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Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

scientificamerican.com

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Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#101

Post by fjfaase »

fsiefken wrote: post #10

Read Bernardo Kastrup's, a Dutch computer scientist and philosopher, criticism on panpsychism: " https://www.bernardokastrup.com/p/papers.html https://iai.tv/articles/will-we-ever-understand-consciousnes... https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/emtud2/bernardo... He proposes an alternative answer for the mind-body problem; idealism instead of materialism https://www.bernardokastrup.com/p/papers.html

Joscha Bach has an interesting take on how to combine idealism with materalism. See for example his 'The Ghost in the Machine' talk at 35C3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3K5UxWRRuY

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#102

Post by sebastianconcpt »

kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

You are not alone but is a gross oversimplification that of course doesn't explain a LOT of phenomenon.

Check this 9min David Chalmers interview about it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo&feature=emb_titl...

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#104

Post by criddell »

kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

> If I'm correct, then an illusion of consciousness makes complete evolutionary sense.

If you are correct, then actual consciousness would make sense as well, wouldn't it?

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#105

Post by PaulDavisThe1st »

kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

Sorry, but this barely scratches the surface.

The key problem of consciousness is not what we have an experience of (eg. "you're a real thing that thinks and feels"). It's the fact that it is possible to have any experience at all.

Yes, it seems quite likely that a great deal of what we are conscious of is an "illusion" created in our brains, albeit some rather handy illusions. But that doesn't get even one step closer to the core philosophical problem of how we (or anything else) is able to experience anything at all (including the illusion of being a real thing that thinks and feels)

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#106

Post by sebastianconcpt »

danharaj wrote: post #97
kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

How do you define an illusion without first positing a being that can experience (hence conscious) an illusion? What does it mean that consciousness is a 'lie our brain tells us', who are we? Are you assuming some form of cartesian dualism, or perhaps you are making a sort of homunculus argument? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

Right, the illusion hypothesis isn't consistent and also can't explain Qualia.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#107

Post by Vysero »

kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

It's not a lie lol our pain and the pain of others is important and worth caring about. If it's not, then what is? Nothing.. so far as I can see.

If that's a lie then you're going to have to define what it means to lie before I would acknowledge a lie is any different from the truth.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#108

Post by ajuc »

CuriouslyC wrote: post #81
ajuc wrote: post #9

Mu. The definition provided ("consciousness is experience") explains nothing, you cannot experimentally decide if atoms experience anything, the fact that they do or don't doesn't change any prediction for how they behave over time. It's meaningless, like wondering if magic exists but is actively hiding from us. Paranoia is that way. > Despite great progress in our scientific understanding of the brain, we still don’…

We already know atoms in aggregate experience something. That's settled. If you want to argue that individual atoms are incapable of feeling, then you need to explain how the interaction of atoms brings something distinctly non-physical into being. The ironic thing is your position is actually the one that requires additional evidence, while the position you're arguing against is well supported.

> If you want to argue that individual atoms are incapable of feeling, then you need to explain how the interaction of atoms brings something distinctly non-physical into being.

How do you know it is nonphysical? How is it more nonphysical than "rain" or "red" or "planet". Neither of these things shows up in any law of physics.

> We already know atoms in aggregate experience something.

What do you mean by "experience"?

> the position you're arguing against is well supported

The position I'm arguing against provides no predictions. I can make even better theory if you value that: "everything happens because of magic". I'll call it the ultimate theory of everything, because it explains everything and cannot be disproved.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#109

Post by TuringTest »

hosh wrote: post #74
bitL wrote: post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because there are a lot of scientific wackos that are trying to push it to mainstream without any proof, see e.g. PhDs in congnitive neuroscience with focus on art and whole conferences organized around such ideas. It looks like some New Age cult inside science. Whether it's true or not, there is no methodology how to measure it, putting it outside scientific domain. It's on the level of simulation hypothesis. The ra…

There's an assumption that consciousness must be a result of emergent properties. I am not sure something like that has been definitively proven. I think there will never be a proof of consciousness that will satisfy the standards set by scientific experimentation.

Orson Scott Card's sequels to Ender's Game explored the idea that consciousness is defined by an elementary particle, and emergent properties merely define the experiences that such consciousness has.

Re: Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

#110

Post by normalnorm »

kypro wrote: post #84

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kin…

The position you describe is known as "eliminative materialism": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

I find this position absurd for the following reason:

> The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial.

Yes, but who experiences this illusion? This explanation begs the question.

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