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Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

npr.org

211–220 of 247 posts

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#211
post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To me, your attitude is that problems shouldn't exist because we should solve them, as if there's a magical process that guarantees perfection. But what happens when we miss something? What happens when an employee has a thought about an engineering technique that maybe didn't quite make sense, but speaking out would disrupt an entire chain of command within the culture we invest into day-in day-out, and they get dis…

We can cross that bridge when we get there. At the moment, getting there seems to be the problem because if you hide problems and you ignore the people complaining about them, then you get the situation we are in.

> if you're human, then you get the situation we are in.

Fixed that for you...

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#212
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm confident I'm a safer driver than at least 50% of the people on the roads - if I thought pilots were only as safe as an average driver I'd be worried.

I'm confident I'm a safer driver than at least 50% of the people on the roads So is almost everybody else. :) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_superiority#Driving_a...

Well, if you're only claiming median skill I don't think that applies.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your statements broke my brain... "The plane got approved, it must have been good enough, however grueling it got during the design process". But all evidence shows it wasn't good enough (the design killed some 300 people!), but it got rubber stamp approval.

> But all evidence shows it wasn't good enough Sure, but without additional context we can’t know what they were talking about, or whether those remarks were relevant to the final product.

Except, the quote you’re referring to was dated 2018.

The 737 MAX started operations in May 2017.

So the comment was after the plane was regularly flying, and people on the inside were STILL joking about its safety.

(0) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/09/boeing-737-...

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#214

Geez. > "Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't," says one employee to another, who responds, "No." > Peter DeFazio, [D-Oregon], called newly released documents "incredibly damning" That's hard to argue with. You'd like to think this kind of thing would... leak. Who said conspiracies involving hundreds of people are impossible?

Here on hn, on the other hand, there are plenty of people that say that they don’t see any problem in flying on the max once it is again in service. From my point of view I’ll happily let them be the guinea pigs while I’ll avoid at all costs to fly on that death machine.

I mean, I have already flown on them dozens of times prior to the catastrophic events, so I’m not really opposed to boarding them again after recertification.

Then again, it’s not clear to me what else they “covered up” or issues that this new article is focused on. I’d be happy for the FAA to delay them further and get to the bottom of this.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#215
post #6

Geez. > "Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't," says one employee to another, who responds, "No." > Peter DeFazio, [D-Oregon], called newly released documents "incredibly damning" That's hard to argue with. You'd like to think this kind of thing would... leak. Who said conspiracies involving hundreds of people are impossible?

Blow your whistle all you want but until something catastrophic happens, the whistleblowers would turn out the way the whistleblowers for the 737ng airframe cracking came out: fired and then ignored.

Whistle-blowing is misunderstood.

You can't just start leaking internal documents and making accusations without evidence. ...that will get you fired, and possibly in jail.

You need to talk to a lawyer, follow the legal process, and make allegations that you can PROVE.

So many whistle-blowers come out with wild stories (often true), but since they bring zero evidence to the table they are ignored. ...and if they have evidence, they just blindly leak it to the press without going through the process, which can endanger people/privacy and destroy IP.

Don't get me wrong - whistleblowers are important, but if you really want to make positive change and not just stick it to your employer - do it responsibly.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#216
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Blow your whistle all you want but until something catastrophic happens, the whistleblowers would turn out the way the whistleblowers for the 737ng airframe cracking came out: fired and then ignored.

Whistle-blowing is misunderstood. You can't just start leaking internal documents and making accusations without evidence. ...that will get you fired, and possibly in jail. You need to talk to a lawyer, follow the legal process, and make allegations that you can PROVE. So many whistle-blowers come out with wild stories (often true), but since they bring zero evidence to the table they are ignored. ...and if they have…

It feels like the problem is cultural. If the culture doesn't allow enough time for confidence in deliverables, then what proof would you have? Often there are a million items that can go wrong (although all tests pass). So probabilistically something is wrong, but there's no solid item to latch on to.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#217

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you missed the point, "will often express very blunt concerns about quality/risks in emails or PRs" means he straight up communicates any issue without sugar-coating. Which is what you want from a conscious employee. If despite that someone higher up in the decision chain ignores the issue (in the case of safety risks, that is criminal negligence), to continue to fight this battle is pointless and would only…

I think there's a fine line between communicating without sugar-coating and speaking past one's own local knowledge of a problem that a lot of engineers don't recognize.

There’s plenty of ways that an IC can misconstrue managers not acting on their advice, and usually they come down to a lack of understanding the organisation, or immaturity. Having learnt a lot of those lessons the hard way throughout my career, I’d like to think I usually don’t fall into those traps.

