Live data from Hacker News

Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

scientificamerican.com

291–300 of 356 posts

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not sure if can even be attempted. If turns out to be a phenomenon that originates in a sub-Plank's scale then "machinery" isn't something conceptually possible there.

If consciousness, or any phenomenon that effects our physical world in a way we can perceive, originated from some mechanism that takes place on a sub-plank scale, then I think that it would be conceivable for some super advanced machinery to be able to effect or even replicate said phenomenon. Just not with our current level of technology

Well, semantics are stretching at that level a bit because while at sub-Plank it would still be technique/technology involved, I'm not 100% sure it can be called machinery. I don't discard that it could be machinery at our newtonian scale that creates an environment where that ultra-micro thing happens tho.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#292
I believe time is intrinsically linked with our experience of consciousness, maybe consciousness in general.

Sorry for the armchair philosophy, this is a topic I like to think about.

We know that time is the 4th dimension, all things exist in 4-dimensions and we just experience one 'slice' of this dimension at a time. The concept of something having 'not happened yet' really means 'we haven't experienced it yet' - it'd be like saying that the house 5 blocks away isn't on fire 'yet', simply because we haven't walked 5 blocks over and seen it yet. If we were able to move through time as freely as we move through other dimensions, then a house that catches on fire 'tomorrow' is really on fire 'now'('now' really isn't the right word here, but I don't think a better one exists) - we just have to walk down the street into tomorrow and see it.

In this way, we also exist as infants and as old men and women at the same time. We experience on infinitesimally small slice of ourselves at a time, each slice being a moment in time. Why don't we experience this all at once? Our body IS existing in the past and the future and the now, we are all tasting our 60th birthday cake right now, but we don't experience it yet.

There are two possibilities: Consciousness is the one thing that exists outside of time, such that instead of existing throughout our whole lifespan consistently and experiencing our whole life at once and constantly, we move through time experiencing one moment at a time, and maybe move into and out of time via birth/death. If you start thinking about memory this gets very interesting(as does the other possibility) in so far as memory is represented by the physical state of your brain and memory stores 'past' events. Basically implying that for some reason the 4D shape of your brain is such that on the 'future' side of your brain there are neurons arranged in such a way to describe what the state of your brain is on the 'past' side.

OR, consciousness does exist within 4 dimensions as our bodies do, and we ARE experiencing our entire lives at once. I don't know about you, but for me it FEELS like I'm only experiencing this single moment right now. But that doesn't mean I'm not also experiencing every other moment right now. At this moment in time, my brain is in a certain state(in terms of neurons and neurochemicals), that state encodes my memories and feelings that I have at this moment, personally I think that state encodes all the qualities of my consciousness, but I know this could be argued. So if I were experiencing all moments at once, then this moment would feel exactly like it would feel if this were the only moment I was experiencing. I would also be experiencing moments in the future, and in those moments this moment would be just a memory. So how do I know whether I'm experiencing those other moments as well right now, this current moment clearly feels unique to me and it seems like the only moment I'm experiencing, but maybe that's how all moments feel. Maybe there is a different 'me' experiencing every other moment right now, and I happen to be in this moment typing this message BECAUSE this moment IS the one where I happen to be sitting here typing this message. The me that's eating my 60th birthday cake is also doing that right now, and not thinking about the nature of consciousness, but maybe has a vague memory of this moment because the physical structure of my brain encodes 'previous' brain states as memories in 'future' brain states for whatever reason.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Alice: We can agree the brain is conscious, yes? Bob: Of course. Alice: But what if you scaled up all the neurons in the brain a factor of 2? Would it still be conscious? Bob: Sure, if it's the same system running the same way. There's no reason to expect it to matter. Alice: Then if it was a factor 4 larger? Bob: Absolutely. Human brains are sized as they are as a matter of evolutionary coincidence. Bird neurons are…

This scaling argument only works if the consituent molecules, atoms and particles also scale proportionally. If you scale the system but keep one end tied down it isn't the same system.

No, it holds much more strongly than that. The idea that consciousness can only arise in neurons shaped exactly like human neurons—and not, say, slightly larger neurons like exist in many other animals, or neurons with slightly different energy-carrying chemicals, or whatever—is implausible, because evolution isn't goal-directed. Evolution didn't find the one true physical layout that leads to conscious experience, because evolutionary strategies fundamentally can't solve those sorts of problems.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#294
post #211
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. > It's a lie our brain tells us [...] Who is "us"? Or, to be more precise, if your brain tells you that you're experiencing pain, than what is " you ", and what is " experiencing "? That's the question of consciousness. This is not somethi…

> You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. Well yeah, I experience something which I understand to be a conscious experience, but I don't think it's real. I accept there is an experience of consciousness, but I don't see any reason to believe it is real even though I think I expe…

> Well yeah, I experience something which I understand to be a conscious experience, but I don't think it's real.

To paraphrase, you're saying that you experience an experience, but this experience isn't real, therefore you're not experiencing it. This is a contradiction, and it doesn't make sense: Consciousness is the act of experiencing something, even if this "something" is not real. For example, experiencing a drug-induced hallucination is still a real phenomenon, even if the content of the hallucination is not real.

> I think my brain is sensing pain and telling me to perceive the pain in the context of "self".

You're using the words "I"/"me" and "perceive". Consciousness is the "I" that "perceives".

> This isn't a good argument. There's no hard evidence that there isn't an invisible elephant sat next to you right now.

I have (soft) evidence that I have a consciousness. I cannot share this evidence with you, therefore it is not hard evidence – this is the as yet unsurmountable problem with consciousness. In contrast, I have neither hard nor soft evidence that there's an invisible elephant next to me.

