161–170 of 272 posts
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Ross Ulbricht would like to have a word with you.
they snatched his computer while it he was using it - open and unlocked
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In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses power, allowing the adversary to make a copy and read the decryption keys from RAM. Though if this is part of your threat model you should be much more concerned about a thousand more mundane problems, like adversaries reconstructing keystrokes from keyboard vibr…
How long does it take RAM to lose that data though? Most laptops take far more time to remove the ram than a PC and it's soldered down in a lot of cases.
I guess the higher the RAM capacity the shorter it would be because of the decrease in physical cell size.
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you'll still have to explain why there is a huge blob of seemingly random data on your hard drive if someone looks close enough.
With whole disk encryption the whole drive is seemingly random data, that's the point.
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In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses power, allowing the adversary to make a copy and read the decryption keys from RAM. Though if this is part of your threat model you should be much more concerned about a thousand more mundane problems, like adversaries reconstructing keystrokes from keyboard vibr…
If your attack vector is adversaries ready to deep freeze your laptop, perhaps you should do your computing in a more secure location :)
The killcord would have been useful for Ross Ulbricht (Silk Road) who was busted by the FBI after using his laptop in public - they grabbed it while he had it unlocked and didn't have time to put it in suspend.
Couldn't you just pair your computer with your phone (or something that you keep on you) via blue tooth, detect the loss of signal, and then trigger whatever action you'd like to trigger?
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If you are doing proper OpSec, you would have whole disk encryption anyway, in which case destroying the computer is largely unnecessary, I think. That said, the caveat of XKCD 538 ( https://www.xkcd.com/538/ ) still applies.
In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses power, allowing the adversary to make a copy and read the decryption keys from RAM. Though if this is part of your threat model you should be much more concerned about a thousand more mundane problems, like adversaries reconstructing keystrokes from keyboard vibr…
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If your attack vector is adversaries ready to deep freeze your laptop, perhaps you should do your computing in a more secure location :)
It's pretty common for law enforcement to quickly freeze RAM when busting hackers. I've definitely read of cases where suspects encryption keys were pulled from RAM using exactly this method. The killcord would have been useful for Ross Ulbricht (Silk Road) who was busted by the FBI after using his laptop in public - they grabbed it while he had it unlocked and didn't have time to put it in suspend.
I’d really love a citation on this, especially since “quickly” seems to imply that they’d do this out in the field.
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It's not pronounced "of", it's more like "ev", exactly like the contraction of words it's made up of. Would have.
To me "would of" and "would've" are pronounced exactly the same. If I said "would ev" that would sound weird. It would sound very similar to "whatev": https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=whatev
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In theory an adversary could deep-freeze the computer the moment the kill cord activates. Sufficiently cold RAM doesn't loose data immediately when it loses power, allowing the adversary to make a copy and read the decryption keys from RAM. Though if this is part of your threat model you should be much more concerned about a thousand more mundane problems, like adversaries reconstructing keystrokes from keyboard vibr…
If your attack vector is adversaries ready to deep freeze your laptop, perhaps you should do your computing in a more secure location :)
From tidbits in this thread, it sounds like a Veracrypt hidden volume with a distress passphrase, plus a fairly simple dead-man script wouldn't be hard to set up. Something like: kill sensitive processes, drop caches, wipe memory, then panic the kernel.