Live data from Hacker News

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

time.com

61–70 of 147 posts

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Building some intelligent machine is still possible within this limit. There is an example that it is possible: the human brain. But you are right that we could be more far away from that than what we think. And also that it may be that the limit of intelligence of some machine might actually not be so much be ahead of human intelligence. (Whereby, personally, I think that it should be theoretically and practically p…

I agree with you entirely, I'm sure strong AI will be reached. Even if we dropped down onto linear growth, I think strong AI isn't that far away. I just think exponential growth can't continue indefinitely as Kurzweil predicts.

I don't think he predicts exponential growth will continue indefinitely. Where did you get that from?

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#62
post #36
post #18

I remain unconvinced that a transplanted consciousness would really be the same person as opposed to a new, identical person. What's worse, it might be impossible to tell the difference since even the new consciousness wouldn't be able to know. … But it'd really suck to be the last generation before some significant increase in lifespan (say, up to 200) is reached.

If even the new consciousness isn't able to know, then what does "same" mean and what part of that definition aren't you satisfying? More acutely, why should you care about satisfying it?

It means you think you just spent $500m on your 'upload' when in reality you just committed some elaborate suicide, launching some other (very similar) chap into immortality.

Selfless, but unintentional.

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#63
post #43
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hint: You're using it right now. Hopefully.

Do you mean the Internet? How would that be intelligence? Or do you mean my brain? That's not artificial intelligence (at least not obviously artificial!). Edit: Maybe you meant a computer... but that would be quite a long shot. In short, spell it out, guys!

Why the downvote? Was the last sentence considered rude? I can only hope I wasn't downvoted for 'lack of IQ' in not understanding a hint...

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#64
post #18

I remain unconvinced that a transplanted consciousness would really be the same person as opposed to a new, identical person. What's worse, it might be impossible to tell the difference since even the new consciousness wouldn't be able to know. … But it'd really suck to be the last generation before some significant increase in lifespan (say, up to 200) is reached.

Assuming:

We could make a complete physical copy of a brain with all state information (neural connections, blood & solute concentrations, etc.) - along with the exactly body of the person with that brain.

Result: The copy wouldn't "feel" what's happening to the original. For example, if I fly the copy around the word and burn their hand - we wouldn't expect the other to feel it.

Likewise, we may be able to copy the brain in a computer simulation but your initial self wouldn't "feel" what happens to your computer self. I think you're right in saying the copy-consciousness wouldn't know it wasn't "real".

Something like hooking your brain to the computer (like The Matrix) seems like it'd probably be the only way to make you experience consciousness - but that's of course linked to our death. Unless perhaps we could slowly replace neurons with computer-based copies over time so that the effect would be slow enough that you could adapt. Then you could perhaps over-clock the brain when all of the cells are the computer ones? Just a thought...

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#65
post #18

I remain unconvinced that a transplanted consciousness would really be the same person as opposed to a new, identical person. What's worse, it might be impossible to tell the difference since even the new consciousness wouldn't be able to know. … But it'd really suck to be the last generation before some significant increase in lifespan (say, up to 200) is reached.

Assuming:

We could make a complete physical copy of a brain with all state information (neural connections, blood & solute concentrations, etc.) - along with the exactly body of the person with that brain.

Result: The copy wouldn't "feel" what's happening to the original. For example, if I fly the copy around the word and burn their hand - we wouldn't expect the other to feel it.

Likewise, we may be able to copy the brain in a computer simulation but your initial self wouldn't "feel" what happens to your computer self. I think you're right in saying the copy-consciousness wouldn't know it wasn't "real".

Something like hooking your brain to the computer (like The Matrix) seems like it'd probably be the only way to make you experience consciousness - but that's of course linked to our death. Unless perhaps we could slowly replace neurons with computer-based copies over time so that the effect would be slow enough that you could adapt. Then you could perhaps over-clock the brain when all of the cells are the computer ones? Just a thought...

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#66
post #18

I remain unconvinced that a transplanted consciousness would really be the same person as opposed to a new, identical person. What's worse, it might be impossible to tell the difference since even the new consciousness wouldn't be able to know. … But it'd really suck to be the last generation before some significant increase in lifespan (say, up to 200) is reached.

How do you know that the instance of you that awakes every morning is really the "same" consciousness as went to sleep the night before? :-)

Buddhists say it's not.

