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The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

theatlantic.com

71–80 of 200 posts

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#71

I find this discussion a bit pedantic and ivory-towerish. Fact is that democracy is constantly under attack say voter suppression etc. The question should be about what can be done in practice to make democracy work better, not whether it "is" a perfect system or not. Democracy can be made to work better if people get informed, there are proposals like " https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquid_democracy" and https://en.…

The other question to ask, is "What actually works better?". Precious few governments in the history of man have not been large-scale atrocity generating machines. Democracies generally seem to offer most, more of a chance than the others. There's always Trump... in democracies, the Trumps are constrained by law. In most other cases, the Trumps wield absolute power. Pick your poison.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Agreed. One of the best features of small "d" democracy is that it lends the government a pretty powerful argument for legitimacy. Which is perhaps the most important feature a government needs to last. Edit: Consent of the Governed is probably the most powerful legitimacy arguments there is beside maybe Divine Right.

I disagree that democracy provides consent of the governed. To write with broad strokes: Half of people don't vote. Half that do don't get what they want. Half that do don't understand the issues, and without understanding can't give consent. You don't know what laws your representatives will write. You don't know how the obtuse legal language will be interpreted through a myriad of other legal artifacts by unelected…

I never said the argument was true. An argument can be powerful without being true. I didn't express my personal values in regards to democracy or any other form of government.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#73
post #7

"If we substitute the word indifference for the word liberty, we shall come much closer to the real intention that lies behind the classic argument. Liberty is to be permitted where differences are of no great moment. It is this definition which has generally guided practice. In times when men feel themselves secure, heresy is cultivated as the spice of life. During a war liberty disappears as the as the community fe…

I really loved and got a lot from his early books like Liberty and the News–about how democracy needs good journalism–and Public Opinion–about how public opinion was manipulated in WW1, and many other things. I've read it many times, one of my favourites. A Preface to Morals was the first Lippmann book I read, decades ago, and have read many times since. It's about..philosophy/spirituality and the deep needs of civilization.

Forgive me sharing a passage from Public Opinion, one of my favourite bits from any book. I call it "Two sides to a fact":

The statement is, I think, susceptible of overwhelming proof, that moral codes assume a particular view of the facts. Under the term moral codes I include all kinds: personal, family, economic, professional, legal, patriotic, international. At the center of each there is a pattern of stereotypes about psychology, sociology, and history. The same view of human nature, institutions or tradition rarely persists through all codes. There is a war supposed to affect all alike. Two men are partners in business. One enlists; the other takes a war contract. The soldier sacrifices everything, perhaps even his life. He is paid a dollar a day, and no one says, no one believes, that you could make a better soldier out of him by any form of economic incentive. That motive disappears out of his human nature. The contractor sacrifices very little, is paid a handsome profit over costs, and few say or believe that he would produce the munitions if there were no economic incentive. That may be unfair to him. The point is that the accepted patriotic code assumes one kind of human nature, the commercial code another. And the codes are probably founded on true expectations to this extent, that when a man adopts a certain code he tends to exhibit the kind of human nature which the code demands.

That is one reason why it is so dangerous to generalize about human nature. A loving father can be a sour boss, an earnest municipal reformer, and a rapacious jingo abroad. His family life, his business career, his politics, and his foreign policy rest on totally different versions of what others are like and of how he should act. These versions differ by codes in the same person, the codes differ somewhat among persons in the same social set, differ widely as between social sets, and between two nations, or two colours, may differ to the point where there are no common assumptions whatever. That is why people professing the same stock of religious beliefs can go to war. The element of their belief which determines conduct is that view of the facts which they assume.

That is where codes enter so subtly and so persuasively into the making of public opinion. The orthodox theory holds that a public opinion constitutes a moral judgment on a group of facts. The theory I am suggesting is that, in the present state of education, a public opinion is primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts. I am arguing that the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determines what group of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see them. That is why, with the best will in the world, the news policy of a journal tends to support its editorial policy; why a capitalist sees one set of facts, and certain aspects of human nature, literally sees them; his socialist opponent another set and other aspects, and why each regards the other as unreasonable or perverse, when the real difference between them is a difference of perception. That difference is imposed by the difference between the capitalist and socialist pattern of stereotypes. “There are no classes in America,” writes an American editor. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” says the Communist Manifesto. If you have the editor’s pattern in your mind, you will see vividly the facts that confirm it, vaguely and ineffectively those that contradict. If you have the communist pattern, you will not only look for different things, but you will see with a totally different emphasis what you and the editor happen to see in common. ...

And since my moral system rests on my accepted version of the facts, he who denies either my moral judgements or my version of the facts, is to me perverse, alien, dangerous. How shall I account for him? The opponent has always to be explained, and the last explanation that we ever look for is that he sees a different set of facts. Such an explanation we avoid, because it saps the very foundation of our own assurance that we have seen life steadily and seen it whole. It is only when we are in the habit of recognizing our opinions as a partial experience seen through our stereotypes that we become truly tolerant of an opponent. Without that habit, we believe in the absolutism of our own vision, and consequently in the treacherous character of all opposition. For while men are willing to admit that there are two sides to a “question”, they do not believe that there are two sides to what they regard as a “fact.” And they never do believe it until after long critical education, they are fully conscious of how second-hand and subjective is their apprehension of the social data.

