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Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

reuters.com

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Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#571

Post by duelingjello »

cattlemansgold wrote: post #232
jefe_ wrote: post #114

Boeing was still promising end of year FAA certification for 737 Max as recently as early December. Around that time, they had a spokesperson on CNBC who was asked directly how the outstanding steps (which indicated February at the earliest) aligned with their end of year statements and the position was essentially, 'we've been saying end of year and end of year could still happen.' When your brand is suffering a cri…

The Starliner mission was a test. You wouldn't have 100% confidence that a test would be executed flawlessly. The purpose of the test is to find flaws in the system, and that's exactly what they did.

They’ll run remember to run PTP or NTP before launch next time, won’t they?

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#572

Post by pizlonator »

ilamont wrote: post #362
pizlonator wrote: post #215

So I read somewhere than Muilenburg was the only engineer in the Boeing C suite. There were no pilots in the C suite. And this was part of the problem. The new CEO has a degree in accounting. I bet he’ll do great.

Four out of 15 of Boeing's Executive Council have engineering degrees. https://www.boeing.com/company/bios/

Ok fine I’ll play.

Having an engineering degree and being an engineer aren’t exactly the same thing. Like, Colbert has an engineering degree to do with “information systems”. Deal’s resume is mostly about supply chains. Hyslop gets to call himself an engineer, so ok, that’s one. Uddanwadiker is an engineer, but IT.

So there is one actual aero engineer in the C suite. I exaggerated (it’s the internet so what fun it is to exaggerate) but not by much. Point is, these people aren’t the dream team I’d pick to design airplanes.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#573

Post by WalterBright »

bumby wrote: post #563
WalterBright wrote: post #560

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The problem with this standpoint is that procedural fixes are the least preferable way of managing a hazardous condition. The way to make things safe is to address ALL points in the zipper that led to the accident. That includes the pilot error aspects.

I don’t disagree but there are clear hierarchical criteria on how these hazards should be addressed. The reason behind engineering mitigation being favored is because they make the less reliable procedural mitigations moot (I.e., they improve the overall reliability by removing one of the points of failure, in this case the pilot). Forgoing engineering mitigations in favor of procedural fixes goes against good engine…

> I can understand if the AD was intended as a short term fix but I would question the rationale if it were considered a long term solution

It was not, Boeing at the time was working on a solution.

Regardless, however, the pilots MUST know how to deal with runaway trim. This was true before MCAS, and is true after. It was true on the 757 (I spend 3 years working on the design of the 757 stab trim system). The cutoff switches are prominently within easy reach on the center console for very good reason, 40 years before MCAS.

It is not acceptable that pilots were unaware of the cutoff switches. It is unacceptable that MAX pilots did not read, understand, and remember the Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX crews.

Similarly, airplane engineers work hard to keep the airplane from catching fire. But pilots also MUST learn to properly use the airplane's fire suppression systems. Most of pilot training consists of learning emergency procedures.

It's why airplanes still have pilots, instead of using automation instead.

Boeing still deserves blame for the flawed MCAS implementation. But there were other contributing factors in the crashes that must be dealt with.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#574

Post by dmix »

CharlesColeman wrote: post #300
dmix wrote: post #107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s funny how people treats unions as panaceas to all problems. It’s strange to present them as some sort of solution in this case, where there was widespread engineering and management cultural issues, and would therefore somehow have prevented major air disasters. Workers rights and forcing higher wages might be great for the working poor and it might actually make economic sense in certain niche industries where…

> It’s funny how people treats unions as panaceas to all problems. > But it is not some grand solution to high level engineering problems caused by stupid cost saving priorities made by C-class executives and other weakness in quality down the line. They're not a panacea to all problems, but they could be the solution or part of a solution to many of them. In this case the "stupid cost saving priorities made by C-cla…

> In this case the "stupid cost saving priorities made by C-class executives" were the major issue, and how do you deal with that? You increase the power of other, non-management stakeholders. Unions are the way you do that for labor.

