U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998) • Hacker News Board

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#41

Post by jcranmer » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:29 PM UTC

NeedMoreTea wrote: post #37

DuskStar wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're assuming that Japan could have kept Midway resupplied, let alone defended it. From what I understand, that's very questionable. Midway wasn't keeping Japan contained in the South Pacific - the two were as militarily separated as Midway and the Aleutians. Japan probably could have taken the South Pacific in early 1942, in fact - but instead divided her fleet carriers up piecemeal, available to be defeated in de…

No it wasn't keeping them contained, but it was an attempt to draw out the US carriers. Had the US lost Midway and Japan not got bogged down in the endless, unwinnable campaign in the Solomons that absorbed endless Japanese resources, Yamamoto's plan may have worked as his stepping stone to Hawaii. Only Midway and they probably couldn't have kept it... Had they got to Hawaii, I'm not sure Japan would have cared much…

The Japanese probably never had the logistical capacity to actually capture Hawaii. Hawaii is a supply chain 4000 miles away, and is not exactly rich in natural or industrial resources that can sustain itself. Getting a major fleet to Hawaii would eat up most of the IJN's support ships, and if someone at Pearl Harbor had the presence of mind to destroy the fuel tanks there before retreating, the IJN would have its fleet stuck there without any means of resupply, which would be easy pickings for the USN to recapture.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#42

Post by Smoosh » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:29 PM UTC

stcredzero wrote: post #5

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — The Department of Energy said tonight that approximately three‐quarters of the A‐1 model Polaris nuclear warheads deployed on submarines in the mid‐1960's were probably “duds” because of mechanical defects. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/02/archives/early-polaris-mi... To be fair, the Japanese had really good torpedos at the start of WWII, but there were other things which were just as unproven…

Another example is when the M16 rifle was first introduced in the Vietnam War, it was unreliable due to fouling.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#43

Post by quotemstr » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:32 PM UTC

mmhsieh wrote: post #11

quotemstr wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which is why the nuclear test ban is, IMHO, a bad idea. A nuclear deterrent must be credible to be effective. If an adversary comes to believe that, say, 80% of our warheads are duds and most of theirs work, the logic of retaliation may come to favor a first strike.

The logic behind test bans (in conjunction with numerical caps on warheads) is to create uncertainty in the reliability of one's own arsenal to discourage either side from contemplating a first-strike.

I'm not sure about that. What if you're convinced that your brilliant scientists have created working warheads while you think the enemy's dolts haven't been able to keep their arsenal working? What if your enemy thinks the same thing in reverse? I think there's always a temptation to overestimate one's own capability and underestimate the sophistication of others.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#44

Post by InTheArena » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:33 PM UTC

rocketpastsix wrote: post #2

They talk about it in the movie "Midway" (2019). It's definitely one of those things a lot of people thought was embellished to make the incoming battle of Midway look more drastic. However it was absolutely true. Without the dive bombers and code breaking they were able to do in the lead up Midway would have been a disaster for the Americans.

Midway was surprisingly accurate.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#45

Post by jandrese » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:34 PM UTC

> Because of this logistics fiasco, veteran submariner and historian Paul Schratz said he ‘was only one of many frustrated submariners who thought it a violation of New Mexico scenery to test the A-bomb at Alamagordo when the naval torpedo station was available.’

LOL.

Another interesting fact about the US torpedoes is that they were slow by WWII standards, especially compared to the Japanese torpedoes. This is normally a fairly bad flaw because it gives the enemy ship more time to dodge the torpedo, however in the Battle off Samar it turned out to be an advantage as they allowed the torpedoes fired by a tiny destroyer managed to scare the mighty battleship Yamato away from the battle for quite a long time because the torpedoes took so long to arrive that the Yamato was well out of position once they finally missed.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#46

