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Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

reuters.com

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Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#591

Post by [deleted] »

linuxftw wrote: post #567
chrisseaton wrote: post #385

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You have to be an engineer to understand safety. You're just restating the same thing without any actual arguments. Why do you need to be an engineer to understand safety? I don't know what magic training or experience do you think engineers get that nobody else does? And as I've already said, it looks to me that Boeing's chronic problems are leadership not technical . Get a leader in.

You have to be an engineer to understand safety. It should be abundantly clear what is meant by this. They're building aircraft. What do accountants know about building aircraft? Nothing, nothing at all. How can the buck stop with them? It can't. It has to stop somewhere lower, with an engineer, that understands safety. Unfortunately, a non-engineer won't know if their engineer underlings are A) Qualified or B) Compe…

[deleted]

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#592

Post by chrisseaton »

linuxftw wrote: post #567
chrisseaton wrote: post #385

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You have to be an engineer to understand safety. You're just restating the same thing without any actual arguments. Why do you need to be an engineer to understand safety? I don't know what magic training or experience do you think engineers get that nobody else does? And as I've already said, it looks to me that Boeing's chronic problems are leadership not technical . Get a leader in.

You have to be an engineer to understand safety. It should be abundantly clear what is meant by this. They're building aircraft. What do accountants know about building aircraft? Nothing, nothing at all. How can the buck stop with them? It can't. It has to stop somewhere lower, with an engineer, that understands safety. Unfortunately, a non-engineer won't know if their engineer underlings are A) Qualified or B) Compe…

You don’t need to be able to do your subordinates’ jobs in order to be able to lead or manage them or to take responsibility. In a big company like Boeing you can’t possibly know the job of all your subordinates so your elitism is never going to work.

How do you think for example the President of the United States effectively line manages people as diverse as defence and national parks without simultaneously being a soldier and a geographer? How do you think he judges qualification and competence of these people in globally significant safety jobs and how does he manage the buck stopping with him?

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#593

Post by camkego »

ethbro wrote: post #548
mlyle wrote: post #440

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The procedures and how software systems handle changes to launch time are members of the set of hundreds of thousands of choices made during design and implementation that need to be validated. Yes, they feel like a "silly mistake" but ultimately most things that lead to failure will be in that category.

Or, in other words, getting to space is hard because it requires millions of opportunities for silly mistakes. Most complex engineering projects are hard not because of one thing, but because of the mind-bogglingly large number of things that must all be done correctly. (1 - x) ^ y, where x is the chance of each small mistake and y is the total number of opportunities, doesn't need a very large x, if y is large enoug…

Yeah, this is a key insight, and something I didn't learn as a software developer with many years of experience until I studied probability formally. Maybe these days this is better known. This is also known as the inclusion-exclusion principal and can be used to model failure probability.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#594

Post by cmarschner »

rossdavidh wrote: post #488

So, realistically, what will happen? Not what _should_ happen, but what will actually happen? 1) the current board will continue 2) European (and other) regulators will not be impressed 3) Boeing sales vs. Airbus will not return to their previous levels for years, if ever; a goodly percentage of international travel will be locked up for Airbus 4) Boeing will also face more competition from SpaceX (and perhaps others…

Short term supply will be inelastic - Airbus wouldn’t be able to fill all the demand if customers turn their backs on Boeing. The opportunity might be for COMAC to gain some ground...

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#595

Post by inferiorhuman »

WalterBright wrote: post #578
inferiorhuman wrote: post #566

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The way to make things safe is to address ALL points in the zipper that led to the accident. That includes the pilot error aspects. So how do you propose training against an unfinished product? Boeing still hasn't given the FAA a completed software package to evaluate. At the time of the 737 MAX crashes there were, what? two? 737 MAX simulators, and none of them emulated MCAS or even the forces required to crank the…

> MCAS activation is not, and was not, a runaway stabilizer situation. It presented as a runaway stab trim. Repeatedly coming on and driving the nose down is runaway trim. No two ways about it. And the usual, standard, runaway trim procedure would stop it. > they had a third set of eyes that could spend time going through reams of documentation From my reading of that incident, nothing of the sort happened. The 3rd p…

It presented as a runaway stab trim. Repeatedly coming on and driving the nose down is runaway trim. No two ways about it.

No, it didn't. From the latest QRH:

Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously.

Well that's not met as MCAS doesn't run continuously. By design it stops periodically. Put it another way. You're arguing semantics while the 737 MAX remains a smoldering pile of aluminum and hubris.

2.) Control airplane pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as required.

4.) If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged ....

MCAS also stops after the trim switches are hit. So, again MCAS activation is not a runaway trim condition.

From my reading of that incident, nothing of the sort happened. The 3rd pilot simply reached forward and flipped off the cutoff switches.

Reread the report. The third pilot went back into the cabin to fetch reading material.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#596

Post by sitkack »

hooloovoo_zoo wrote: post #282
philwelch wrote: post #239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The NYT didn’t have to be right, they only had to sell newspapers and clicks. The burden of evidence for publishing a hit piece is much lower than that for making an actual business decision. I’m no fan of Boeing but the truth is, betting your entire business requires a much higher burden of proof than journalism does.