This to me sounds like that old regex joke, now you have two problems.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#575

Post by camel_gopher »

FrojoS wrote: post #378
sbuttgereit wrote: post #247

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I"m not completely sure that's the case (and to be fair, I've not been following Starliner closely, so could well be wrong). There are tests to prove out ideas during the course of development, but then there are tests which would perhaps be more accurately called "demonstrations"; where you're not trying to find flaws and refine your designs, but rather prove that you're [insert thing-name you're proving here] actua…

You are correct. The SpaceX version of this exact same test was literally called „Demo-1“. Ironically Boeing called it „Boeing Orbital Flight Test“. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Orbital_Flight_Test

Boeing boefted that one

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#576

Post by WalterBright »

inferiorhuman wrote: post #570
WalterBright wrote: post #538

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know, sounds too simple to be true. But it is: Boeing Emergency Airworthiness Directive "Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are mov…

I know, sounds too simple to be true. But it is No, it's not. So here's some context. Boeing installed known not-to-spec structural components on the NG. Boeing installed known to fail prematurely slat tracks on the NG and 737 MAX. Boeing installed (probably known) not-to-spec pickle forks in the NG and 737 MAX. Boeing falsified repair documentation for an Air Canada 787. Oh, and of course, Boeing hid any mention of…

> As the Ethiopian crew found out: it can't.

Whatever you read about that is simply wrong. (I've seen a LOT of misinformation in popular print about this.) You're correct that the hand cranks were unusable. But the electric thumb switches WERE usable and were pointed out in the AD.

Note that the crews of BOTH the LA and EA crashes had already used the thumb switches to restore normal trim, the LA crew did so 25 times.

> best guess

No guessing required. Follow the training, which is supposed to be a "memory item", meaning they weren't supposed to need to consult a checklist nor dig through anything nor guess.

I am not a pilot, but I would not consider myself fit to fly unless I knew by memory what every single switch in the cockpit does, ESPECIALLY the ones prominently located within easy reach. You can bet it's not the infotainment system.

For damn sure I would read every Emergency Airworthiness Directive for the airplane I'm the pilot of, most especially one issued in response to a crash.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#577

Post by missosoup »

ativzzz wrote: post #336
asperous wrote: post #326

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a programmer who got an MBA, I can tell you that in my cohort there were absolutely extremely smart super stars who put the time into everything they do and have the talent to make good decisions and have the empathy to be good managers. There were also people who tried their best but their judgement was clearly lacking. My cohort has Civil Engineers, Materials engineers, Physicians, Finance, Accountants.. and als…

The current hacker news meme is that bad management of any kind is due to MBAs, where in reality a bad manager is a bad manager and an MBA has nothing to do with it.

MBA teaches bad management.

MBA is a set of methodologies that are hilariously unfit for purpose unless your business is about making widgets in large volume.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#578

Post by WalterBright »

inferiorhuman wrote: post #566
WalterBright wrote: post #560

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The problem with this standpoint is that procedural fixes are the least preferable way of managing a hazardous condition. The way to make things safe is to address ALL points in the zipper that led to the accident. That includes the pilot error aspects.

The way to make things safe is to address ALL points in the zipper that led to the accident. That includes the pilot error aspects. So how do you propose training against an unfinished product? Boeing still hasn't given the FAA a completed software package to evaluate. At the time of the 737 MAX crashes there were, what? two? 737 MAX simulators, and none of them emulated MCAS or even the forces required to crank the…

> MCAS activation is not, and was not, a runaway stabilizer situation.

It presented as a runaway stab trim. Repeatedly coming on and driving the nose down is runaway trim. No two ways about it. And the usual, standard, runaway trim procedure would stop it.

> they had a third set of eyes that could spend time going through reams of documentation

From my reading of that incident, nothing of the sort happened. The 3rd pilot simply reached forward and flipped off the cutoff switches. The crew landed safely and went on with their day. Nobody bothered to inform the next crew flying that same airplane.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#579

Post by WoodenChair »

munk-a wrote: post #233
pizlonator wrote: post #215

So I read somewhere than Muilenburg was the only engineer in the Boeing C suite. There were no pilots in the C suite. And this was part of the problem. The new CEO has a degree in accounting. I bet he’ll do great.

At some point we (society at large) are going to realize these fluffy c-level people are toxic and remove value from companies - then, ideally, we'll move back to a default of promoting internally.

> ...then, ideally, we’ll move back to a default of promoting internally.

Muilenburg was promoted internally.

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