Earlier quoted context omitted.
> tune it so it’s slow enough without impacting overall usability (e.g. takes 50ms on your server) I want to insist that this is a very important part. If you are 99.9% of applications or websites out there, the only time you need to run that hash is at registration, login and password change. All of these case will be fine if it's a bit slow. Don't lowball it. Also informationally I would like to add that as part of…
Also you can do the stretching in the browser client (“server relief”) without losing security. Historically this would have meant a big performance penalty (and thus an advantage for attackers, who don't need to use your code) but JS and wasm are fast enough now that the price is fairly low.
Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
101–110 of 171 posts
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#102A lot of people in the comments are wondering about using SHA-2 vs Blake3 for password hashing. The answer is, neither of these is suitable by itself for password hashing. Sadly there’s still a lot of advice on the internet (and, sadly, real systems) which do things like store md5(password) in a database and call it a day. Blake2/3, SHA-2/3, and other cryptographic hash functions are meant to be fast , while also eff…
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
> which argues that we use too many rounds in symmetric constructions: our security margins are too high and don't match any of the best "practical" attacks. We're too paranoid for our own good. He suggests reducing the number of rounds for a number of constructions like AES, SHA-3, Blake2, etc. This seems a quite dangerous way of thinking. New attacks, methods to attack crypto are discovered regularly. A view years…
I don't know what his arguments are, and I don't have much of a clue about crypto, but perhaps his argument could go along the lines of "a secure algorithm shouldn't be secured just by increasing the number of rounds too much"?
Specifically at the end of the paper he argues that the choice of AES rounds is close to reasonable (and warrants little round reduction), and that ChaCha8 matches a reasonable number of rounds on AES (yielding a substantial 2.5x improvement in throughput vs. ChaCha20).
Following from these conclusions, I guess you could say that ChaCha12 is already quite ludicrously good, so ChaCha20 is downright wasteful. Not totally sure I agree yet with the specific numbers, but he makes a good point.
The paper also includes some helpful advice for those attempting to read cryptanalysis papers.
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#104A lot of people in the comments are wondering about using SHA-2 vs Blake3 for password hashing. The answer is, neither of these is suitable by itself for password hashing. Sadly there’s still a lot of advice on the internet (and, sadly, real systems) which do things like store md5(password) in a database and call it a day. Blake2/3, SHA-2/3, and other cryptographic hash functions are meant to be fast , while also eff…
I get md5 is pretty weak now, but what's wrong with sha-256 and a salt?
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not sure why you are downvoted. Your table looks more factual than the blake3's github.
RE: the downvotes; while I didn't partake, I know there is history between the BLAKE/BLAKE2/BLAKE3 author, JP Aumasson, and Rurban, in particular related to differing opinions over the publication of SipHash. Differing opinions here means that most of the cryptographic community agree that SipHash clears its claims as a PRF, while Rurban indicated he has found undisclosed vulnerabilities that he wishes not to publish…
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#106I look forward to a future point in time where Blake7 is released.
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#107A lot of people in the comments are wondering about using SHA-2 vs Blake3 for password hashing. The answer is, neither of these is suitable by itself for password hashing. Sadly there’s still a lot of advice on the internet (and, sadly, real systems) which do things like store md5(password) in a database and call it a day. Blake2/3, SHA-2/3, and other cryptographic hash functions are meant to be fast , while also eff…
I get md5 is pretty weak now, but what's wrong with sha-256 and a salt?
Generally you want slow, high cpu & memory hash functions for password hashing. This is the opposite of what md5/sha/blake aim for, as they want to be fast as possible. A fast hash allows the attacker to make many guesses very quickly (i think you can get something like 2 billion sha256 hashes a second with high end gpus). A slow hash makes it harder for the attacker to take lots of guesses (adding high mem usage helps protect against using alternate architectures like fpgas to speed things up).
Anyways, for passwords use something like argon2.
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#108A lot of people in the comments are wondering about using SHA-2 vs Blake3 for password hashing. The answer is, neither of these is suitable by itself for password hashing. Sadly there’s still a lot of advice on the internet (and, sadly, real systems) which do things like store md5(password) in a database and call it a day. Blake2/3, SHA-2/3, and other cryptographic hash functions are meant to be fast , while also eff…
I get md5 is pretty weak now, but what's wrong with sha-256 and a salt?
A practical password cracking rig can probably do upwards of 10^11 hashes per second. The same rig can only do 10^5 bcrypt hashes per second.
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also you can do the stretching in the browser client (“server relief”) without losing security. Historically this would have meant a big performance penalty (and thus an advantage for attackers, who don't need to use your code) but JS and wasm are fast enough now that the price is fairly low.
If you’re going to do this, make sure you still hash the client’s hash output on the server (you can use SHA-2 in this case since the client’s hash output will effectively be high-entropy if salted). Otherwise you will be vulnerable to a “pass the hash” attack where an attacker in possession of your stored password hashes simply passes the hash to login.
After reading more it seems the only mitigation is Layers of Security.
Re: Blake3 is 10 times faster than SHA-2
#110JP Aumasson just announced Blake3 at Real World Crypto a few days ago during the lightning talks. This was also right after he presented on "Too Much Crypto"[1] which argues that we use too many rounds in symmetric constructions: our security margins are too high and don't match any of the best "practical" attacks. We're too paranoid for our own good. He suggests reducing the number of rounds for a number of construc…
> which argues that we use too many rounds in symmetric constructions: our security margins are too high and don't match any of the best "practical" attacks. We're too paranoid for our own good. He suggests reducing the number of rounds for a number of constructions like AES, SHA-3, Blake2, etc. This seems a quite dangerous way of thinking. New attacks, methods to attack crypto are discovered regularly. A view years…
He does actually address this counterargument in his paper. In fact most of his paper is a rebuttal to this argument (the status quo wisdom, so to speak).