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A Guide to WebAuthn

webauthn.guide

111–120 of 122 posts

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#111
post #106

My spider-senses are tingling: Is this tracking I can't get rid of?

I mean, if you are logged in, the service already knows who you are.

I guess your public key could get associated with your identity. But the pub key is only sent when you register, I believe. So I can't see how this would be used for tracking.

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#112

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately for the user experience, those tokens typically can’t be cloned even upon initial setup. The practical result of this is that if you intend to keep a second token as a backup, you need to remember to register the backup token individually for each service you use your primary one for. This is unlikely if you keep the backup at home, and it’s downright impractical if you kept it in e.g. a safe deposit bo…

There are other recovery modes that don't require a second token. One common example is a sheet of recovery codes you receive at the enrolling stage that you are prompted to print and store somewhere safely.

I've got a system where I mail these one time codes (via snail mail) to a family member as a failsafe. I only use this for 2fa, but that ensures that if I lose my key while say out of the country, I can call my family member and they can read me some codes over the phone.

It's a bit archaic in a way, but works wonderfully as an accessable and relatively secure backup strategy.

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#113

I didn't read the whole thing, but the first few paragraphs make it sound almost exactly like SQRL (ie. no secrets to keep).

SQRL used to be a nice protocol, now it's a completely unusable monster with more than 100 pages of technical documentation.

If you're interested in something similar that actually works and is very simple, take a look at https://github.com/btcontract/lnurl-rfc/blob/master/spec.md#...

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#114
Why is everybody acting as if this is some kind of solution to password-based auth? Can you even imagine a world in which a big chunk of the population carry these tokens around and never ever lose them?

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#115

In the future, what will prevent some random border officer from pointing my phone to my face and unlocking all my social media, google/Apple accounts, mail, bank etc?

What's stopping them from doing that now?

My password, pin, whatever, is in my head

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's stopping them from doing that now?

My password, pin, whatever, is in my head

In that case you should probably not use this, or if you do, sign out of your accounts. If you're worried about Face ID, you can actually temporarily disable it easily (without even looking at your device) by holding down the power button and volume up until it vibrates.

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#117

This guide focuses on what WebAuthn looks like for the server. What does it look like for the user? As far as I can imagine, it boils down to relying on the possession of a certain piece of hardware instead of knowing a certain password. That is, I have to carry around some kind of USB device and plug it into every computer I want to use. The device holds all my secret keys and does all the magic behind the scenes. B…

The most common use case today is 2FA, where WebAuthn is the standard way to do something U2F defined only for 2FA. In this scenario where it's only a second factor, yes, it relies on you possessing a Security Key, and on the bad guys not possessing it. This matches the threat model, which is typically that bad guys are not your flatmate or your mother they live in another country and will never meet you. WebAuthn (a…

What is a "pessimised hash"?

A Google search only turns up HN posts written by you.

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They are stored on hardware tokens. There does not seem to be a way to have privately generated software keys, nothing like putty's pageant or .ssh/authorized_keys. WebAuthn seems to be designed by big businesses to take control of the authentication ecosystem.

There are already open source hardware and software available by the people at SoloKey. Both Nitrokey and SoloKey sell the tokens.

If you are looking for a solution that supports FIDO2 and also functions as a hardware password manager (lots of sites still don't even support security keys) check out OnlyKey - https://onlykey.io/

OnlyKey is also open source here are some of the features: - On device PIN - FIDO2 (15 Resident keys) - TOTP (24 accounts) - Static passwords (24 passwords up to 56 char long) - OpenPGP

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The most common use case today is 2FA, where WebAuthn is the standard way to do something U2F defined only for 2FA. In this scenario where it's only a second factor, yes, it relies on you possessing a Security Key, and on the bad guys not possessing it. This matches the threat model, which is typically that bad guys are not your flatmate or your mother they live in another country and will never meet you. WebAuthn (a…

Unfortunately for the user experience, those tokens typically can’t be cloned even upon initial setup. The practical result of this is that if you intend to keep a second token as a backup, you need to remember to register the backup token individually for each service you use your primary one for. This is unlikely if you keep the backup at home, and it’s downright impractical if you kept it in e.g. a safe deposit bo…

There are tokens that support this. OnlyKey has a secure backup feature where you can have an encrypted backup file. If you lose your physical key you would just load the backup file onto a new key and all of your accounts are ready.

https://onlykey.io/

https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-...

Allowing backups is as you mentioned a tradeoff of security vs usability. The greatest risk to your accounts is not always account compromise, it can be losing access to your own accounts. With OnlyKey you can choose to enable this feature or not. Backup requires user physical presence and restore requires the backup file and correct key/passphrase.

Re: A Guide to WebAuthn

#120
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sell? Bingo! That's what I was talking about.

SoloKeys person here ;) You can implement software authenticators (listening on local USB port), I imagine some password manager people will do so eventually, or have a direct way to hook into requests. Krypton did this for U2F. Hardware keys are for if you want hardware security, obviously they can't be free unless you want someone with a different business model to subsidise them.

Yes software authenticators that use a security key for OTP are a good option. This is what Yubikey does with the Yubikey Authenticator. As with most security things there are tradeoffs to each approach. The pro of a software authenticator is that you can have an unlimited number of accounts, the con is that it requires the user to install an app on their phone/computer (in some cases the OTP shows up in a desktop app it may be possible for hacker to intercept). With the OTPs being generated and typed by the key itself the pro is that you don't have to install an app and login can be faster because the OTP is typed for you, no reading and typing it manually (also harder to phish). The con being you can't store unlimited accounts and since the key is typing the OTP the key has to be physically connected to a phone/computer.
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