Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

I accept you perceive pain in the context of a self.

> you can't have an illusion of consciousness, because an "illusion" requires consciousness.

I think this might be the core of our disagreement. I don't know why you think that?

An illusion is just a false perception of reality so it doesn't technically require consciousness - but I think I know what you're getting at.

Imagine a computer which can "see" its surroundings through a camera.

Why couldn't I program this computer to think it's conscious and to experience its visual data in the context of a self? That's what I honestly think we're doing and what you're describing when you talk about consciousness.

I don't know why the experience you're calling consciousness can't just be explained more easily by your brain processing sensory inputs in the context of a self. I understand to you this feels like a special thing, but from a physical perspective I honestly don't know what you're describing that couldn't be explained as sensory inputs in the context of a self.

Would I be right in thinking you don't believe my example computer is conscious? And would it help you understand my position if I said I think my computer might be conscious in a very primitive way?

If taken to its logical ends, constructs like the crayon box and human fucking empathy are off the table too - I cannot and do not have any idea of who or what you are being, therefore I cannot comprehend consciousness? What?

In short, I am a computationalist[1]: consciousness is a pattern that may appear in physical processes. I expect it can be translated into different physical processes. I think the definitional boundary separating conscious processes from other processes is subjective, even if there are common landmarks we generally agree are on one side or the other.

That seems all well and good. However I am not a hard materialist[2]: I do not believe that physicalism addresses the hard problem of consciousness[3]. I like to note this by the absence of timelessness in my experience: the present moment seems to be distinguished from the perceived past and future only because I am experiencing it. Contrast this to a physical description or model of myself and my surroundings that seems sound without reference to a specific "present" moment. To see that such a model does not contain a "now", think about simulating it: you would need to choose a moment on the timeline to start, to insert a "now". Physical models don't seem to capture the notion of "present moment". Attempts to shoe-horn it in (with e.g. consciousness particles or what have you) seem simultaneously untestable and offensive to Occam's razor.

Subjective experience then seems to be unaccounted for. I am content saying it is not found in any model of physical processes, only in the physical processes themselves. Notice I am no longer talking about consciousness: the computation and brain state is still susceptible to description. Only the subjective experience, whose toe we can catch with the present moment, escapes.

Odd as it might sound, I find it tempting to say that the subjective experience is not personal. It seems incommunicable, but what I mean is that there is no aspect of myself in it: that's all over in the computation (incidentally I am reminded of one of the objections to "Cogito, ergo sum"[4].)

At this point, the idea of "Atman"[5] is starting to look pretty good (thank you those who found the Adviata link, I would not have.) However, besides Prof. Grim's touch on the topic I know nothing about it (haw). My impression of Atman is that it is ineffable, primitive and pervasive. It does not have a location because it is not a thing: it is an aspect of reality.

And now we arrive at panpsychism, or at least what I thought panpsychism is. Subjective experience, but not the computational content that gives rise to the more visible parts of consciousness, is a fundamental aspect of reality. Rocks have subjective experience. Rocks are not conscious, unless they include physical processes we choose to recognize as consciousness. A rock's subjective experience is a lot like your subjective experience of the IR spectrum, assuming that you are like me and have no qualia affected by it.

[0]: https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/mind-body-philosophy... [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum#Use_of_%22I%2... [5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advaita_Vedanta

I'm not great with words at the best of times, but I really struggle to convey my thoughts on this subject. I probably shouldn't have used the word experience here. Try this:

I perceive something which I understand to be a conscious experience, but I don't think it's real.

I think a computer with a webcam perceives, or "experiences" something in some sense of the word. I think the only difference is that humans experience these things through a concept of a self.

> I have (soft) evidence that I have a consciousness. I cannot share this evidence with you, therefore it is not hard evidence – this is the as yet unsurmountable problem with consciousness.

I'd say you have an intuitive conception which you're claiming is evidence. And I get why you think that because I think I'm conscious too. As I type these words and look at my monitor now I too have this experience of a me, or an I, perceiving and doing something.

Perhaps what you're asking is why this experience that I'm describing exists rather than nothing? And I think the simple answer to that is that if you perceived the world as if you were unconscious then you would perceive others and yourself as morally insignificant.

Your brain kind of has to say: Hey! Look at these things you're sensing, thinking and doing! That's you. And what's more there are others like you that can also experience hurt and other emotions.

If your brain doesn't say that you might as well kill yourself because pain and happiness are just boolean variables and not really manifestable experiences. Or in my opinion, illusions.