The most common one I’d say is when an IC thinks whatever they’re concerned about is much more important than the organisation thinks it is. In such a situation, as long as I’ve communicated my concerns to the right people, I never have any bitterness about an organisation accepting risks I’ve raised after proper analysis (unless of course, it has some impact, and then they start politically back pedalling the risk acceptance).

Personally, due to the nature of my work, I am often brought in to contribute to projects that are either well under way, or nearing completion. I will often find things that I think are risks or other issues at this stage. Any time this happens, there’s a whole bunch of things that could explain what I’ve found. Perhaps I’ve made a mistake in my assessment, perhaps there’s some mitigation (planned or otherwise) that I’m not aware of, perhaps they already know about it and have accepted it, perhaps there’s some major constraint I don’t know about... So I ask around and try find out if there are any easy answers. If not, then I’ll escalate it to other stakeholders. Usually phrased something like “I’ve noticed this, I think it’s an issue for these reasons, and could potentially cause such-and-such an impact”, sometimes with “I’d suggest we consider this alternative approach” and potentially “I’d recommend delaying delivery of this project to address these concerns if necessary”. Even at this stage, I don’t know all the facts, so I simply express my thoughts without claiming to have any definitive conclusions, and trying my best to qualify them with where I believe the limits of my knowledge/understanding are.

In a well run organisation, this will result in my concerns being proven either founded or unfounded, previously known or previously unknown, and some sort of action could result (even if that’s only risk acceptance, further investigation, or plans for future mitigation). In a dysfunctional organisation, my concerns will either be dismissed off the bat, or pointlessly argued about by political actors.

In my experience the latter reaction will usually come from incompetent management trying to conceals their failures, or incompetent contractors trying to defend their billable work. In the first case I’ll just make plans to leave the organisation. In the latter case I don’t really care. I’m a contractor myself, so my job is to deliver value to the employer (who would usually be happy with me in such a situation), I’m not particularly concerned about whether my work satisfies other contractors in that respect.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#218
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. Exactly this. They are literally saying: > [Sounding safety alarms is] inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate [ie punitive] action in response [to prevent any alarms on the next unsafe design].

Boeing were dangerously incompetent w.r.t the 777 MAX, but I have to disagree here - this isn't about putting down whistleblowing or dissenting opinions. What they're saying is they are gonna slap some people on the wrist and issue company wide memo saying something to the effect of "Please don't say stupid embarrassing stuff like this in the company chat or over email". However we are in agreement that this isn't a…

> slap some people on the wrist and issue company wide memo saying something to the effect of "Please don't say stupid embarrassing stuff like this in the company chat or over email".

While that's on the low end of the range of severity I'd expect, I can't help but point out that that is, in fact, punitive action and would, in fact, discourage (albeit probably not prevent) any warnings about the next unsafe design.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But all evidence shows it wasn't good enough Sure, but without additional context we can’t know what they were talking about, or whether those remarks were relevant to the final product.

Except, the quote you’re referring to was dated 2018. The 737 MAX started operations in May 2017. So the comment was after the plane was regularly flying, and people on the inside were STILL joking about its safety. (0) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/09/boeing-737-...

In that case the NPR article (which doesn’t mention a date) is just factually incorrect.

> Another damning exchange calls into question the safety of the 737 Max long before the plane was approved to fly passengers.

> "Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't," says one employee to another, who responds, "No."

If that quote was from 2018, then it’s from a year after FAA approval, not “long before” it.

I was criticising the reporting, not defending Boeing, and as you’ve kindly pointed out, the reporting is even more dubious than I had first thought.

Re: Boeing employees mocked FAA in internal messages before 737 Max disasters

#220

Geez. > "Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't," says one employee to another, who responds, "No." > Peter DeFazio, [D-Oregon], called newly released documents "incredibly damning" That's hard to argue with. You'd like to think this kind of thing would... leak. Who said conspiracies involving hundreds of people are impossible?

Here on hn, on the other hand, there are plenty of people that say that they don’t see any problem in flying on the max once it is again in service. From my point of view I’ll happily let them be the guinea pigs while I’ll avoid at all costs to fly on that death machine.

Unless they redesign the airframe, I don't think there is any way of fixing the aircraft. One of the requirements ought to be that the aircraft is capable of gliding when it loses power. Given that its airframe is unbalanced it will have a hard, neigh, impossible time "gliding". It will most certainly plunge to the earth killing all the souls onboard.
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