Post by caycep » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:37 PM UTC

NeedMoreTea wrote: post #28

DuskStar wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ehhh. There's a lot of people that seem to think that Midway would have been a disaster for the US if they lost, but there's not much reason behind this. The only thing the US was really risking that had a significant strategic impact were the carriers - if the island of Midway fell it would have been essentially unsupportable by Japanese forces (being far past Japan's supply lines, when Japan was already facing logi…

Strategically crucial in a Pacific that had seen most everything the Japan side of Midway fall. If Midway had fallen, New Guinea, Coral Sea and Fiji were next in line, putting Australia and New Zealand at risk. What you call minimal gain would, had Yamamoto's plan come off, have put over 60% of the Pacific under Imperial Japanese control. US would have been fighting their way across the Pacific, island to island at a…

Granted, Yamamoto himself had no illusions re: a protracted struggle between Japanese industry, vs. American industry of the '30's/'40's era.

Assuming no loss of political will, I suspect even in a worse case scenario where the US lost all its 3 carriers, it would still have eventually produced enough to win the war. Just maybe it would have taken several years longer...

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#47

Post by DuskStar » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:39 PM UTC

mynameishere wrote: post #33

ceejayoz wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

6-12 months of Japanese free reign in the Pacific might've led to conditions in which the US would've pursued a negotiated peace, though.

6-12 years of Japanese total domination in the Pacific would have led to their eventual defeat. Their probability of victory was zero from day one of the war.

I'd say it was zero as soon as they gave the US such a large piece of internal propaganda (the attack on Pearl Harbor). Without that, and without a declaration of war, Japan might have been able to ignore US forces in the Pacific. Getting the US to attack Japan in response to attacks on countries full of lesser peoples would have been a difficult proposition, and the willingness to fight on through the slog that the South Pacific became might not have been there.

But after Pearl Harbor...

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#48

Post by jcranmer » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:39 PM UTC

caycep wrote: post #46

NeedMoreTea wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Strategically crucial in a Pacific that had seen most everything the Japan side of Midway fall. If Midway had fallen, New Guinea, Coral Sea and Fiji were next in line, putting Australia and New Zealand at risk. What you call minimal gain would, had Yamamoto's plan come off, have put over 60% of the Pacific under Imperial Japanese control. US would have been fighting their way across the Pacific, island to island at a…

Granted, Yamamoto himself had no illusions re: a protracted struggle between Japanese industry, vs. American industry of the '30's/'40's era. Assuming no loss of political will, I suspect even in a worse case scenario where the US lost all its 3 carriers, it would still have eventually produced enough to win the war. Just maybe it would have taken several years longer...

In 1943, the US was commissioning an Essex-class carrier more or less every month, so the extra time would have been closer to "several months longer" instead.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#49

Post by m4rtink » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:39 PM UTC

stcredzero wrote: post #5

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — The Department of Energy said tonight that approximately three‐quarters of the A‐1 model Polaris nuclear warheads deployed on submarines in the mid‐1960's were probably “duds” because of mechanical defects. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/02/archives/early-polaris-mi... To be fair, the Japanese had really good torpedos at the start of WWII, but there were other things which were just as unproven…

The japanese 25 mm AA gun seems to be considered pretty bad as well, at least by western WWII historians.

Re: U.S. Torpedo Troubles During World War II (1998)

#50

Post by m4rtink » Thu, Jan 16, 2020, 9:41 PM UTC

Smoosh wrote: post #42

stcredzero wrote: post #5

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — The Department of Energy said tonight that approximately three‐quarters of the A‐1 model Polaris nuclear warheads deployed on submarines in the mid‐1960's were probably “duds” because of mechanical defects. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/02/archives/early-polaris-mi... To be fair, the Japanese had really good torpedos at the start of WWII, but there were other things which were just as unproven…

Another example is when the M16 rifle was first introduced in the Vietnam War, it was unreliable due to fouling.

This was prominently shown in the first Vietkong game, including having to use just 20 round clips when using it to reduce the chance of fouling happening. Quite a nice touch.