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#67
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with you entirely, I'm sure strong AI will be reached. Even if we dropped down onto linear growth, I think strong AI isn't that far away. I just think exponential growth can't continue indefinitely as Kurzweil predicts.

I don't think he predicts exponential growth will continue indefinitely. Where did you get that from?

This line: "Kurzweil calls it the law of accelerating returns: technological progress happens exponentially, not linearly."

He doesn't bracket his law with exponentially to a 'certain point' or 'is currently happening'. He claims it is a law that all technological progress currently happens and will always happen exponentially.

Perhaps I am misreading him, but I interpret predictions as claims that exponential growth will always continue.

Anyway. That aside, You can't use an exponential curve to make predictions about the future if you accept that the curve will end at some point. If you accept the curve will change and you can't know the point of change then you can't use it to make a prediction.

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Building some intelligent machine is still possible within this limit. There is an example that it is possible: the human brain. But you are right that we could be more far away from that than what we think. And also that it may be that the limit of intelligence of some machine might actually not be so much be ahead of human intelligence. (Whereby, personally, I think that it should be theoretically and practically p…

I agree with you entirely, I'm sure strong AI will be reached. Even if we dropped down onto linear growth, I think strong AI isn't that far away. I just think exponential growth can't continue indefinitely as Kurzweil predicts.

I think his proposition is roughly, that a singular technology grows on an S-curve, but as each one technology slows another picks up the baton and runs with it, and the totality (sum of S-curves) has historically looked exponential, and promises to continue.

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#69
Progress hyperaccelerates, and every hour brings a century's worth of scientific breakthroughs. We ditch Darwin and take charge of our own evolution. The human genome becomes just so much code to be bug-tested and optimized and, if necessary, rewritten. Indefinite life extension becomes a reality; people die only if they choose to. Death loses its sting once and for all. Kurzweil hopes to bring his dead father back to life.

I am a theist because I believe that human beings - flawed, fallible, finite, and mortal - derive ultimate meaning and hope from believing in something that is bigger than themselves. Now, some will say that this is a delusion and that it is vital to maintaining an intelligent outlook on life that one stay with what is observable, verifiable, and controllable as a way both of explaining and living life. All of which is fine, as my point here is not to enter into non-hacker-related topics. But, that said, when I read statements like those quoted above from this article, I can't help but think that statements such as these reflect what is merely the scientific equivalent of needing to believe in something that is bigger than ourselves as part of retaining hope in this life - this taking the form, in Singularity thinking, of something akin to attaining human perfectability via an exponentially expanding knowledge base that presumably will be applied by humanity toward good and not toward evil. Obviously, this view is grounded in the science of what computers have done and potentially can do in the future but the final step in the analysis - that immortality will be achieved and that (it would seem) all major human problems will be solved through this superior intelligence - strikes me as being more about faith than about science.

Re: 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal

#70
post #18

I remain unconvinced that a transplanted consciousness would really be the same person as opposed to a new, identical person. What's worse, it might be impossible to tell the difference since even the new consciousness wouldn't be able to know. … But it'd really suck to be the last generation before some significant increase in lifespan (say, up to 200) is reached.

Luckily, Quantum Mechanics has that covered: the notion of swapping 2 identical particles doesn't make physical sense (that statement has testable consequences). This notion of "no swap" can of course be extended to larger things, like a whole human body.

Therefore, a sufficiently perfect copy of you _is_ you. For instance, if I freeze your body, copy it, then unfreeze the copy, it will not even end your conciousness and replace it by a new "identical" one. It simply does not make physical sense.

Now, uploading may be a bit different, (you wouldn't run on biological neurons any more), but it still looks like it should work. First, if the upload is of sufficient quality to permit a later download (I expect it to be), then when you're back to your physical body, QM says that your conciousness didn't end, but merely lived something while in a computer. I therefore expect my conciousness not to end, even if I'm never downloaded back. Further, I strongly suspect that conciousness is nothing more than a not yet understood mathematical property of running software.

For further reading, I strongly recommend the sequence on quantum physics by Eliezer Yudkowsky, on lesswrong. The introduction about philosophical zombies is also quite interesting. It's long, but you can absorb it in chunks.

http://lesswrong.com/lw/r5/the_quantum_physics_sequence/

Post reply on HN