I'm sorry, I don't know how to explain this phenomenon to you. Maybe you're not conscious, and I'm figuratively trying to explain colors to a blind person. I consider it much more likely, however, that you're in denial of the evidence you have right in front of your inner eye.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#295
Panpsychism is interesting but I'm not convinced.

If I can summarise the idea it's answering the question "how can consciousness arise from unconscious matter (like the human brain)" with "it can't, matter is already conscious (i.e. it has conscious experience)".

It's a very simple explanation, a very Occamist explanation. But at the same time it is not _really_ an explanation. It just pushes the question back from "how can complex matter like the human brain be conscious?" to "how can simple matter like quarks be conscious?". But panpsychism does not even attempt to answer the further question- it's simply ignored. That is, panpsychism says that "matter is conscious" but it doesn't say _why_ matter is conscious, or what exactly consciousness _is_ after all. It just passes the buck.

So it's not very different than answering the question with "because God willed it". I mean, that's an answer too. It's a metaphysical answer- but so what? Panpsychism is not metaphysical but it's not more explanatory than God. Not until it explains _what_ consciousness is and _why_ quarks have it.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#296
post #250

Another point to make on panpsychism: how do people who reject the theory explain hierarchical life? To what level is a human conscious if its component cells aren't? Are ant colonies "conscious" due to the complexity of the behavior of the ants? Does that make ants less conscious? To an alien visitor, ant colonies can be considered single organisms, because they act with intent toward a specific goal and react to sp…

At what point in development does a child become capable of hearing and interpreting sounds? Can a human hear sounds even if the cells in it cannot? Do ant colonies contain a primitive hearing because they react to vibrations in the air? Does the USA, when it ‘reacts’ to hurricanes?

Not knowing where definitions land is tough, but it's wrong to think that ground reality gives a damn that you find it hard. I don't know precisely where consciousness starts when a human develops. I don't know what point its heart start beating either. None of this has any clear bearing on what the objective truth is, or how it's implemented.

It's not like we don't know anything about consciousness. We know consciousness is not metaphysics, because we can talk about it and affect it with physical actions. We know consciousness is a property of the brain, for similar reasons. The only sensible way of satisfying the prior two points is that consciousness exists at program-level (aka. it's not some opaque oracle hiding in protons), so we know that too.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#297
post #250

Another point to make on panpsychism: how do people who reject the theory explain hierarchical life? To what level is a human conscious if its component cells aren't? Are ant colonies "conscious" due to the complexity of the behavior of the ants? Does that make ants less conscious? To an alien visitor, ant colonies can be considered single organisms, because they act with intent toward a specific goal and react to sp…

>> To what level is a human conscious if its component cells aren't?

That is like asking "how can a car be a vehicle if its component parts aren't vehicles?". But we know that we can make things with new properties by combining things that do not have those properties. E.g. dough is sticky, but neither water now flour are. Whiskey is alcoholic, but rye is not. etc etc.

The hierarchical question is answersed by this intuition: that combining things in herarchies yields new things that didn't exist before, and with properties that none of the original components had.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#298
post #275

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are a human, I don't know for sure, but it seems reasonable to assume.

It's not a matter of assuming, it's a pretty serious point: Is there any test you can imagine that will prove anything about another person's consciousness? If not, then any discussion about consciousness is "handwavy" and "untestable." Tests about your own consciousness are interesting, but ultimately can't answer anything about consciousness in general, because they are by definition n=1, since you can't know if my…

I can't think of any test, no.

But I don't think this makes discussions about consciousness useless. If you tell me something about your consciousness I can check if it fits my experience, and you can test something I say for yourself.

What this means is that there might not be an absolute truth about this, only relative truths.

But then, this applies to anything, as no experience can happen outside of consciousness, so all of science is the same way.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#299
My only concern with the consciousness debate is purely from a self-preservation PoV. Here is a scenario to elaborate: 1) In fifty years compute horsepower is enough to be able to fully simulate a brain. 2) population of earth is 10B and climate change is really making the planet unlivable. 3) we believe that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon 4) we decide we'll invest in computronium and just continue our (& other species) lives in cyberspace 5) civilization opts-in to shed the mortal coil and jump to cyberspace.

now at this point some super advanced quantum computer realizes that wait a minute, we made some subtle mistake and there does seems to be something else (perhaps quantum) aspect to consciousness that we missed. so now essentially we have committed genocide on ourselves. I just want to be really really really sure that there is nothing else to consciousness before I give in to the 'emergent consciousness thesis'.

Personally, I like Roger penrose's 'Orchestrated objective reduction' theory of consciousness where he posits that proto-consciousness is an innate property of universe due to quantum wavefunction collapse. so essentially everytime there is a wf collapse its like the system had a conscious moment. human brain is just an instrument complex enough to 'catch' phenomena and turn it into a conscious experience. The 'how' part is where it gets murky, there have been some attempts to link it to microtubules in brain cells but nothing concrete yet. IMO its worth a serious look from biochemistry point of view.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#300

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I meant experience in the form of sensory perception, followed by inference and comparison. I suppose you mean experience that would be tinted by interpretation ?

Ultimately all experiences are mediated by ego (ahamkara) Advaita Vedantas says that ahamkara is a delusion caused by maya (delusion and imperfect cognition) so Brahman can only be known by a negative way I.e. “de-experiencing” all false cognitions. The Upanishad says Neti Neti (“[it is] not [this] [and] not [that]”) What remains is Brahman. Does anything remain? This is the big point of contention between Buddhists…

I understand what you mean. Yet when you are told something you have to be able to think "yes, this fits my experience, I can interpret it the way you say", otherwise you will not accept it as true.

You seem well versed in the matter, can you recommend sources to learn more about all this ?

Post reply on HN