So where two factions see vividly each its own aspect, and contrive their own explanations of what they see, it is almost impossible for them to credit each other with honesty. If the pattern fits their experience at a crucial point, they no longer look upon it as an interpretation. They look upon it as “reality”. It may not resemble the reality, except that it culminates in a conclusion which fits a real experience.

...For the opponent presents himself as the man who says, evil be thou my good. He is an annoyance who does not fit into the scheme of things. Nevertheless he interferes. And since that scheme is based in our minds on incontrovertible fact fortified by irresistible logic, some place has to be found for him in the scheme. Rarely in politics or industrial disputes is a place made for him by the simple admission that he has looked upon the same reality and seen another aspect of it. That would shake the whole scheme. – Public Opinion, 1922, p81

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#74
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree that democracy provides consent of the governed. To write with broad strokes: Half of people don't vote. Half that do don't get what they want. Half that do don't understand the issues, and without understanding can't give consent. You don't know what laws your representatives will write. You don't know how the obtuse legal language will be interpreted through a myriad of other legal artifacts by unelected…

You give consent for a given group of people to govern you, not for every decision they make. That would be direct democracy (and probably a clusterfuck).

> probably a clusterfuck

Why do you believes this? I'm not an advocate of direct democracy but I have no idea why this valuation is so ubiquitous.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I see no reason to believe that ignorance decreases the human desire to act politically.

I see no reason to disbelieve that ignorance decreases the human desire to act politically. If you don't know you've been wronged (or limited) and you don't know what change is effective, or you are supplied with necessarily limited misinformation...you spend your efforts in other pursuits.

I neither believe or disbelieve in this hypothesis. Given an absence of evidence upon the issue I see no reason to believe either way.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That reminds me of a truism I heard about protesting: The purpose of protesting is to demonstrate the need for violence to the fence-sitters. If protesting results in change non-violently, so much the better. But the purpose is to demonstrate that violence is absolutely necessary.

That seems like an odd thing to believe is a truism. Sure, it’s occasionally correct, but always? You believe that MLK and Gandhi were really in it for the violence?

Probably not, but there were other leaders within those larger protests who did believe in violence and called for it, but were not followed as much. From the government perspective, those leaders did present a threat of violence. Meaning that at any point Gandhi/MLK could fade into irrelevance and one of those leaders could lead the charge.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#77
post #5

I'll restate something that's often misunderstood about democracy. The use of elections is not to find the "best" leader (for any definition of "best" that you have) but to prevent civil unrest. It offers an alternative to pushing for opinions violently in order to be heard. For this it needs to offer a credible and legitimate path towards political changes.

> For this it needs to offer a credible and legitimate path towards political changes.

This, but it also needs to be trusted. The losers need to feel that they lost, not just be told they have by the winners.

This is why American democracy was stable after GWB’s initial election. Also, one of the reasons the UK voted to not change its voting mechanism in a recent referendum was that STV was portrayed as too “complicated”, while FPTP has an intuitive definition of “winner”.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#78
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You give consent for a given group of people to govern you, not for every decision they make. That would be direct democracy (and probably a clusterfuck).

> probably a clusterfuck Why do you believes this? I'm not an advocate of direct democracy but I have no idea why this valuation is so ubiquitous.

Have thought about this a bit. Moving towards DD used to seem like an obvious evolution to me, particularly with modern technology. Following recent political developments I see a lot more risks now.

First of all is how do we choose what to vote on; a lot of power is rests on whoever drafts and sets the "framing" of votes. If we also do this "directly" in some manner then the filtering mechanism is vulnerable, and if we try to crowd source all the things we are likely to get "government by reddit".

Direct democracy moves power away from politicians and towards media (traditional and social), celebrities, opinion makers. If you believe we live in a world of misinformation now, there is a potential for direct democracy to make that much worse.

It's also not obvious in a direct democracy how you would control for holistic things that result from many decisions. The obvious one is how do you balance a budget without making the voting process very complicated.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#79
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You give consent for a given group of people to govern you, not for every decision they make. That would be direct democracy (and probably a clusterfuck).

> probably a clusterfuck Why do you believes this? I'm not an advocate of direct democracy but I have no idea why this valuation is so ubiquitous.

Every attempt to democratise has been characterized this way. Representative democracy was once castigated as a chaotic rule by brutes.

Re: The Basic Problem of Democracy (1919)

#80
post #7

"If we substitute the word indifference for the word liberty, we shall come much closer to the real intention that lies behind the classic argument. Liberty is to be permitted where differences are of no great moment. It is this definition which has generally guided practice. In times when men feel themselves secure, heresy is cultivated as the spice of life. During a war liberty disappears as the as the community fe…

I really loved and got a lot from his early books like Liberty and the News –about how democracy needs good journalism–and Public Opinion –about how public opinion was manipulated in WW1, and many other things. I've read it many times, one of my favourites. A Preface to Morals was the first Lippmann book I read, decades ago, and have read many times since. It's about..philosophy/spirituality and the deep needs of civ…

> The point is that the accepted patriotic code assumes one kind of human nature, the commercial code another. And the codes are probably founded on true expectations to this extent, that when a man adopts a certain code he tends to exhibit the kind of human nature which the code demands.

Jane Jacobs wrote a whole book 70 years later about how important she thought this particular distinction was. (Her view is that both are necessary but that either can corrupt the other.)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_of_Survival

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