanese resources, Yamamoto's plan may have worked as his stepping stone to Hawaii. Only Midway and they probably couldn't have kept it... Had they got to Hawaii, I'm not sure Japan would have cared much…

My understanding is that while the US losing her carriers at Midway would have allowed Japan free reign in the South Pacific for a few months, that was already the case for anywhere that all 6 fleet carriers showed up. Nothing the US had - combined, worldwide - could match those 6. Killing the US carriers at Midway was just to turn it from a 6v3 to a 6v0 - instead it ended up 2v2, but so goes war. Japan invading Hawa…

You are right of the unarguability of US manufacturing against Imperial Japan's, but that inevitability still doesn't eliminate the time recapturing territory that had Japanese presence. Their no surrender policy made island recaptures slow, brutal and ugly. Even with carrier provided air superiority.

Had they got to Hawaii, I imagine the experience would have been similar to all Japanese occupied territories -- famine, brutality, extensive forced labour and systemic murder. So long as the troops are fed, and enough comfort women can be found, nothing much else mattered...

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#56

Post by NeedMoreTea »

caycep wrote: post #46
NeedMoreTea wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Strategically crucial in a Pacific that had seen most everything the Japan side of Midway fall. If Midway had fallen, New Guinea, Coral Sea and Fiji were next in line, putting Australia and New Zealand at risk. What you call minimal gain would, had Yamamoto's plan come off, have put over 60% of the Pacific under Imperial Japanese control. US would have been fighting their way across the Pacific, island to island at a…

Granted, Yamamoto himself had no illusions re: a protracted struggle between Japanese industry, vs. American industry of the '30's/'40's era. Assuming no loss of political will, I suspect even in a worse case scenario where the US lost all its 3 carriers, it would still have eventually produced enough to win the war. Just maybe it would have taken several years longer...

That's roughly my interpretation too -- there's no way Japan could out-manufacture US industry, and the difference in materiel, ship building and aircraft production wins out, even if Midway had been a catastrophic US loss.

I suspect a couple of years longer is much nearer the mark than a few months as the Japanese dug to never surrender, but second guessing history is a no cost game... Who knows what other dominoes would have fallen, and where, in the extra time.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#57

Post by m4rtink »

jandrese wrote: post #45

> Because of this logistics fiasco, veteran submariner and historian Paul Schratz said he ‘was only one of many frustrated submariners who thought it a violation of New Mexico scenery to test the A-bomb at Alamagordo when the naval torpedo station was available.’ LOL. Another interesting fact about the US torpedoes is that they were slow by WWII standards, especially compared to the Japanese torpedoes. This is normal…

It's important to note that the torpedoes Japanese generally used we powered by compressed pure oxygen, making them faster & giving them more range.

But it also turned them into even bigger explosion hazard than normal torpedoes when the ship caring them is hit. As a result many Japanese ships are documented going down after what would normally be minor hits due to their oxygen torpedoes exploding and causing massive damage.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#58

Post by swiley »

jandrese wrote: post #45

> Because of this logistics fiasco, veteran submariner and historian Paul Schratz said he ‘was only one of many frustrated submariners who thought it a violation of New Mexico scenery to test the A-bomb at Alamagordo when the naval torpedo station was available.’ LOL. Another interesting fact about the US torpedoes is that they were slow by WWII standards, especially compared to the Japanese torpedoes. This is normal…

IMO that really is the point of weapons at the end of the day: to scare your enemies into giving up some resource. Any damage caused is only to remind them that they should be scared.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#59

Post by reddog »

NeedMoreTea wrote: post #56
caycep wrote: post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Granted, Yamamoto himself had no illusions re: a protracted struggle between Japanese industry, vs. American industry of the '30's/'40's era. Assuming no loss of political will, I suspect even in a worse case scenario where the US lost all its 3 carriers, it would still have eventually produced enough to win the war. Just maybe it would have taken several years longer...

That's roughly my interpretation too -- there's no way Japan could out-manufacture US industry, and the difference in materiel, ship building and aircraft production wins out, even if Midway had been a catastrophic US loss. I suspect a couple of years longer is much nearer the mark than a few months as the Japanese dug to never surrender, but second guessing history is a no cost game... Who knows what other dominoes…

Yeah, the US GDP was 4x Japans at the start of the war and 7x bigger at the end. Japans fate was sealed on Dec 7th, 1941.

But would a Midway disaster have extended the war 2 years? The US would become the worlds only nuclear power in 1945 and start cranking out atomic bombs no matter what happened at Midway.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#60

Post by chiph »

Smoosh wrote: post #42
stcredzero wrote: post #5

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — The Department of Energy said tonight that approximately three‐quarters of the A‐1 model Polaris nuclear warheads deployed on submarines in the mid‐1960's were probably “duds” because of mechanical defects. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/02/archives/early-polaris-mi... To be fair, the Japanese had really good torpedos at the start of WWII, but there were other things which were just as unproven…

Another example is when the M16 rifle was first introduced in the Vietnam War, it was unreliable due to fouling.

That was the Army's fault. They changed the powder from the one specified by Colt and the Air Force. They didn't require the troops to clean their weapons (wtf?), and the Ordnance Corps desperately wanted the M-16 to be a lighter M-14.

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1981/06/m-16-a-...

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