"The NYT didn’t have to be right, they only had to sell newspapers and clicks." This is totally wrong. The New York Times depends on its reputation for accuracy.

That certainly didn't play when Judith Miller [1] given the bull horn at the NYT allowed the Bush Administration to march us directly into a bullshit war. They are indirectly responsible for the deaths of millions.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judith_Miller

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#597

Post by inferiorhuman »

WalterBright wrote: post #576
inferiorhuman wrote: post #570

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know, sounds too simple to be true. But it is No, it's not. So here's some context. Boeing installed known not-to-spec structural components on the NG. Boeing installed known to fail prematurely slat tracks on the NG and 737 MAX. Boeing installed (probably known) not-to-spec pickle forks in the NG and 737 MAX. Boeing falsified repair documentation for an Air Canada 787. Oh, and of course, Boeing hid any mention of…

> As the Ethiopian crew found out: it can't. Whatever you read about that is simply wrong. (I've seen a LOT of misinformation in popular print about this.) You're correct that the hand cranks were unusable. But the electric thumb switches WERE usable and were pointed out in the AD. Note that the crews of BOTH the LA and EA crashes had already used the thumb switches to restore normal trim, the LA crew did so 25 times…

Whatever you read about that is simply wrong. (I've seen a LOT of misinformation in popular print about this.) You're correct that the hand cranks were unusable. But the electric thumb switches WERE usable and were pointed out in the AD.

And if you enable the electric trim switches on a 737 MAX you get MCAS activation. MCAS, of course, trims faster than the switches. Using the electric switches is fighting a losing battle (look at the graphs of trim input vs output). How are you supposed to fly the plane when you can't trim the stabilizer?

Look at the graphs from the Indonesian report. The pilots were countering with trim up button presses and MCAS still managed to take the trim to a severe AND position.

Look at the graphs from the Ethiopian report. You'll see a long gap where the electric trim was disabled (leaving the pilots with no way to trim the stabilizer). Outside that gap you'll see an automatic (MCAS) AND command with no change in trim and a couple ANU clicks from the pilots with no resulting change in trim.

No guessing required. Follow the training, which is supposed to be a "memory item", meaning they weren't supposed to need to consult a checklist nor dig through anything nor guess.

And what memory items were they supposed to have in mind? Keeping in mind MCAS presented counter to how Boeing defines runaway trim.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#598

Post by inferiorhuman »

WalterBright wrote: post #573
bumby wrote: post #563

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t disagree but there are clear hierarchical criteria on how these hazards should be addressed. The reason behind engineering mitigation being favored is because they make the less reliable procedural mitigations moot (I.e., they improve the overall reliability by removing one of the points of failure, in this case the pilot). Forgoing engineering mitigations in favor of procedural fixes goes against good engine…

> I can understand if the AD was intended as a short term fix but I would question the rationale if it were considered a long term solution It was not, Boeing at the time was working on a solution. Regardless, however, the pilots MUST know how to deal with runaway trim. This was true before MCAS, and is true after. It was true on the 757 (I spend 3 years working on the design of the 757 stab trim system). The cutoff…

It is not acceptable that pilots were unaware of the cutoff switches. It is unacceptable that MAX pilots did not read, understand, and remember the Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX crews.

The Ethiopian crew tried the cutout switches and found they couldn't trim the airplane with the hand cranks because Boeing lied. How is that a pilot training issue?

But there were other contributing factors in the crashes that must be dealt with.

A Boeing employee concern trolling over pilot training is pretty rich considering that Boeing knowingly hid crucial details from pilots.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#599

Post by skocznymroczny »

lokedhs wrote: post #296
smileysteve wrote: post #291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It also seems like most people in the US only cares about ticket price, Ryan Air, EasyJet, and other discount airlines suggest that Europe cares significantly more about price.

That is true. And these airlines never show up in the top half of the airline rankings. However, when flying these airlines you don't expect good service, and no one is going to proclaim that “flying is always a bad experience” because these airlines exist.

Personally, I have good experience with those airlines. As long as you are aware of the rules (print your boarding pass at home or use mobile boarding pass, limited carry-on luggage, usually doesn't go to the main airport) it's a good experience. Airplanes are relatively new, they are clean inside and the staff is friendly.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#600

Post by stjohnswarts »

jefe_ wrote: post #114

Boeing was still promising end of year FAA certification for 737 Max as recently as early December. Around that time, they had a spokesperson on CNBC who was asked directly how the outstanding steps (which indicated February at the earliest) aligned with their end of year statements and the position was essentially, 'we've been saying end of year and end of year could still happen.' When your brand is suffering a cri…

It really is a shame that it takes the deaths of hundreds to even budge the needle on getting back to being an engineering company rather than profit is #1 company and quality a distant 3rd. They should be ashamed to not have started from scratch on a new optimized plane design because they literally sell their planes for DECADES and almost have a captive market. Quarterly earnings focused governance killed those people as surely as faulty design.
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